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A political economy environment typified by political corruption, poor implementation of 
economic policy rules and weak policy coordination, can alter the fiscal behaviour of 
government and how it interacts with the monetary policy of the Central Bank. This study 
solved and estimated a Small Open Economy New Keynesian Dynamic Stochastic General 
Equilibrium model with a modified fiscal bloc. This is done in order to examine fiscal and 
monetary policy interactions under alternative assumptions of a rent-seeking government that 
follows discretionary policies and where no economic policy coordination exists. Its specific 
objectives were to assess the nature of fiscal policy interactions with monetary policy in 
Nigeria; examine the transmission effect of the policy interactions on output and inflation, and 
to investigate the optimal fiscal and monetary policy mix that guarantees economic stability in 
Nigeria. A first-order Taylor approximation method was used to solve the model around its 
deterministic steady state. Thereafter the Bayesian method, specifically the Metropolis-
Hastings algorithm was used to estimate the parameters of the model. In order to derive the 
optimal combination of fiscal and monetary policy, the Dynare computational routines on 
Ramsey policy and Discretionary policy were employed. The results from this study revealed 
that both fiscal policy and monetary policy act as strong substitutes. This highlights the 
possibility of conflicts between fiscal and monetary decisions. Secondly, the overall impact of 
policy interaction negatively affects both inflation and output. This corroborates the lack of 
coordination between both policies. Moreover, it implies that stabilisation policies may be 
inadequate in guiding the Nigerian economy. Thirdly, the results on the optimal fiscal-
monetary combination point out that politicians and bureaucrats in government should commit 
to policy rules. At the same time, they should implement policies that enhance the welfare of 
the entire citizens, not just a subset of the citizens. In addition, the study recommends among 
others that fiscal and monetary policies should be harmonised. For instance, the Central Bank 
of Nigeria and the Federal Ministry of Finance can adopt the same economic model and 
assumption in planning and forecasting policy targets. 
 
 











1.1   Background of the Study 
Fiscal and monetary policies are the two most significant tools available to policymakers, in 
guiding an economy, towards attaining desired macroeconomic objectives which include high 
and sustainable economic growth, price stability, employment and viable external balance. The 
government employs fiscal tools such as spending and taxes to provide public goods, to 
redistribute income and stabilise aggregate demand. The Central Bank also uses interest rate, 
exchange rate and money supply to stabilise the price level, output and the financial system. 
Both policies are used for the short-term stabilisation of the economy which guarantees 
medium to long-term outcomes in growth and welfare (World Bank, 2014). Based on their 
importance, governments and central banks, the fiscal and monetary authorities respectively, 
are constantly faced with the task of setting the appropriate policy targets that get the economy 
closest to its optimal state. 
However, there is a lack of consensus on the most appropriate manner that policymakers can 
utilize fiscal and monetary policies (Mundell, 1962; Wren-Lewis, 2011). This concern, in 
specific terms, whether the instruments of fiscal and monetary policies are independent or 
intertwined in their impact on the economy. Debates in the academic and policy-making circle, 
between the Keynesian and Monetarist schools of economic thought, implicitly posits fiscal 
and monetary policies as separable in nature, since it centred on the importance of each policy, 
relative to the other (Hetzel, 2013). This argument is premised on the notion that the 
importance and macroeconomic effect of either policy can be isolated from the other (Hallett, 
Libich and Stehlik, 2011). But in the literature, inquiry into this debate remains inconclusive 




and fiscal, that an economy should adopt (Mundell, 1962; Ajayi, 1974; Ajisafe and Folorunso, 
2002; Musa, Asare and Gulumbe, 2013). 
Policy discourse has, therefore, evolved into the proposition that fiscal and monetary policies 
are interdependent rather than separate (Niemann and Hagen, 2008). This proposition borders 
on the view that ongoing interactions exist between both policies. Policymakers belonging to 
this school of thought usually canvass that fiscal and monetary instruments should be combined 
in addressing any macroeconomic issue. The central argument, therefore, is to mix or interact 
fiscal and monetary policies since externalities are assumed to exist between the two policies, 
such that a change in one influences the stance of the other and its overall macroeconomic 
effect (Niemann and Hagen, 2008). In other words, the successful outcome or effectiveness of 
fiscal (monetary) policy depends on the stance of (monetary) fiscal policy. For instance, rising 
and uncontrolled budget deficits can constrain the ability of the central bank to control inflation 
rates. This is because rising budget deficit can induce the government to resort to seignorage 
revenue from the central bank. The government, in this instance, can pressure the central bank 
to print new money in order to finance its fiscal shortfall. Money is consequently injected into 
the economy and in turn, the apex bank responds by using restrictive monetary policy to control 
the resulting inflation. 
 
The issue of fiscal and monetary policy interactions, therefore, has come to fore, arising from 
numerous theoretical and empirical contributions. Tinbergen (1952) argued that fiscal and 
monetary policies should be considered as a coherent entity and separately. Similarly, Theil 
(1957) opined that policy authorities should combine fiscal and monetary instruments in the 
right proportion in order to simultaneously attain desired policy outcomes. In the modern 
literature, Sargent and Wallace (1981), Leeper (1991), Sims (1994), Leeper and Leith (2015), 
highlighted the need for fiscal and monetary interactions in order to determine price level. They 
showed that the effectiveness of policy instruments of the Central Bank- to stabilise and control 
inflation- depends to a large extent, on the fiscal stance of the government. Fiscal and monetary 
policy interaction is also relevant in its impact on medium to long-term outcomes such as 
public debt (Cochrane, 2001; Niemann and Hagen, 2008) and economic welfare (Beningno 





Furthermore, economic events like the formation of the European Monetary Union and the 
aftermath of the global financial crisis has sparked interest in the issue of fiscal and monetary 
policy interaction (Petreveski, 2013; Reserve Bank of India, 2013). The European Monetary 
Union (EMU), for instance, is modelled as fielding an economic policy game between several 
national fiscal authorities and a single central bank, the European Central Bank. The union's 
only apex bank is bound by the Maastricht Treaty to focus on price stability while the various 
fiscal authorities are subject to the Pact of Stability and Growth that sets limits on debt and 
deficit ratios. Both policymakers within the union, therefore, are expected to act together. 
 
In the same vein, the global financial crisis also underscores the essence of the interrelation 
between the government and the Central Bank. In the aftermath of the crisis and the recession 
following, some advanced economies opted for expansive fiscal policy. In this regard, 
policymakers resorted to applying fiscal instruments in the form of bailouts and stimulus, due 
to the ineffectiveness of monetary policy to stimulate the economy at the Zero Lower Bound 
rate. The United States, in particular, injected US$125 billion in implementing the Economic 
Stimulus Act and US$787 billion under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (Kliem, 
Kriowoluzky and Sarferaz, 2015). The expansionary nature of fiscal stimuli has posed a 
challenge in the manner that inflationary and debt sustainability pressures mounted from the 
accompanying rise in deficits and debts. Monetary authorities are therefore concerned with the 
looming effect of government expanding stance on their ability to stabilise the price level. This 
is because government deficits and debts have the potential to constrain the central banks from 
achieving their primary objective of controlling the price level (Sargent and Wallace, 1981; 
Leeper, 1991). It is then important to find out how to fix the right monetary targets that 
complement such impending bleak fiscal reality (Leeper, 2013).  
 
The concern for fiscal and monetary policy interaction in Nigeria stems from the need for 
policy alignment between the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) and the Federal Ministry of 
Finance (FMF). The absence of coordination between both policy authorities can constrain the 
effectiveness of their policies and is a potential source of instability and lower macroeconomic 
performance. There is evidence of weak coordination of fiscal and monetary policy in Nigeria, 




(FLAC) and the Monetary and Fiscal Policy Coordination Committee (MFPCC) (Englama, 
Tarawalie and Ahortor, 2013; Oboh, 2017). The measuring rod of coordination between fiscal 
and monetary policy is when both policies have similar stances in the instrument of budget 
balances and real interest rate i.e. expansionary fiscal/expansionary monetary and tight 
fiscal/tight monetary (Rothenberg, 2004). Available facts, however, show that over the period 
1970-2015, fiscal and monetary policies were uncoordinated across 25 years but 
complementary in 21 years. This depicts the weak form of policy coordination between both 
policies (see section 3.5)   
 
A second argument on the need to study fiscal and monetary policy interaction is to help guide 
the design of a consistent set of policies that will consolidate the ongoing Economic Growth 
and Recovery Plan of the Federal Government at reviving the Nigeria economy after a bout of 
stagflation. Data from the National Bureau of Statistics (2016) reveal that the economy slipped 
into a recession after it contracted by -0.36 percent and -2.06 percent in 2016Q1 and 2016Q2. 
At the same time, the Inflation rate in Nigeria rose from an average of 12.24 percent over the 
period 1996-2016 to 17.6 and 18.10 percent in August and October 2016. The central bank, 
therefore, responded by tightening its stance. It raised the Monetary Policy Rate from 11 to 12 
percent in March 2016. This was further increased to 14 percent in July 2016, in order to rein 
in on the rising inflationary trend. The Federal Ministry of Finance, on the other hand, pursued 
an easy fiscal stance. In 2016Q1 and 2016Q2, the budget deficit stood at N548.42 billion and 
N1090.96 billion, respectively. Policy analysts deduced that the twin problems of negative 
economic growth rate and rising inflation were aggravated by the conflicting and 
uncoordinated stances of both fiscal and monetary policy (Central Bank of Nigeria, 2017). 
Therefore, it becomes necessary to complement both policies in the right direction in order to 
curtail future recessionary episodes and consolidate the gain of the current recovery plan. 
 
The interaction between fiscal policy and monetary policy in Nigeria is examined within a 
New Keynesian Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (NK DSGE) framework. This 
framework combines standard Keynesian assumptions such as price stickiness, imperfect 
competition and the use of stabilisation policies, with the traditions of microeconomic 




macroeconomic models are usually built by aggregating the behaviour of rational 
microeconomic agents, i.e. households and firms. The NK DSGE model, therefore, considers 
the simultaneous economic interaction among households, firms, a Central Bank that sets 
monetary policy and a government that fixes fiscal policy, under the assumptions that 
optimising agents form rational expectations and the Central Bank and government each 
commit to policy rules among others. 
Stemming from the preceding paragraphs, this thesis empirically characterises the existing 
nature of policy interaction in Nigeria. The thesis also gauges the effect of the policy 
interactions on output and inflation in Nigeria. The study, by implication, also obtains the 
optimal fiscal and monetary mix that should enhance the outcome of both policies and the 
overall macroeconomy.  
1.2 Statement of Research Problem 
This study investigates fiscal and monetary policy interactions in a small open economy, New 
Keynesian Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (NK DSGE) model where certain 
theoretical assumptions are altered. Several empirical studies have examined fiscal-monetary 
policy interactions within a DSGE model (Muscatelli, Tirelli and Trecroci, 2005; Davig and 
Leeper, 2009; Algozhina, 2012; Cekin, 2013; Gilksber, 2016; Chen, 2017). The DSGE 
framework provides an appropriate setting to investigate policy interactions. This is because it 
assumes ongoing interdependencies among several economic agents that includes households, 
firms, central bank and the government. Furthermore, the DSGE-based method is premised on 
theoretical assumptions that are relevant for policy analysis. It is, therefore, immuned from the 
susceptibility of other estimation techniques to the Lucas’ critique. However, a fallout is that 
some assumptions used in the DSGE models are unsuitable in the context of developing 
economies (Vangu, 2014). Some of these unsuitable assumptions pertain to the behaviour of 
government, that is, the fiscal policy bloc of the model. Several studies examining fiscal-
monetary policy interactions, in this respect, have assumed rather unrealistically that 
government is benevolent and at the same time, commits to policy rules.  
Empirical evidences such as the Corruption Perception Index (2016), World Governance 




conventional assumptions do not hold for a developing economy such as Nigeria. This study, 
therefore, abstracts from these conventional assumptions. The conventional assumption of the 
fiscal sector is then modified in line with political economy literature such that, the government 
is posited to be neither benevolent nor does it commit to a policy rule (Persson, 2001; Fragetta 
and Kirsanova, 2010; Miller, 2016). The government, however, is assumed to have rent-
seeking tendencies and prefers to use policy discretion in maximising the welfare of a subset 
of the society. The modifications to the fiscal bloc can also be used to capture the weak 
coordination between fiscal and monetary policies in Nigeria (Englama, Tarawalie and 
Ahortor, 2013). It is, therefore, needful to investigate the existing policy interactions when 
alternative fiscal realities are explicitly modelled. 
This study is, therefore, related to empirical studies that assess fiscal and monetary policy 
interactions in Nigeria (Chuku, 2010; Okafor, 2013; Musa et al., 2013). This study nevertheless 
differs from them by adopting the DSGE method. However, this study is most related to 
Adegboye (2015). His study is one of the few studies that investigate fiscal and monetary 
policy interaction in Nigeria, using the New Keynesian DSGE framework. This thesis differs 
from Adegboye (2015) because the study considers fiscal and monetary policy interaction in 
the form of a fiscal rule in government spending and a Taylor rule, but leaves out the possibility 
of policy discretion and rent-seeking which is more related to government’s fiscal behaviour 
in Nigeria.  Secondly, the work was silent about capturing the poor coordination that exists 
between fiscal and monetary policies in Nigeria, since there is empirical evidence of weak 
coordination in Nigeria (Englama, Tarawalie and Ahortor, 2013).  
  
This study has consequently identified four research gaps to fill. First, there are few studies on 
fiscal and monetary policy interaction in Nigeria. Second, few studies have applied the DSGE 
method in Nigeria, even fewer are works that have used the DSGE technique to analyse fiscal 
and monetary policy interaction. This thesis contributes to the sparse literature on dynamic 
general equilibrium modelling in Nigeria which only a few researchers such as Alege (2008); 
Olayeni (2009); Adebiyi and Mordi (2010); Alege (2012) and Adegboye (2015) among others, 
have ventured into. Third, this work borrows from the political economy contributions of 
Persson (2001) and Miller (2016) to study fiscal and monetary policy interactions in a DSGE 




political economy reality of Nigeria. Fourthly, an interaction variable is constructed in order 
to explicitly define fiscal-monetary policy interactions.  
1.3 Research Questions 
Following the need to examine the fiscal and monetary policy interaction under alternative 
assumptions of a rent-seeking government that follows discretionary policies and absence of 
economic policy coordination, this study seeks to answer the following questions: 
i.   To what extent does fiscal policy interact with monetary policy in Nigeria? 
ii.  What is the transmission effect of the policy interaction on output and inflation in Nigeria? 
iii. What is the optimal fiscal and monetary policy mix that guarantees output and inflation  
      stability in Nigeria? 
1.4 Research Objectives 
The broad objective of this thesis is to examine the interactions between fiscal and monetary 
policy under alternative assumptions. The specific objectives are to:  
i.   assess the extent to which fiscal policy interacts with monetary policy in Nigeria; 
ii.  examine the transmission effect of the policy interactions on output and inflation in Nigeria;  
     and 
iii. investigate the optimal fiscal and monetary policy mix for output and inflation stability in 
     Nigeria. 
1.5 Research Hypotheses 
The study tests the following hypotheses stated in both null and the alternative: 
H01:  Fiscal policy has no interaction with monetary policy in Nigeria  
H11:  Fiscal policy has interaction with monetary policy in Nigeria  
H02:  There is no transmission effect of the policy interaction on output and inflation in Nigeria  
H12:  There is a transmission effect of the policy interaction on output and inflation in Nigeria 




         Nigeria 
H13:  There is an optimal fiscal and monetary policy mix for output and inflation stability in  
         Nigeria 
1.6 Scope of the Study 
This thesis runs on two central themes: the impact of fiscal behaviour on monetary decisions 
and the optimal mix of fiscal and monetary policy in Nigeria. First, the study displayed some 
empirical facts on fiscal-monetary policy interaction in Nigeria using relevant fiscal and 
monetary policy targets and instrument variables such as budget deficits, public debt, money 
supply, interest rates and inflation rates. 
The work then undertakes both positive and normative analysis. In the positive analysis, this 
thesis considers whether and how fiscal policy variables such as government spending, budget 
deficit, debt influences the Central Bank’s goal of low and stable inflation. In case of the 
normative study, the work draws from literature on macroeconomic policy design to conduct 
some sensitive policy analysis in order to determine optimal fiscal and monetary policy mix.  
The study covers the period from 1961Q1 to 2016Q4. This period is regarded as sufficient in 
the sample for analysing fiscal and monetary policy interaction in Nigeria. The study period is 
also characterised by several shifts in both policies that are necessary for interaction between 
them. These include changes in government that can influence fiscal behaviour and the period 
of no independence and operational independence for the Central Bank of Nigeria. 
  
1.7 Significance of the Study 
The attempt to examine the extent of interaction between fiscal policy and monetary policy, 
and the optimal manner that fiscal and monetary policy should interact, is germane on two 
grounds. First, it can be taken as a template to empirically guide the interaction between both 
policy institutions in the future, so that policymakers can formulate and plan macroeconomic 
targets such as inflation rates, debt levels and growth rates for the Nigerian economy. 
Secondly, policymakers can also identify and quantify the transmission of fiscal actions on 




unexplored literature on fiscal-monetary policy interactions in Nigeria, especially within the 
context of modelling the fiscal behaviour of government using alternative assumptions and the 
application of the Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium framework.  
1.8 Method of Analysis 
The study, first, employs a-theoretical methods to explain the long-term trend and derive 
business cycle properties of relevant fiscal and monetary policy variables. This is in the chapter 
where trend analysis and preliminary stylised facts on policy interactions in Nigeria are 
generated. 
This study then goes ahead to adopt the dynamic general equilibrium framework based on the 
New Keynesian school of thought in order to address the set objectives. The procedure used to 
analyse the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model used includes the following: (1) 
write down the model (2) Derive the system of equilibrium conditions of the model (3) solve 
for the steady state (4) calibrate the parameters (5) solve the model by log-linear approximation 
(6) Estimate the deep parameters of the model using the Bayesian method and finally, (7) 
simulate the model with necessary counter-factual policy experiments performed. 
1.9 Outline of the Study 
This work is divided into six Chapters. Chapter one introduces the subject matter, the research 
problem is defined in this chapter, questions of the thesis and strategies to answering these 
questions are stated.  Chapter two reviews the literature on Fiscal and Monetary Policy 
Interactions. In this chapter, conceptual, theoretical, methodological and empirical reviews are 
presented; research gaps stemming from the literature are also identified. In chapter three, some 
stylized facts on fiscal-monetary policy interactions in Nigeria are illustrated. The study's 
theoretical framework and methodology make up Chapter four, while the estimation results are 
presented in Chapter five and finally, conclusions, policy implication of findings and 










LITERATURE REVIEW  
This chapter provides a comprehensive outline of developments in the literature on the 
interactions between fiscal and monetary policy. The chapter is divided into four major 
sections: Conceptual, Theoretical, Methodological and Empirical. In the conceptual review, 
definitional issues surrounding Fiscal and Monetary policy interactions are examined. Under 
the theoretical review, the main theories underlying the economic policy interactions are 
outlined and critiqued. For the methodological review, the essentials techniques of estimation 
are mentioned and evaluated.  Finally, several empirical findings regarding fiscal-monetary 
policy interactions are enumerated in the empirical review. 
2.1 Review of Definitional Issues 
2.1.1 Fiscal and Monetary Policy Interaction 
The idea of interactions between Fiscal and Monetary policy springs from the assumption that 
both policies are interrelated. This idea reflects in the writing of Tinbergen (1952) who argued 
that economic policy should be considered as a coherent entity that is devoid of any form of 
isolation. Fiscal and Monetary policies are, in this regard, interrelated in their impact on each 
other’s target. This is premised on the ground that there are externalities or spill-over between 
the instruments of both policies such that a change in one influences the stance of the other 
(Niemann and Hagen, 2008).  
 
Two channels are involved in explaining the existing externalities or spill-over between both 
policies. The first channel runs from the influence of fiscal policy on the instruments and 
targets of monetary policy. This channel essentially considers the impact of government 
expansive stance in deficit and debt, on nominal variables such as interest rate and price level. 




from the central bank. This means that the government can put pressure on the central bank to 
print new money in order to finance its fiscal shortfall. The central bank can also finance these 
deficits by purchasing government securities through the open market operation. These deficit 
financing methods inject money into the economy and in turn, the apex bank responds by using 
restrictive monetary policy to control the resulting inflation. Furthermore, increased deficit 
spending and new debt issuance raise the rate of interest, when the supply of government 
securities increases which lowers the price and moves the interest rate upward. The second 
channel concerns the externality that runs from monetary policy to fiscal policy. The rate of 
interest affects the real value and sustainability of government debt (Niemann and Hagen, 
2008). The variability of the price level also impacts on public finances as it makes it difficult 
to predict and plan for the level of public finances (Algozhina, 2012). 
 
Fiscal and monetary policies are also interacting in their overall macroeconomic impact. The 
Investment Saving- Liquidity Preference and Money Supply (IS-LM) models, for example, 
show that the fiscal and monetary policy instruments are interacting in the goods and money 
markets in order to influence aggregate output and interest rate. Theil (1957) also assume that 
a central policymaker possesses all available policy instruments and can simultaneously attain 
desired policy outcomes by combining these instruments in the right proportion. The works of 
Sargent and Wallace (1981); Cochrane (2001) and Niemann and Hagen (2008) shows that the 
instruments of fiscal and monetary policy are interacting to determine the price level, debt level 
and economic growth.  
 
Fiscal and monetary policies can by nature, interact as substitutes or in a complementary 
manner in their effect on the aggregate economy. Both policies interact as substitutes when an 
expansionary fiscal (monetary) policy is countered by contracting monetary (fiscal) policy and 
as complements, when an expansionary fiscal (monetary) policy is accompanied by a 
corresponding expansionary monetary (fiscal) policy stance, i.e. they offset and support each 
other in the stabilisation of the economy. Another nature of interaction between both policies 
borders on Leeper (1991) classification of active and passive regimes. Both policies can 




policy decision without regards to the path of government finance while a passive authority 
will respond to changes in the state of fiscal debt (Leeper, 1991). 
 
2.1.2 Working definition of Fiscal and Monetary Policy Interaction 
Based on the preceding section, fiscal and monetary policy interaction is defined as the 
interplay between both policies with resulting impact on each other’s instruments and on 
macroeconomic targets or outcomes. 
 
Some assumptions guiding this working definition include: 
1.   There are interdependencies between both fiscal and monetary policy;  
2. There is a decentralised policy environment such that the two authorities- Central Bank and 
Ministry of Finance- are respectively in charge of setting monetary policy and fiscal policy; 
and 
3.   Policy externalities exist between both policies such that changes in one policy induces 
changes in the other policy. 
 
2.2 Theoretical Review of Literature 
This sub-section shows the underlying macroeconomic theories on the interactions between 
the fiscal and monetary policies. A background which summarises the major schools of thought 
on economic policy is presented. Thereafter, specific theories on fiscal and monetary policy 
interaction are outlined. They include the Monetarist Arithmetic and the Fiscal Theory of the 
Price Level. 
2.2.1  Macroeconomic Theories up to the New Keynesian School of Thought 
The occurrence of the Great Depression of the 1930s in the United States and Europe sparked 
the paradigm shift from the classical to the Keynesian school of economic thought (Jahan, 
Mahmud and Papageorgiou, 2014). The classical school reflected primarily the works of Adam 
Smith and David Ricardo. First, they focused on the underlying factors that spawn and sustain 
economic growth. They postulated that an economy is able to reach its potential output or full 




potential output, the economy can re-adjust on its own in the long run through the price 
mechanism. This precludes any form of government policy. The re-adjustment capacity of the 
economy demonstrates their liberalist tradition. Essentially, they advocated for minimal 
government intervention since the economy is self-correcting. Wages and prices are also 
regarded as flexible and determined by the price mechanism.  
John Maynard Keynes in his book, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, 
differed in his prescription to tackling the Great Depression. Keynes drifted from the 
Classicals’ emphasis on aggregate supply to the concept of aggregate demand. The Classicals, 
going by the Say’s law, correlated the state of the economy with the level of the aggregate 
supply curve. Keynes, in a different manner, posited that the changes in aggregate demand can 
distort the actual levels of output from its potential level, creating gaps.  Keynes also focused 
on the short run, he believed that contrary to the Classicals the economy may never attain full 
employment in the long run, because “in the long run we are all dead.” The economy may be 
unable to correct itself because prices are sticky in the short run. Keynes, therefore, advocated 
for the intervention of the government, specifically the use of fiscal and of monetary policy, 
which are termed stabilisation policies, to direct the economy to its level of potential output. 
The monetarists led by Milton Friedman link in a direct proportionate manner, changes in the 
money supply to changes in the level of output. They opine that only money matters in an 
economy (Jahan and Papageorgiou, 2014). They uphold the liberalist view of the Classicals 
and likewise argue for minimal intervention of government in the economy. In this respect, 
they avoid the use of Keynesian stabilisation policy. Fiscal policy is neutral in its impact due 
to its crowding-out effect, while the lags associated with monetary policy can be long and 
destabilising. They advocate the implementation of a monetary rule in money supply such that 
the central bank increases the money supply at a fixed annual rate. 
The New Classicals build on the ideas of the Classicals. They focus on the supply side of the 
economy, flexible prices and the ability of the economy to correct itself. The New Classicals 
propose the use of sophisticated mathematical economic models with rational agents who 
desire to maximise their preferences (Hoover, 2008). This school also centres its analysis on 




the future based on the information available to them, and that they act on those expectations.  
The New Keynesians adopts the conventional argument of sticky prices and the effectiveness 
of stabilisation policy in returning an economy to the level of the potential output and also 
incorporates the aggregate supply bloc into their model. They also adopt a mathematical model 
of the aggregate economy built upon microeconomic foundations (Mankiw, 2008). 
2.2.2    Models of Fiscal and Monetary Policy Interactions 
The major theories explaining fiscal-monetary policy interaction are presented and reviewed 
by highlighting their similarities and differences, strengths and weaknesses as well as existing 
gaps. These theories underlying fiscal-monetary policy interaction are the IS-LM model, the 
Monetarist Arithmetic (Sargent and Wallace, 1981; McCallum, 1984) and the Fiscal Theory 
of Price Level (Leeper, 1991; Sims (1994, 1999); Woodford (1995, 1996, 2001). These 
theories, especially the Monetarist Arithmetic and Fiscal Theory of Price Level, are set within 
the mathematical model and rational expectation framework of the New Classical and New 
Keynesian schools of economic thought.  
 
a. The Investment Saving and Liquidity Preference – Money Supply (IS-LM) model 
The IS-LM model is used for policy analysis to depict the manner in which fiscal and monetary 
policies interact to determine the level of aggregate output and interest rate. The IS curve 
represents equilibrium in the goods market which shows that aggregate spending is defined as 
the summation of private household consumption, investment spending by firms and purchases 
by the government. The LM curve on the other hand, represents equilibrium in the 
money/financial market such that real money supply equates money demand. 
The two curves intersect to uniquely determine the aggregate output (Y) and interest rate (r). 
The interaction between fiscal and monetary policy in this model occurs whenever there is a 
change in one policy such that the other adjust its path to this change. For instance, when there 
is a change in fiscal policy such that the government increases the level of spending or lowers 
taxes, this affects the goods market and shifts the IS curve to the right. Mankiw (2016) notes 
that the central bank can respond to this change in three ways. These include holding constant 
the level of money supply, the interest rate and the level of output. In the case that the central 




market increases as well as spilling over to the money market where the interest rate equally 
rises. When the central bank reacts to a change in the policy of government by keeping the rate 
of interest fixed, then it shifts the LM curve to the right and the level of money supply rises. 
This scenario is in fact further modelled in a formal manner. Finally, in the face of reacting to 
fiscal policy by holding the level of aggregate output unvaried, the central bank will have to 
shift the LM curve to the left which indicates that the volume of money in circulation reduces. 
b. Monetarist Arithmetic 
The seminal contribution to the concept of the Monetarist Arithmetic was by Sargent and 
Wallace (1981). It highlights the idea that central bankers are required to regard the 
government’s fiscal policy, while making policy decisions. This is because government actions 
can render ineffective the ability of monetary authority to determine and stabilise price level 
in the economy. Sargent and Wallace (1981) define fiscal-monetary policy interaction as a 
Stackelberg game between the Central Bank and Treasury. They demonstrate that in a fiscally 
dominant regime, the central bank may find it difficult to control inflation since it may be 
unable to decide the path of money stock given the exogenously determined path of 
government’s budget deficit. In arriving at this conclusion, they draw on a monetarist model 
embedded in an Over-Lapping Generation framework. In this model, they centrally assume 
that the path for government deficit is exogenously determined i.e. the government is assumed 
to set the deficits, while the central bank controls the level of money supply and can raise 
revenue from money creation. In the model, fiscal and monetary policies are interacting within 
a consolidated government budget constraint. This constraint is an identity that links both 
policies. It shows that the government finances its budget deficit by issuing one-period bonds 
and by money creation. 
The path of fiscal policy is, therefore, assumed to exogenously evolve under this form of policy 
game; while the central bank passively adjusts to the path of this government policy. Under 
this circumstance, for every deficit the government fixes, the central bank is forced to finance 
it through money creation, if it cannot be financed by the sale of bonds. The central bank is 
also constrained to finance government deficit if the economy reaches a fiscal limit where the 
government can no longer issue new bonds since it has accumulated a large amount of debt 




money or buying government securities injects money into the economy, which leads to a surge 
in volume of money supplied and by the monetarist quantity theory implies increases in the 
price level and then inflation. The solution to the constraint imposed on the central bank is an 
independent and conservative authority that can discipline the government by refusing to 
finance its deficit. 
 
However, there have been reactions to the position of Sargent and Wallace (1981) as stated 
earlier in the previous paragraphs. For instance, Weil (1987) re-examines their conclusion that 
primary budget deficits have to be monetized i.e. central banks are restricted from selecting 
desired range of money supply in the face of exogenously determined budget deficits of the 
fiscal authorities. Weil (1987) adopts a simple monetary model nested within a fusion of the 
Over-Lapping Generation and Infinite-Horizon frameworks. The study assumes a monetary 
economy with intergenerational dynamics where new and infinitely-lived individuals 
continuously enter the economy. The results reveal contrasting conclusions such that when 
intergenerational effects are considered, there are larger chances that central banks can 
determine the paths of monetary policy for every given fiscal policy. By implication, the 
findings of Weil (1987) differs from Sargent and Wallace (1981) on grounds that the study 
departs from the standard OLG models and assumes real interest rates that vary. In the same 
vein, Darby (1984) counteracts the Sargent and Wallace (1981) assertion. The author shows 
that this assertion may not hold under certain conditions. The author overturns Sargent-Wallace 
assumption that real interest rates are higher than growth rates, and also modifies their 
definition of real interest rate using the after-tax values; but retains Sargent-Wallace 
proposition that real interest and growth rates are constant. In a model where real interest rates 
are lower than growth rates, Darby (1984) shows that the Sargent-Wallace may not hold. 
The conclusions of Weil (1987), Darby (1984) show that the Sargent-Wallace hypothesis may 
hold or not depending on the underlying assumptions held or relaxed. McCallum (1984), Miller 
and Sargent (1984) prove this. McCallum (1984) examines the monetarist notion that 
government budget deficit can be non-inflationary on condition that it is funded by bond sales 
rather than from currency. Using a discrete time, deterministic model, the study is able to 




including interest payments or not. Specifically, the monetarist hypothesis does not hold when 
deficits are defined as excluding interest payments. Also, Miller and Sargent (1984) relax the 
Sargent-Wallace assumption of an exogenously fixed interest rate. According to the authors, 
the real interest rate is partly derived as a function of the ratio of interest-bearing government 
bonds to base money. By this, the study uses ad-hoc aggregate demand and supply equations 
to show that merely comparing real interest and growth rates as conducted in Darby (1984) is 
insufficient to predict the Sargent-Wallace hypothesis.  
 
c. Fiscal Theory of the Price Level  
Even though Weil (1987), Darby (1984), McCallum (1984) contradict Sargent-Wallace 
hypothesis because they modify some of its assumptions, Buiter (1999) supports this 
hypothesis. Apart from the generalization of Sargent-Wallace hypothesis when certain of its 
assumptions are relaxed or modified, a second source of contradiction to this proposition is 
from Leeper (1991), Sims (1994), Cochrane (2001), Woodford (1995, 2001). This set of 
articles make up the literature on the Fiscal Theory of Price Level (FTPL) 
 
Its proponents argue that fiscal policy is the foremost determinant of price level. Unlike the 
monetarists who propose that government budgets indirectly affect the price level through the 
seignorage- money stock channel. Woodford (1995, 1996, 2001) and others posit that 
government budget can have a direct impact on price level void of any monetary channel. This 
indicates that fiscal policy takes on an active role while monetary policy only plays a passive 
role in controlling the price level.  
 
One of the key contributions to the literature on the fiscal theory of the price level is from 
Leeper (1991). The study shows the joint pairing of fiscal and monetary policy paths which 
uniquely determines equilibrium price level. In a specific manner, the study models the 
interaction between fiscal and monetary policy as an active and passive game. An active policy 
is defined as policy that fixes its path independently from variation to the budgetary condition 
or debt shocks while a passive policy responds to budgetary shocks and is constrained by the 
actions of the authority with the active policy. A unique determination of the price level, 




monetary policy with a passive fiscal stance and an active fiscal policy coupled with a passive 
monetary policy leads to uniquely determined prices. The combination of two passive policies 
leads to indeterminacy of the price level, while the pairing of two active policies produces an 
explosive path. The fiscal policy in the proposition of the fiscalists, therefore, takes on an active 
path while monetary policy is passive in order to uniquely determine the price level. 
 
It suffices to note at this point that there are several issues of contest between proponents of 
the Monetarist Arithmetic and the Fiscal theory of the price level. Although, the monetarist 
literature comprising the thoughts of Sargent-Wallace assume that there is a budget constraint 
on government which is an identity that must be satisfied for all paths of prices, the proponents 
of FTPL assumes otherwise. They opine that government budget constraint is fulfilled only for 
equilibrium price paths. In dealing with fiscal dominant regimes, the monetarist doctrine 
suggests that central banks should become independent and follow a Taylor’s rule in 
determining the course of monetary policy. However, Woodford (1995, 1996, 2001) argue that 
such recommendation is insufficient in quelling unstable price levels, since government budget 
surpluses have direct effects on price levels even in the face of a conservative and independent 
central bank. This is because the price level adjusts to maintain inter-temporal government 
budget balance. As a result, Woodford (1995, 1996, 2001) advocates fiscal policy as the main 
determinant of price levels.  Furthermore, he suggests that the pairing of a Taylor rule for 
monetary policy with government budget deficits rule for fiscal policy is panacea to achieve 
low and stable inflation rates. On similar grounds, Leeper (1991); Leeper and Leith (2015) put 
forward that the joint movements of monetary and fiscal policies determine the price level. 
Leeper (1991) specifically recommends that monetary and fiscal policies are paired such that 
an active policy stance is accompanied by a passive one to realise a low and stable price level. 
A second line of contest between FTPL and the monetarist doctrine centres on the existence of 
Ricardian or Non-Ricardian fiscal policy. Woodford (1995, 1996, 2001) assumes the existence 
of non-Ricardian fiscal policies. Under this setting, Ricardian equivalence as posited under 
conventional macroeconomic studies is violated and fiscal policy can have non-neutral effects 
on aggregate demand. Specifically, the inter-temporal government budget constraint is 




Ricardian fiscal policies exist. In addition, a third line of division between both theories rest 
on the instrument of monetary policy. While the monetarist considers money stock to be the 
instrument of monetary policy, the FTPL of Woodford (1995,1996, 2001) backs the use of 
nominal interest rate, since they assume a cashless economy experiencing financial innovations 
and have no government-backed money. Like Woodford, Sims (1994) proposes that in a 
rational expectation framework, fiscal policy plays a major role in price level determinacy. In 
the same vein, Sims (1994) advocates that interest rate rather than money stock leads to unique 
price paths. But, Sims’ point of departure is his assumption of an economy with frictionless 
market as Woodford assumes the presence of nominal rigidity.  
Although authors of the FTPL critique the monetarist notion, their contributions have also been 
scrutinized. For instance, Christiano and Fitzgerald (2000) support their assertion, so does 
Cochrane (2001). Both show the plausibility of FTPL models. However, some writers such as 
Buiter (1999, 2002), Niepelt (2004), Kocherkalota and Phelan (1999) are pessimistic of the 
FTPL strand of literature. Niepelt (2004) demonstrates that the FTPL model fails to produce 
unique and equilibrium price paths when analysed in a different model, specifically in a cash-
in-advance (CIA) constraint model with postulations of a positive interest rates and a money 
supply target. Furthermore, Buiter (1999, 2002) shows that the FTPL has a fundamental 
economic flaw. The author argues that the FTPL model confuses government budget 
constraints with equilibrium conditions. Just as Niepelt (2004), Buiter (1999, 2002) also argues 
that FTPL postulations hold only in models where monetary policy is specified as interest rates. 
Equilibrium price level is over-determined in models where this assumption is altered. 
 
In summary, both theories similarly adopt the central ideology that the fiscal policy is 
important for price level determinacy, and are mainly concerned with short-term stabilisation 
issues. However, Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (2001) surmise the major difference between 
the FTPL and monetarist arithmetic. While the monetarist arithmetic viewed fiscal-monetary 
policy interaction as a non-cooperative game between the government and its central bank and 
believed that coordination of fiscal-monetary policy produced Pareto improving outcomes. By 
contrast, the FTPL coined the problem of fiscal-monetary policy interaction as one that 
concerns design of the right combination of policies to provide stable economic outcomes. 




inter-temporal government budget constraint, whether fiscal policy follows a Ricardian or non-
Ricardian process, using either the money stock or interest rate as a tool of monetary policy 
and whether government debt is nominal or real. In addition to the four theoretical issues that 
have been spotted, another major theoretical gap is the emphasis on stabilisation, leaving out 
long term issues such as debt or structural reforms. However, Cochrane (2001), Leeper and 
Leith (2015) comprise the few articles which consider long-term debt issues. Other theoretical 
gaps span across whether a consolidated government budget constraint should be prescribed 
in the face of a decentralised policy environment and whether the assumption of an exogenous 
fiscal policy holds. 
 
In relation with the theoretical gaps identified, this study considers the strengths and defects of 
both theories. The thesis outlines theoretical assumptions that synchronises the best of both 
theories and that holds in the Nigerian context.  
2.3 Methodological Review 
The existing methods that have been used by researchers to analyse the interactions between 
fiscal and monetary policy are categorized as a-theoretical, game theoretical and dynamic 
general equilibrium framework. The a-theoretical method involves pure statistical analysis of 
economic phenomena, while the game theoretical and dynamic general equilibrium methods 
are essentially computational-based techniques. Generally, computational techniques use 
numerical methods to solve economic models that assume that economic agents such as 
households, firms and policymakers, are interacting according to rules. One is usually 
interested in deriving equilibrium outcomes and the relevant rules underlying such interactions. 
In the two methods, it is assumed there are economic agents who are concerned with optimising 
their objective functions in the face of economic constraints. This sub-section presents a review 
of some studies that have employed these three methods. 
 
2.3.1   A-theoretic Statistical Methods 
The a-theoretical statistical approach has been used in a number of studies to capture fiscal-
monetary policy interactions. A-theoretic methods are concerned with the statistical 




studies, statistical measures serve as the basis for deciding the existing form of interaction 
between fiscal and monetary policy (Alege, 2008).  
 
The studies by Nyamongo, Sichei and Mutai (2008), Rothenberg (2004), Montoro, Takats and 
Yetman (2012) began their examination of fiscal and monetary policy interaction by 
characterising the cyclical properties of each policy i.e. whether they are procyclical or 
countercyclical and each policy stance i.e. whether they are tight or loose. In this regard, the 
most widely adopted measure of fiscal policy in these studies is the structural or cyclically-
adjusted budget balance. The cyclically-adjusted budget balance is obtained by removing the 
business cyclical component of the budget balance from its nominal component. On the other 
hand, monetary policy is captured by the real interest rate or the policy rate of the Central Bank.  
 
Once each policy has been appropriately measured, they are thereafter characterised. For 
instance, Montoro, Takats and Yetman (2012) examined the cyclical properties of both 
policies. They estimated the correlation between the cyclical component of Real Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) and the real interest rate on one hand, and the correlation between 
the cyclical component of Real Gross Domestic Product and budget balance as a percent of 
GDP on the other hand. Large and positive values of the correlation parameter imply a 
countercyclical fiscal/monetary policy while a negative value means that fiscal/monetary 
policy is procyclical. Rothenberg (2004) also investigated the nature of the policy stance. He 
interpreted positive values of the cyclically-adjusted budget balance as an expansionary/loose 
fiscal stance while negative values mean a contractionary/tight fiscal stance. Conversely, 
Carlson (1982) interpreted negative values of real interest rates as tight monetary policy while 
its positive value means that monetary policy is loose. 
 
After characterising the cyclical properties and stance of both policies, the nature of interaction 
existing between both policies can then be investigated. Nyamongo, Sichei and Mutai (2008) 
for example, investigated policy interaction in Kenya with respect to the extent of coordination 
between both policies. In the study, both policies are interpreted as being coordinated when 
they simultaneously take on a tight/tight stance or a loose/loose stance. In a related manner, 




between the policy rate of Federal Reserve and the adjusted budget balance of the United States 
government. The author found a statistically insignificant and negative correlation between 
both fiscal and monetary policy, which is interpreted as evidence of no coordination. 
 
The a-theoretical statistical approach also includes estimation techniques that depend primarily 
on statistics without relying on economic theories. Relevant a-theoretic estimation techniques 
that have been applied in the context of research on fiscal and monetary policy interactions 
include Granger Causality, Cointegration and Vector Auto regression techniques. For example, 
Janků and Kappel (2014) used a multivariate regression analysis to examine fiscal and 
monetary policy interaction in countries of the Visegrad Group: the Czech Republic, Slovakia, 
Poland and Hungary over the period 2000Q1- 2012Q4. The authors estimated fiscal and 
monetary reaction functions for each country using twelve separate equations. The authors 
conducted unit root tests on variables used, in order to ensure stationarity and to avoid spurious 
regression. The result of the study showed that monetary policy has stabilising effect, such that 
inflation and output gap significantly respond to it both in a negative and positive manner. The 
fiscal policy too has stabilising effects on the economy to some extent. Furthermore, the study 
found that fiscal policy significantly adjusts to monetary policy in three out of the four sample 
countries: Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland. This means that there is monetary dominance 
in these countries. However, the study left out diagnostic testing of parameter values for 
violation of assumptions of ordinary least square estimates. 
 
Reade (2011) used a cointegrated VAR method to assess monetary and fiscal interactions in 
the United States over the period 1982Q1- 2010Q2. The author found that, monetary policy 
has a passive stance while fiscal policy has an active stance. Both policies are revealed to 
complement each other. Muscatelli, Tirelli and Trecroci (2002) estimated VAR and Bayesian 
VAR models for 5 OECD countries: Germany, France, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States, using quarterly series comprising the output gap, the inflation rate, a measure of 
fiscal stance and the interest rate, in order to examine fiscal and monetary policy interactions 
and their effects on macroeconomic targets. The authors estimated for fixed parameters in the 
conventional VAR technique, in order to assess whether fiscal and monetary policy interact as 




using the Bayesian VAR model, so as to capture any regime shift in fiscal and monetary policy 
interactions over time. The study found asymmetry in the interaction between fiscal and 
monetary policies in some countries. The study also provided evidence that the nature of 
interdependence between fiscal and monetary policy has shifted over time. 
 
Franta, Libich and Stehlík (2012) also used the Time Varying Parameter VAR to analyse the 
interactions between fiscal and monetary policies, in terms of how monetary authorities 
respond to government spending shocks, comparing countries with inflation targeting and non- 
inflation targeting regimes. The authors estimated the Bayesian VAR models comprising of 
five variables in output, private consumption, the short-term interest rate, government spending 
(consumption and investment), and government debt over the period 1980Q1–2008Q2 for the 
economies of Australia, Canada, Japan, Switzerland, the UK, and the U.S. The authors then 
obtained impulse response functions of the variables assuming a spending shock. The result of 
the study showed that central banks in inflation-targeting regimes can withstand not 
accommodating government’s spending shocks. Gerba and Hauzenberger (2014) also used the 
TVP-VAR to examine fiscal and monetary policy interaction in the United States. The fallout, 
however, of the a-theoretic approach is their susceptibility to the Lucas’ critique. 
 
2.3.2     Game Theoretic Models 
Blinder (1982), Alesina and Tabellini (1987) are examples of early application of game theory 
models to issues on economic policy interactions. In these studies, fiscal and monetary policy 
can be modelled as relating in three ways: as a single, unified policy maker- who can set both 
fiscal and monetary targets; as independent institutions with no coordination; and in a leader-
follower interaction (Blinder, 1982). Moreover, these studies use the linear-quadratic 
constrained optimisation technique, to analyse a policymaker who maximises a (quadratic) 
policy preference or minimises loss functions in policy instruments subject to economic 
constraints. Two important results are usually obtained: first, the policy reaction functions 
which is a rule that depicts how one agent responds to the action of others and then, the 
equilibrium policy solutions. The equilibrium solution is usually an optimal rule in specified 
fiscal and monetary policy variables like interest rates, money supply, government spending 




studies proceed further to estimate the parameters in these functions and simulate using a 
computational iterative method that converges. 
 
Alesina and Tabellini (1987) examined fiscal and monetary policy interaction in a static- 
deterministic policy game that consists of three economic agents- the central bank, fiscal 
authority and wage setters. Using the quadratic programming and constrained optimization, 
the authors minimise the quadratic loss functions of both fiscal and monetary authorities as 
deviations of inflation and outputs from their targets. Then the authors computed the policy 
reaction functions of the fiscal and monetary authorities in government expenditure and money 
supply, under assumptions of both discretionary and rule-based policy regimes. In a related 
manner, Nordhaus (1994) also used a linear-quadratic programming to solve a constrained 
optimisation problem of a static game model. In this model, fiscal and monetary authorities 
seek to maximise different preferences in inflation, unemployment and potential output subject 
to constraints on the economy. From this, the study derived first-order conditions and computes 
both fiscal and monetary policy reaction function in budget deficit and real interest rate.  
 
Bartolomeo and Gioacchino (2004) studied fiscal-monetary policy interaction in a dynamic 
two-stage game and within a long run (public debt) context. This contrasts with the static games 
of Alesina and Tabellini (1987); Nordhaus (1994). In the first stage, the authors derived 
equilibrium conditions, preferably the correlated equilibria. Then output from the first stage is 
imputed in the differential game of the second stage. In this stage, central bank and the 
government minimise their inter-temporal loss functions subject to government budget 
constraints. The introduction of government budget constraints differs from the approach of 
Alesina and Tabellini (1987); Nordhaus (1994) who only specify aggregate supply functions. 
The authors compute policy reaction functions in money supply and fiscal deficits. 
 
Apart from the policy reaction functions computed from solving game theoretical model, the 
solution concept of these games is a second trend worth mentioning. The essential solution 
concepts are the cooperative and non-cooperative (Nash and Stackelberg). Games in the non- 
cooperative realm assume that the treasury and central bank optimise separate loss or 




fiscal and monetary policy makers optimising on a consolidated loss or preference function 
subject to economic constraints. This idea of a consolidated objective function reflects the 
existence of fiscal and monetary policy coordination than the non-cooperative solutions. 
 
Petit (1989) computed cooperative and non-cooperative (Nash and Stackelberg) equilibria of 
a differential game between treasury and the central bank. Here each policy maker is modelled 
as choosing optimal policy strategies by minimising a quadratic loss function subject to 
economic constraints defined as an econometric function comprising of a system of 20 
differential equations. Just like Petit (1989), Hallett and Weymark (2007) also derive 
cooperative and non-cooperative solutions. The study computes optimal fiscal and monetary 
policy rules in expenditure and money supply using the Nash and Stackelberg solutions to a 
two-stage dynamic game between the government and the central bank. In the first stage, the 
requisite institution is designed. In the second stage, both authorities set their policy 
instruments, expenditure and money supply respectively, given the already designed institution 
in stage one. Specifically, both authorities minimise their respective loss functions. Also, 
Saulo, Rego and Divino (2013) solve for optimal fiscal and monetary policies paths under three 
coordination regimes: Nash, Stackelberg and Cooperative. In the dynamic game, both policy 
authorities seek to minimise their respective quadratic loss function subject to micro-founded 
economic constraints in IS function, Aggregate supply and the Government Budget constraint. 
Thereafter, the authors employ numerical simulation to calculate the loss associated with each 
coordination regime.  
 
Another aspect to the game-theoretic methods is game models with micro foundations. Micro-
founded objective functions and economic constraints is a relatively recent trend in the 
application of game theoretic models to issues of fiscal-monetary policy interaction. It involves 
deriving objective functions and constraint equations from a general equilibrium model 
comprising of preferences and technologies of a representative household and firm, alongside 
the budget constraint of government. It is noteworthy to emphasise micro-founded game 





Adam and Billi (2008) solved a micro founded model from a New Keynesian framework. In 
the same vein, Dixit and Lambertini (2003b) build a social loss function micro-founded from 
a New Keynesian framework. Here, the two players of the dynamic stochastic game, fiscal and 
monetary policymakers are expected to minimise this social loss function in deviation of output 
and inflation from target subject to rational expectation constraint. Thereafter the authors 
derive separate reaction functions for the two authorities and compute Nash and stackelberg 
equilibria under both discretionary and commitment regimes. Then, the authors conduct a 
numerical simulation of their model. In the same manner, Hallett, Libich and Stehlik (2011) 
consider a policy game between fiscal and monetary authority over the medium term. Here 
both policymakers seek to maximise a quadratic policy preference function in inflation and 
output, subject to supply-side constraints. The preference functions are micro-founded. From 
the constrained optimisation, the study derives reaction function for both the fiscal and 
monetary sides in inflation and budget deficits, respectively. In addition, the authors solve for 
optimal (Nash) policy in both.  
 
From the review above, three observable methodological trends in game theory are policy 
reaction functions, the type of solution concepts computed such as Cooperative, Nash, 
Stackelberg, Correlated, Markov-Perfect, etc; and whether the game was micro-derived or not. 
However, one methodological issue stands out. This borders on the most realistic approach 
used to model the strategic interaction between the fiscal authority and central bank. Are they 
involved in a cooperative game with a consolidated objective function or government budget 
constraint? or in a non-cooperative game, possessing differing objective functions? Or in a 
Markov switch between both cooperative and non-cooperative regimes. Probably, the 
institutional setting inherent in the macroeconomic policymaking arena will provide the hint 
to aid in realistic modelling of this policy game.  
 
2.3.3    Dynamic General Equilibrium Methods 
These dynamic general equilibrium methods are couched within the dynamic general 
equilibrium framework. The framework describes that macroeconomic behaviour hinges on 
the interaction among microeconomic units. The assumptions of the dynamic general 




central banks are rational. These agents are assumed to form rational expectations of the future. 
The households and firms seek to maximise their preferences and technology subject to 
constraints, while governments and central banks interact by specifying policy rules. These 
agents live and make their economic decisions in a finite or infinite time horizon, and over a 
discrete or continuous space. Dynamic general equilibrium models fall into two major schools: 
The Classical Real Business Cycle and New Keynesian Dynamic Stochastic General 
Equilibrium models. In this section, the application of both models in studying economic 
policy interactions is outlined. 
 
a. Real Business Cycle Models 
Real Business Cycle (RBC) models, which is a dynamic general equilibrium apparatus, stems 
from the contributions of Kydland and Prescott (1982); Long and Plosser (1983) and others. 
The model underlies a business cycle theory which emphasises real shocks, particularly, 
unanticipated changes in total factor productivity i.e. technology as the source of economic 
fluctuations. Other forms of real shocks such as government purchases, preferences and 
expectations are also plausible. The RBC model is also an essential methodological 
masterpiece. RBC models, in this respect, are built on the micro foundation of Walrasian 
general equilibrium, the basic neoclassical growth models of Solow (1956), Cass (1965), 
Koopman (1965), the Ramsey (1928) inter-temporal model and the stochastic growth model 
of Mirman and Brock (1972). These models, therefore, assume a representative agent 
framework comprising of rational and identical households and firms that have explicit 
objective functions which they want to maximise subject to budget and technology constraints. 
There is also a perfect frictionless market for labour and capital; and prices adjust 
instantaneously. In addition, there is little role for government regulation since markets are 
assumed to always clear, furthermore, the model assumes the classical dichotomy where 
money is regarded as neutral. 
 
Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005), Romer (2006) critique that RBC models are unable 
to prove the neutrality of money, the dominance of technological shocks in explaining the 
cyclical trends in actual economies like the United States and that prices are taken to be 




forms of government regulation. An implication of these assumptions is that RBC models leave 
out money and monetary policy and in general, it is traditionally silent on the application of 
economic policies. Despite this, Rebelo (2005) notes that RBC models have been useful for 
policy analysis as it has been a workhorse for the study of optimal fiscal and monetary policy. 
Its usefulness in this regard, may be linked to some extensions to the RBC framework. RBC 
models, in some ad-hoc cases, have been modified to include money, government spending, 
imperfect competition, among others (Rebelo, 2005). 
 
b. Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) Models 
DSGE Models are built on the micro-foundation and dynamic general equilibrium framework 
just as the RBC model. Their point of departure from RBC models is to abstract away from the 
Classical assumptions of frictionless markets, flexible prices and neutrality of money. The 
DSGE models stems from the contributions of Smets and Wouters (2003); Gali (2003); 
Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005); Smets and Wouters (2007). In this variant of DGE 
models, it is assumed that business cycle is driven by both real and nominal shocks, non-trivial 
effect of monetary policy, monopolistic competition, nominal rigidity etc. In the standard 
model, there are three agents: the household, firms and Central Banks. The household 
purchases goods, holds money and bonds, supplies labour to the firms and maximises its 
expected present value of utility. There are two types of firms: intermediate and final goods 
firms. The firms produce differentiated products in monopolistic competition. The central bank 
sets the nominal interest rate in Taylor-type rules. 
 
The DSGE models have been used for economic policy analysis than its RBC counterpart, 
since it recognises a role for stabilising (fiscal and monetary) policies. It can also account for 
the effect of both real and nominal shocks on the economy. This study will adopt the DSGE 
framework based on the New Keynesian school of economic thought. Therefore, an extensive 
discussion of the NK DSGE framework is presented, with a focus on how NK DSGE models 
are solved and estimated. This is done in the context of works that have applied the NK DSGE 






c. Solving DSGE models 
DSGE models often lack an exact and closed form solution that can be cumbersome and messy 
with paper and pencil. Their solutions are derived by numerical methods in order to find an 
approximated path. In this subsection, some solution methods to solving DSGE models are 
presented. The discussion is due primarily to Flotho (2009); Fernandez-Villaverde, Rubio-
Ramirez and Schorfheide (2016). The solution methods are generally classified into the 
perturbation and projection Methods. The perturbation solutions are local approximations that 
usually involve a Taylor series approximation of equilibrium equations around their non-
stochastic steady state. Fernandez-Villaverde et al., (2016) argue that perturbation methods are 
most suitable for solving a medium-scale NK model since it is sufficiently well-behaved. 
Linear Quadratic method, linear approximation and second (or higher) order approximation 
are some perturbation methods. Projections methods on the other hand, have global solutions. 
 
i. Linear-Quadratic Technique 
The Linear Quadratic method is a traditional solution to DSGE models, which begins with 
transforming the DSGE model into a linear-quadratic (LQ) problem such that a quadratic 
objective function is optimised subject to constraints that are a linear function of the state 
variable. This approach was used first by Kydland and Prescott (1982) who used it in solving 
a Real Business Cycle model. However, Judd (1996, 1998) as cited in Pierse (2006) pointed 
out that the method is invalid in a non-linear model which is typical of the DSGE framework. 
The correct approach is therefore to compute a second order approximation to the Lagrangian 
function. 
 
Beningno and Woodford (2004) employed this technique to obtain optimal fiscal and monetary 
policy paths that determines inflation and output. The authors built a New Keynesian DSGE 
model comprising of household that maximises utility subject to budget constraint, firms that 
produce differentiated goods and a pricing equation that specifies how price level evolve. The 
authors restate the DSGE model in a linear-quadratic form by computing log-quadratic 
approximation of the household objective function around its steady state. The study also 
derives second-order (log) approximation of constraint equations in Philips curve and the 




objective function. Beningno and Woodford (2004) do so to arrive at a purely quadratic 
objective function. The next step is to minimise the quadratic loss function, resulting from the 
previous step, subject to log-linearised constraint equations. The Lagrange method is used, and 
a system of first order conditions is derived and solved in terms of inflation, output, tax and 
debt. 
 
Leeper and Zhou (2013) also used the linear-quadratic technique, to solve a New Keynesian 
DSGE model for optimal fiscal and monetary policy. In a New Keynesian DSGE model, the 
authors assume a household sector that maximises objective function subject to budget 
constraint, a firm in monopolistic competition that produces differentiated goods using 
technology and sets the price. There is also a government sector with an inter-temporal budget 
constraint and an equilibrium condition in aggregate resource constraint. Nonlinear constraint 
conditions in Philips curve, consumer Euler equation and government budget constraint are 
derived from the model. The objective function of the household and constraint equations is 
then approximated to second-order to compute a purely quadratic loss function. Thereafter the 
loss function is minimised subject to log-linearised constraint equations in order to compute 
optimal fiscal and monetary policy in tax and nominal interest rate. 
 
ii. First-Order Approximation 
Another traditional solution is the linear approximation method, also known as the first order 
approximation, to solving the DSGE model. It involves a Taylor series approximation of the 
system of first order conditions of the DSGE model around their steady state. The DSGE model 
usually has a non-linear system of equilibrium conditions whose solution may be too difficult 
to obtain until the system is linearised using the Taylor series approximation. The method is a 
local approximant whose procedures are valid in the neighbourhood of the non-stochastic 
steady state. Linearisation can be conducted in log or levels. The first-order linear 
approximation is adequate when there are small shocks driving the business cycle and an 
interior stationary solution exists (Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe, 2004). In general, it is adequate 
for several economic analyses since it leads to a state-space representation of the model, which 




order approximation leads to better results, in particular for cases of economic welfare and risk 
analysis (Flotho, 2009; Fernandez-Villaverde et al., 2016) 
 
Leeper (1991) solved a NK DSGE model to find the fiscal and monetary policy paths that 
uniquely determines inflation and government real debt, using the first-order Taylor method. 
This method approximates equilibrium equations around the steady state. The model of the 
study consists of a representative household that maximises a money-in-utility function with 
respect to its budget constraint, government sector with its budget constraint, and stochastic 
linear fiscal and monetary policy rules in interest rate and taxes. Leeper (1991) initially solved 
the model for Euler equations and equilibrium conditions using the recursive method. The next 
procedure is to linearise the equilibrium equations to derive a system of equations in the 
endogenous variables. The system of equations is solved by iteration for decision rules and its 
eigenvalues are checked for unique equilibrium based on the criteria of Blanchard and Khan 
(1980). 
 
In the same way, Woodford (1996) solved a New Keynesian Dynamic General Equilibrium 
Model using the first-order Taylor approximation of deviation of equilibrium conditions from 
their steady state. The equilibrium equations are derived from aggregate demand (AD) and 
supply (AS) blocs. The (AD) bloc contains the Euler consumption equation of households, 
aggregate resource constraint equation and rate of returns on bonds. Equations in optimal price 
level and marginal cost make up the supply bloc. In addition, stochastic processes in deficits, 
money supply and interest rate are also specified. Four stochastic difference equations in 
endogenous variables of the model are got from the linearisation. The system of difference 
equation is solved for unique bounded paths. The Blanchard and Khan (1980) condition of 
stable and unstable roots is employed to determine that at least a locally unique rational 
expectation equilibrium path exists. 
 
Chadla and Nolan (2003) also linearised equilibrium conditions derived from an Overlapping 
Generation (OLG) Model to compute fiscal and monetary policy paths that makes inflation 
and output determined. The authors build a New-Keynesian type of OLG model with sticky 




to its budget constraint; a supply bloc that determines price level; fiscal and monetary policy 
rules in taxes and interest rate such that they are defined respectively as function of debt and 
inflation. Finally, the model also consists of a government bloc specified by its inter-temporal 
budget constraint. The equilibrium conditions are derived from these components and then 
linearised around their deterministic steady state. The result is a system of difference equations 
representing the endogenous and exogenous variables of the model. Initial guesses of numeric 
values are imputed into the parameters of the policy functions and the model is then checked 
for local existence and uniqueness of equilibrium, using the state reduction algorithm of King 
and Watson (1997).  
 
Leeper and Leith (2015) in a slightly different way, log-linearised the equilibrium conditions 
of a sticky price DSGE model around its stationary state. The system of equilibrium conditions 
comprises of household Euler equation, Philips curve, aggregate resource constraint, policy 
rules in interest rates, flow government budget constraint, exogenous fiscal surplus rule and 
shocks to fiscal and monetary policy. Once the equilibrium equations are log-linearised, it is 
reduced to a system of second-order difference equation. The Blanchard and Khan (1980) 
criteria of stable and unstable roots is used to ensure determinacy of equilibria in the study’s 
model. 
 
iii. Solving System of Linear Difference Equations 
The linear approximation method usually produces a system of linear stochastic difference 
equations in state-space form. The essence of solving DSGE models comprises in obtaining 
the solution to this system of equations. This solution is a feedback rule relating the current 
endogenous variables to the state variables of the model. The system of equations can be solved 
by two main methods: the eigenvector-eigenvalue decomposition and undetermined 
coefficients.  
 
The eigenvector-eigenvalue decomposition was first proposed by Blanchard and Kahn (1980). 
It involves delineating the system into stable and unstable equations. The method provides the 
condition for the determinacy of a unique equilibrium such that a solution exists and is unique 




unit circle) is exactly equal to the number of non-predetermined variables Blanchard and Kahn 
(1980). The Blanchard and Kahn (1980) method has been developed further by others such as 
King and Watson (1998), King and Watson (2002), Anderson (2000), Anderson and Moore 
(1985), Sims (2002), Klein (2000) as cited in Flotho (2009). The method of undetermined 
coefficients, on the other hand, involves guessing the solution of the model, (i.e., policy 
functions), then find the unknown coefficients of the system of equations that matches the 
guessed solution. 
 
iv. Second (or Higher) Order Approximation 
The second (or higher) order approximation takes a second or nth-order Taylor expansion of 
the equilibrium conditions of DSGE models around their steady state. They are useful when 
considering welfare and risk measures but they often generate explosive sample paths even 
when the corresponding linear approximation is stable (Fernandez-Villaverde et al., 2016). 
 
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004a, 2007) computed second-order approximation to the policy 
function to solve for optimal fiscal and monetary policy paths from a New Keynesian type 
DSGE model. The NK DSGE model comprises of a household bloc that maximises objective 
function subject to inter-temporal budget and borrowing constraints; a single firm in a 
monopolistic competition and government bloc with its inter-temporal budget constraints 
alongside specification of fiscal and monetary policy in taxes and nominal interest rate. The 
authors derive equilibrium conditions in consumer Euler equation, Philips curve, fiscal and 
monetary policy rules, exogenous processes, among others. The studies derive decision rules 
in relevant endogenous variables from these equilibrium equations that are then approximated 
in logarithm using second-order Taylor expansion around their non-stochastic steady state. The 
utility (welfare) function is also log-linearised to second order. The final procedure is to 
maximise the quadratic welfare function subject to constraints using the Lagrange method, in 
order to find the policy parameters of tax and nominal interest rate equations that maximises 
the household welfare function. 
 
Gnocchi and Lambertini (2016) adopted the second-order approximation algorithm of Schmitt-




nominal rigidity. The study’s model consists of the preferences, technology and constraints of 
household, firms and government usually specified in a canonical NK DSGE model. In 
addition, fiscal and monetary policy rules in taxes, public goods and nominal interest rate are 
specified. The solution to the DSGE model is a set of policy functions that are approximated 
to second-order. The finishing step is to maximise the household welfare function subject to 
constraints made of the Euler consumer equation, the technology function, public goods 
equation and aggregate resource constraint with the Lagrange method. 
 
The preceding solution techniques (linearisation, log-linearisation, linear-quadratic, second-
order Taylor approximation) can be termed perturbation methods using the classification of 
Fernadez-Villaverde, Rubio-Ramirez and Schorfheide (2016). The perturbation methods 
require a Taylor or Pides approximation to the equilibrium equations or policy functions. A 
characteristic of these solution methods is that they produce local equilibrium solutions which 
contrast with the global ones 
 
v. Projection Method 
According to Fernadez-Villaverde et al., (2016), projection methods make up a second group 
of solution methods to dynamic general equilibrium models. The projection method finds 
global solution using the global properties of functional equations to approximate solution.  
 
Niemann and Pichler (2010) used a projection technique called monomial rule Galerkin to 
solve for optimal fiscal and monetary policy path in a DSGE model with monopolistic 
competition and sticky prices. The DSGE model comprises the household and government 
sectors with their preferences and constraints. The authors derived equilibrium equations in 
labour equation, Euler consumption equation, forward looking Philips curve, aggregate 
resource constraint and the government budget constraint. The model is solved for decision 
rules. The next procedure is to use the Lagrange method to maximise the welfare function of 
the individual household subject to some constraints and optimal conditions in government 
budget constraint, forward looking Philips curve, exogenous processes and decision rules in 
relevant endogenous variables. The monomial rule Galerkin method is used to numerically 





Ascari, Florio and Gobbi (2016) derived global solutions using the minimal state variable 
algorithm. The study solves a NK DSGE model with equilibrium equations in consumer Euler 
equation, law of motion in inflation, flow government budget constraint, fiscal policy rule in 
taxes and monetary policy Taylor rule in nominal interest rate. The solution to the DSGE model 
is partitioned into law of motion of the pre-determined variable in debt and the non-
predetermined variables. These policy functions are log-linearised and a system of quadratic 
equations in debt and the non-predetermined variables are derived. The mean square stability 
algorithm is used to verify the uniqueness and stability of the solution. 
 
Davig, Leeper and Walker (2010) employed the monotone map method of Coleman (1991) to 
solve a DSGE model with sticky prices and distortions, to show how uncertainty in fiscal and 
monetary policy can affect equilibrium outcome. The RBC model comprises of a 
representative household that maximises expected utility subject to budget constraint, a firm 
sector made up of intermediate and final good producers and specific rule in taxes and nominal 
interest rates. The monotone map method is used to solve the nonlinear system of equilibrium 
equations through the following procedures: discretise the state space around the steady state 
for each state variable; specify initial set of decision rules for the exogenous variables; then 
substitute these decision rules into the household’s first-order conditions. Numerically 
integrate the exogenous variables 
 
2.4   Estimation Techniques for DSGE models 
The estimation of DSGE models entails confronting DSGE models with observed data in order 
to (1) derive numerical values for parameters in the model and (2) evaluate the fit of the model. 
The earliest attempt to estimate these models was done by calibration. The calibration approach 
was popularized by Kydland and Prescott (1982). It is an informal econometric approach that 
involves fixing parameter values of a DSGE model based on evidence from existing micro- 
econometric studies and long-run data properties. The model is then simulated to obtain 
unconditional theoretical moments that are thereafter compared with those of actual data. 
Although calibration exercises are easy to conduct, the choice of parameters can be arbitrary 




econometric methods have spawned a shift from calibration to more formal econometric 
methods (Ruge-Murcia, 2005).  
 
The formal econometric methods of estimation include the Generalized Method of Moments 
(GMM), Minimum Distance Estimation based on the discrepancy between VAR and DSGE 
impulse response functions, Maximum Information Likelihood (ML) and Bayesian methods. 
These formal statistical methods are classified based on (1) whether they are classical 
frequentist (GMM, ML) or Bayesian. The classical econometricians make inferences using 
available data while their Bayesian counterparts base their inference on prior knowledge in 
addition to available data. Both schools also differ on their assumptions about the 
misspecification and lack of identification of parameters. The classical opines that the 
challenges of misspecification and identification cannot be overcome no matter the amount of 
data or computing power. The Bayesians believe otherwise. (2) Another line of difference 
centres on techniques with limited information (GMM, MDE) or full information (ML, 
Bayesian techniques). Limited information methods use a portion of the information in the 
DSGE model. A researcher applying this method is concerned with deriving specific moments 
that can be matched with data. The full Information methods on the other hand, use all the 
information implied in the model. It involves estimating and evaluating the likelihood function 
(Tovar, 2008). 
 
The GMM estimator is computed by minimising the distance between the sample moments 
and the theoretical moments predicted by the model. The GMM involves estimation of a subset 
of equilibrium relationships such as the consumption Euler equation, NK Philips curve from 
the DSGE model. The method is computationally less tedious since it does not require explicit 
solution of the model. GMM estimators are reliable, but as limited information methods, they 
are less efficient than the estimators you obtain using methods of full information. 
 
The Minimum Distance Estimation (MDE) based on the difference between VAR and DSGE 
models, or in other words, Impulse Response Function Matching Estimation. This estimator 
basically minimises the weighted distance between the empirical IRFs derived from a VAR 




compared with full information maximum likelihood estimators of DSGE models is that it does 
not require the model to fit well in all dimensions but allows the user to focus on the dimension 
of the model that matters most to macroeconomists. However, the method can be vulnerable 
to stochastic singularity, that makes the asymptotic behaviour of the estimator nonstandard 
(Guerron-Quintana, Inouey and Kilian, 2016). 
 
Estimating DSGE models with the Maximum Likelihood method requires the derivation and 
evaluation of the likelihood function of the data. ML is a full information estimator and from 
the moment-matching of limited information methods. Altug (1989) and Bencivenga (1992) 
as cited in An and Schorfiede (2006) are some early applications of this method to DSGE. A 
problem with ML is that the likelihood function may be very irregular and the solution 
algorithm might converge to a local instead of a global maximum (Mickelsson, 2015). Another 
is that as a frequentist method, ML is tedious to estimate and subjected to the identification 
and misspecification problems in DSGE models. 
 
The Bayesian method computes a likelihood function just as the Classical maximum likelihood 
technique but combines the likelihood function with the specification of priors. These prior 
distributions can be used to impute extra information into the parameter estimation. In recent 
times, macroeconomists have come to prefer the Bayesian tools. The primary reason is that 
Bayesian techniques are able to overcome the identification and misspecification issues that 
frequentists have identified in DSGE models.  Another reason centres on the fact that the 
method is a full- information estimation that analyses the complete system of equation rather 
than focus on a partial set of equations.  A third reason is the computational advances, 
especially with the construction of algorithms such as the Monte-Carlo Markov Chain method. 
This study, therefore, has applied the Bayesian method. The procedure involves (1) use the 
Kalman filter to calculate the log-likelihood (2) specify priors (3) apply the Monte-Carlo 
Markov Chain methods especially the Metropolis-Hastings-algorithm to simulate the posterior. 







2.5 Empirical Review 
The empirical review in this section centres on studies characterising fiscal and monetary 
policy interactions. The inherent empirical issues are discussed within the context of spatial 
evidence and using relevant topical issues. Some of the issues to be enumerated include the 
manner of specifying the fiscal and monetary policy rules, the methods used in estimating the 
parameters, and the effect of the policy interactions on some macroeconomic variables such as 
output, inflation and debt. The section concludes with a table summarising the studies and a 
discussion of the empirical concerns.  
 
2.5.1    Empirical Evidence from United States and Europe 
Muscatelli, Tirelli and Trecroci (2005) built and estimated a NK DSGE model with rule-of-
thumb consumers that assume a non-neutral fiscal policy. The authors examined fiscal and 
monetary policy interactions in the United States, specifically, whether fiscal stabilisers 
impede or enhance an independent Central Bank. The study employed the Generalized Method 
of Moment (GMM) to estimate equilibrium equations derived from log-linearising the DSGE 
model using quarterly data over the period 1970Q1-2001Q2. The study then simulated it using 
the Impulse Response Function to investigate the response of output, inflation and real interest 
rate to shocks in the fiscal policy instruments of government spending and taxes. The study 
found that government spending shocks impacts positively on output while a shock to taxes 
has a negative impact on output and a positive effect on inflation. 
 
Muscatelli, Tirelli and Trecroci (2005) also estimated a forward-looking Taylor rule as a 
function of inflation, output and lagged interest rate, over the period 1982Q1-2001Q2 and 
found a significant effect of both output gap and inflation on the nominal interest rate. The 
authors then calibrated the fiscal rules in spending and taxes both as functions of their lag and 
lagged output, using parameter values found from previous studies. The authors simulated the 
model with the estimated fiscal and monetary policy rules, computing the variance frontier. 
The result of the study indicated that tax rules complements a forward-looking Taylor rules 
than spending rules. However, the GMM Method of estimation used in the study is a Maximum 




while estimating the parameters of the DSGE models. The Bayesian estimation technique, on 
the other hand, is able to overcome this problem. 
 
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2007) obtained the optimal fiscal and monetary policy mix that 
maximises economic welfare within a calibrated RBC model augmented with capital 
accumulation, endogenous labour supply and government spending shocks. The authors 
specified a fiscal rule where tax revenue correlates with debt while the monetary rule in interest 
rate responds to its lagged term, inflation and output. The authors calibrated their model to the 
United States data and numerically simulate the policy parameters in both rules. The result of 
the study revealed that in optimised interest rate rule, interest rate responded significantly to 
inflation and insignificantly to output while the optimised fiscal rule shows that tax revenue 
increases slowly to increase in debt. The study also calculated the welfare cost and found that 
the optimised rules yield negligible welfare gains. The rules obtained are called optimised 
simple rules which are expected to guarantee equilibrium determinacy in a model where the 
household utility function and equilibrium conditions are approximated to second order. These 
optimised simple rules are useful in conducting welfare-based analysis in order to obtain 
optimal fiscal and monetary policy mix. 
 
Davig and Leeper (2009) estimated Markov-switching policy rules and also investigated the 
impact of government spending on the aggregate economy via the channel of fiscal-monetary 
policy interaction in the United States. The authors calibrated a NK DSGE model on 
parameters in the equations on preference, technology, price adjustment, real balances, fiscal 
and monetary policy rules, and government spending. All parameters except those for fiscal 
and monetary policy rules and government spending were obtained from previous studies. The 
authors estimated fiscal and monetary policy rules in taxes and interest rate using quarterly 
United States data over the period 1949:1 to 2008:4. The fiscal policy rule in tax depends on 
lagged debt-to-output ratio, output gap, government purchases-to-output ratio and shock term. 
The monetary policy rule in interest rate is the simple Taylor rule that is a function of inflation, 
output and shock term. Both policy rules are assumed to follow a Markov process, switching 
between active and passive states. The estimated fiscal and monetary policy rules are then 




fiscal and monetary policy rules between active and passive regimes. The study also found that 
the policy rule switches are an important determinant of government spending multipliers on 
the economy. The Markov-switching policy rules assumed in this study is essential to capture 
the dynamic and transitional nature of both fiscal and monetary policy across states and time, 
since both policies are in reality, transiting over time, between the passive and active state. 
  
Yemba (2014) calibrated and simulated an open economy NK DSGE model to find the impact 
of optimised fiscal and monetary policy rules with government spending on welfare, real 
exchange and business cycle dynamics. The author solved the system of equations of the model 
using Sims' (2000) second-order accurate method. The study assumed a rich tax and rich Taylor 
rules. The rich tax rule responds to real debt, government consumption, government 
investment, productivity shock and inflation, while the interest rate rule is specified as a 
function of inflation, output gap and nominal exchange rate gap. The study further assumed 
that government is concerned with optimised rules. The government sets policy parameters 
that maximise individual’s utility. The authors of the study then calibrated the model using 
quarterly data for France, Germany, United Kingdom and Netherlands over the period 1977-
2007. Some parameter values are also acquired from past studies while others are arbitrarily 
fixed. The optimised rules were simulated to obtain the policy coefficients. The study revealed 
that both fiscal and monetary policy significantly responds to inflation; the optimal fiscal 
policy stabilises debt.  
 
Gonzalez-Astudillo (2013) used the Bayesian technique to estimate the coefficients of fiscal 
and monetary policy rules within a NK DSGE model. The fiscal rule is specified as following 
a tax path while the monetary rule is specified in interest rate. The coefficients of the policy 
rules are assumed to follow a time-varying process. This is a more realistic assumption 
compared to constant coefficients since parameter values are expected to evolve over time due 
to shifts and structural breaks in the time series. The time-varying coefficients are functions of 
exogenous latent factors that drive the evolution of the policy rules. The author also introduced 
interdependence between both policies by modelling the latent factors to be serially correlated. 
The NK DSGE model is then log-linearised and solved using the minimum state variable 




gap for the United States from 1960Q1-2008Q3. The author found switches between monetary 
and fiscal regimes, in both policy rules. The coefficients of the monetary rule switch frequently 
than the fiscal rule. The impulse response of inflation and output to a shock in tax and interest 
rate was presented and showed that the response of inflation and output to a fiscal and monetary 
shock depends on the existing regime whether monetary or fiscal. 
 
Algozhina (2012) considered the joint interaction of fiscal and monetary policy on inflation, 
exchange rate, and output in Hungary, within a NK DSGE model. The model assumes two 
types of households, optimisers and rule-of thumb individuals. a foreign debt and specifies 
monetary policy rules in interest rate and foreign exchange and fiscal policy rules in public 
investment and public consumption. The Taylor rule is specified as a function of lagged interest 
rate, inflation, output, and the nominal exchange rate, while the rule for the foreign exchange 
intervention is that it responds to the nominal exchange rate and the rate of depreciation. The 
fiscal rules are defined as public consumption and public investment being related to debt and 
output. The author then solved the model by log-linearising its equilibrium system of 
equations. The parameters are calibrated using data over 1995Q1-2011Q3 for the Hungarian 
economy. The author obtained some parameters by estimating the relevant equations in the 
model. After the model had been calibrated, the impulse response functions to shocks in fiscal 
and monetary policy that is, public investment, public consumption and interest rate were 
derived. The findings of the study showed that public investment is not inflationary but boosts 
output while public consumption is inflationary and impacts negatively on output. This implies 
that public investment is welfare-enhancing while public consumption is not. The relevance of 
this study lies in its assumption of the existence of non-Ricardian agents which enables fiscal 
policy to have non-neutral effects on the economy. This current study, therefore, borrows a cue 
from Algozhina (2012) by also assuming the existence of non-Ricardian agents. 
 
2.5.2     Empirical Evidence from Asia 
Cekin (2013) characterised whether fiscal and monetary policy follows an active or passive 
regime. The study investigated the effect of fiscal-monetary policy interaction on the price 
level in Turkey within a DSGE model. The fiscal-monetary policy interactions are explained 




coefficients in the fiscal and monetary rules. The study also estimated a Taylor rule augmented 
with exchange rate over the period 1988Q2-2012Q1 and fiscal rules in tax and budget deficits 
over 1994Q1-2012Q1. The author found that the coefficient of response of monetary policy to 
inflation was less than unity in one era and greater than unity in another. This means that 
monetary policy was passive over a period and active over another period. The study also found 
that fiscal policy switched from active to passive. 
 
The next step is to impute the policy rules into the DSGE model that is linearised and solved 
using Sims’ condition for uniqueness and stability of equilibrium. The author also imputes the 
estimated parameters of the policy rules into the DGE model and numerically simulate to 
unearth that inflation was stable in Turkey over a specified period because fiscal and monetary 
authorities interacted such that an active independent central bank was complemented by a 
passive but disciplined fiscal sector. In a similar manner as Davig and Leeper (2009), this study 
proposed Markov switching policy rules in order to account for transitions in fiscal and 
monetary policy between the passive and active states. 
 
Ehelepola (2014) solved for optimal simple fiscal and monetary policy rules that maximises 
household welfare in Sri-Lanka within a NK DSGE model. The monetary policy rule is a 
Taylor rule specified as nominal interest rate being a function of deviation of inflation rate 
from its steady state and output gap. The fiscal rule is in tax revenue as a function of 
government debt. The study derived a second-order approximation to the policy function of 
the DSGE model and also to the expected utility function of the individual agent. The next step 
is to calibrate the model with the economy of Sri-Lanka using parameter values from some 
existing studies. The study then conducted welfare analysis by comparing the welfare costs of 
the simple policy rules with Ramsey policies under different economic assumptions. The 
findings from the study indicated that optimal monetary policy responds significantly to 
inflation and weakly to output while the optimal fiscal policy is passive in nature and responds 
moderately to changes in debt.  
 
Cebi (2011) assessed fiscal-monetary policy interaction and its stabilising role. He estimated a 




curve, fiscal and monetary policy rules and government budget constraint. The monetary rule 
is the Taylor’s rule and the fiscal rules are specified in government spending and tax in their 
lagged form, output and debt. The author used Bayesian method to estimate the deep 
parameters of the model with data on Turkey over the sample period 2002Q1-2009Q3, in order 
to find the effect of fiscal and monetary policy interaction on inflation, debt and output 
stabilisation. The result showed that monetary policy reacted significantly to inflation but 
mildly reacted to the output gap. Fiscal policy also reacted actively to debt but in a passive 
manner to the output gap. This implies that monetary authorities stabilised inflation while the 
government was able to stabilise debt.  
 
2.5.3    Empirical Evidence from Latin America 
Nunes and Portugal (2010) used the Bayesian method to estimate a NK DSGE model in order 
to characterise whether fiscal and monetary policy had a passive or active stance in the 
aftermath of the inflation targeting regime in Brazil. The equilibrium equations of the study’s 
NK DSGE model consist of the IS curve, the Government budget constraint, the NK Philips 
curve, monetary rule in interest rate, fiscal rules in taxes and equation of motion in debt, interest 
rate, supply shock, demand shock and tax revenue. The model was solved by second-order 
approximation to the policy function. The study then estimated the model by employing the 
Bayesian technique using quarterly data on output gap, inflation rate, interest rate, budget 
deficits and tax revenue over the period 2000Q1-2008Q4.  
 
The results of the estimated parameters showed that the coefficient of inflation and output gap 
in the Taylor rule was greater than one. This means that monetary policy was active over the 
estimated period. The result also revealed that tax responded to debt in an insignificant manner 
while inflation and output gap had greater effect on it. It can then be concluded that fiscal 
policy was passive. The result implies the existence of monetary dominance in Brazil, in the 
post-inflation targeting period. However, the results obtained in this study may require 
reconsideration due to the adoption of the second-order approximation method that does not 
suit the stated objective of the study. The second-order approximation is most appropriate for 





Valdivia and Perez (2013) evaluated the effect of fiscal-monetary policy interaction on price 
level and economic growth during the periods 2007 – 2008 and 2009 – 2010 in seven Latin 
American countries: Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. The 
authors specified a NK DSGE model that comprised of equations in consumption Euler 
equation, IS curve, Philips curve, fiscal policy rule in taxes, monetary policy rule in nominal 
interest rate and money supply, external sector equation, fisher equation and aggregate 
demand. The fiscal policy rule in taxes is defined as function of inflation and economic growth, 
the monetary policy rule in interest rate is specified as related to its lagged term, inflation and 
output, while the monetary policy rule in money supply is specified as being a function of 
lagged money supply, inflation and output.  
 
The parameters in the system of equations were calibrated based on the series in consumption, 
gross fixed capital formation, consumer price index, monetary policy rates, trade balance, 
exchange rate, monetary aggregate, government spending, estimated working population, per 
capita GPD and GDP growth over the period 2000-2012. Some other parameter values were 
obtained from existing studies. The results based on impulse response functions were 
presented. The findings of the study highlighted the importance of coordinating fiscal and 
monetary policy for better economic outcomes across these countries. An evaluation of the 
study revealed that the study did not consider conducting any normative policy analysis that 
borders on optimal policy design, which is relevant in the case of developing and emerging 
economies. 
 
2.5.4     Empirical Evidence from Africa 
Empirical studies on monetary and fiscal policy interaction in Africa within a dynamic general 
equilibrium framework are sparse. One of the few studies in that respect is Anas (2013). 
 
Anas (2013) employed the Bayesian technique to estimate the effect of monetary and fiscal 
policy on inflation and output in Morocco within a DSGE model augmented with price and 
wage rigidity, and monetary and fiscal rules. The monetary rule is the simple Taylor rule while 
the fiscal rules are specified in government spending and taxes. The author solved the DSGE 




rules. The model was then estimated using the Bayesian technique with data on interest rate, 
real GDP, inflation and government spending over the period 1997Q1-2012Q2. The study 
computed impulse responses of inflation, output and other macroeconomic variables to shocks 
in interest rate, taxes and government spending. The result of the study revealed that a shock 
to interest rate lowers output and inflation, a shock to capital taxes lowers investment and 
output while a shock to government spending raises output. This study represents one of the 
few existing works on fiscal and monetary policy interaction within a DSGE model for an 
African economy.  
 
2.5.5     Empirical Evidence from Nigeria  
Empirical studies on monetary and fiscal policy interaction in Nigeria within a dynamic general 
equilibrium framework are also sparse. Adegboye (2015) is one of the few studies known to 
the author. The study first investigated the effect of fiscal and monetary policy interaction on 
inflation and output in Nigeria using the Bayesian method over the quarterly period 1960-2012. 
The author built and solved by log-linearising an open economy NK DSGE model with two 
types of households (Ricardian and Non-Ricardian), firm, external sector, government, with 
fiscal rule in spending as function of lagged spending, lagged output gap and debt; and Taylor 
rule augmented with lagged interest rate and exchange rate. The author also estimated for 
policy parameters using the Bayesian method. The impulse response functions of the fiscal and 
monetary instruments to shocks in output and inflation, were then computed. The result of the 
study showed that monetary policy responds marginally to inflation while the fiscal policy 
responds positively to output gap shock but responds negatively and insignificantly to inflation.  
 
Conversely, the impulse response function of output and inflation to positive shocks in fiscal 
and monetary were presented and the results showed that a shock to government spending 
lowers output but has no systematic impact on inflation. The positive shock to interest rate, on 
the other hand, lowers inflation and increases output. The next objective of the study was to 
solve for optimal fiscal and monetary policy rules that maximise individual welfare by 
maximising expected utility subject to interest rate and government spending rules. The study 




One assumption made in this study that may be unrelated to reality is that the Federal 
Government and the Central Bank of Nigeria can commit to policy rules. 
 
2.5.6 Empirical Nature of Fiscal and Monetary Policy Interactions 
The nature of the interaction between fiscal and monetary policies can be characterised based 
on the positive or negative correlation between them. In this instance, there is a positive 
(negative) correlation between both policies when they act as complements (substitutes). The 
dynamics between fiscal policy and monetary policy can also be described using the 
classification of Leeper (1991). According to Leeper (1991), fiscal and monetary policies can 
interact as a passive and active combination.  
Jawadi, Mallick and Sousa (2016) for instance characterised the existing nature of fiscal and 
monetary interrelation in five emerging economies. The authors found a positive correlation 
between fiscal and monetary policy using the Panel Vector Autoregression method. This 
implies that both fiscal and monetary policy interacts as complements. The study also 
examined the short term macroeconomic effects of fiscal and monetary policies in five 
emerging economies. The result showed that monetary and fiscal policies in interest rate and 
government spending have respectively negative and positive effects on the macroeconomy. 
In a different manner, Chuku (2010) estimated a Markov switching model for regime shifts in 
fiscal-monetary policy interactions in Nigeria over the quarterly period 1970-2008. The results 
showed the dynamics of fiscal and monetary policy to be negatively weak. This means that 
both policies act as weak substitutes. Shahid, Qayyum and Shahid (2016) also found evidence 
for interactions between fiscal and monetary policy after the authors calibrated and estimated 
a small open economy Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium model for Pakistan. However, 
Cazacu (2015) estimated a Structural VAR model for Romania and was unable to find a distinct 
pattern of interactions between fiscal and monetary policies over the quarterly period 2000Q1 
to 2014Q2. 
Gilksberg (2016), with respect to the classification of Leeper (1991), numerically investigated 
the joint fiscal and monetary policy rules that guarantee a unique solution to a dynamic general 
equilibrium model. The authors found that three forms of fiscal-monetary interactions deliver 




combination, active monetary and passive fiscal combination and a passive fiscal and passive 
monetary regime. The passive fiscal-passive monetary regime is a novel finding different from 
Leeper (1991) conventional prescription of an active and passive combination. In the same 
vein, Cevik, Dibooglu and Kutan (2014) found that the fiscal and monetary policies of six 
Emerging European economies over the quarterly period 1995Q1 to 2010Q4, evolve as a 
Markov switching process between an active and passive regime. This indicates the existence 
of divergent forms of interaction between fiscal and monetary policies over a sample period. 
Furthermore, some studies are concerned with examining the existence of fiscal or monetary 
dominance. This closely relates with the active-passive nature of fiscal policy and monetary 
policy. Ornellas and Portugal (2011), for example, estimated a dynamic stochastic general 
equilibrium model and find the degree of fiscal dominance to be trivial in Brazil. This implies 
that the Central Bank may not have to passively adjust its instruments to suit the fiscal stance 
of government. Janku and Kappel (2014) also employed the simple ordinary least square 
regression on quarterly data for Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Poland. The authors 
found evidence of monetary dominance in all the countries except Hungary. This depicts the 
existence of an active monetary policy and a passive fiscal policy.  
Chen (2017), in the same manner, solved and estimated a linear DSGE model and a Markov 
switching model in order to characterise the dynamics between fiscal and monetary policy in 
the United States. The study characterised the nature of both policies as either active or passive. 
The study found that both policies have the most welfare enhancing impact on the economy 
when they interact as an active-active pair. Lima, Maka and Pumar (2012) also used a SVAR 
model to study the interactions between fiscal and monetary policy in Brazil. The study used 
two different identification schemes but produced inconsistent result in deciding the existence 
of fiscal dominance in Brazil. 
Other studies are also concerned with empirically examining the existence or not of Sargent 
and Wallace (1981) hypothesis of the Monetarist Arithmetic. In this respect, they are concerned 
with determining how the fiscal decisions of government constrain the central bank’s ability 
to control domestic inflation. Kliem, Kriwoluzky and Sarferaz (2016), in this regard, estimated 
a Time Varying Parameter- Vector autoregressive model and a DSGE model and found that 




on the form of interactions existing between fiscal and monetary policies. This means that 
fiscally-induced inflation, which is defined as a high magnitude of cyclical relationship 
between fiscal stance and inflation, is likely to occur when a fiscally indisciplined government 
interacts with an independent Central Bank and vice-versa. The authors’ claim that the 
magnitude of relationship between fiscal stance and inflation is independent of the data used 
but on the nature of fiscal-monetary policy regime, is unconvincing, except it is verified by 
other researchers for the sample used or for similar economies to the United States, Italy and 
Germany. 
Dimakou (2015) also investigated fiscal-monetary policy interaction in the face of corruption 
by government officials using an event study analysis on 77 developed and developing 
countries. The author specifically examined the impact of bureaucratic corruption in 
influencing the debt stance of government, and its implication in affecting how the Central 
Bank controls price stability. The finding of the study reiterates the fact that corrupt activities 
have a significant impact in affecting government’s fiscal decisions, which can undermine the 
price stability mandate of the central bank, even in the presence of an independent central bank. 
This pointed to the existence of the arguments of Fiscal Theory of Price Level in the sample 
countries. 
2.5.7  Trends in the Empirical Literature 
 
Some of the patterns identified from the preceding empirical studies include: 
First, the empirical articles can be separated under two major objectives based on whether the 
author(s) sought to examine fiscal and monetary policy interaction or to investigate optimal 
fiscal and monetary policy rules. The first set of articles is positive studies and is concerned 
with estimating or calibrating the parameters in the policy rules (Cebi, 2011; Muscatelli, Tirelli 
and Trecroci, 2005). It is also concerned with establishing the nature of interaction between 
both fiscal and monetary policy and to simulate the effects of policy shocks on macroeconomic 
variables such as inflation and output. The other set of articles is normative and it attempts to 
find optimised policy rules that maximises economic welfare (Ehelepola, 2014; Schmitt-Grohe 





Second, most of the studies on fiscal and monetary policy interaction in DSGE model assume 
that government commit to a policy rule in both fiscal and monetary policy. Therefore, both 
policies are regarded as fully coordinated. Thirdly, these studies also suppose that both 
policymakers are benevolent and therefore concerned with setting policies targets that 
maximise the welfare of the whole society. The fourth empirical pattern concerns the nature of 
interaction between fiscal and monetary policy. Some studies found that both policies were 
interacting in an active-passive manner. Other found that both policies were relating as 
substitutes or complements 
 
The fifth empirical concern is with respect to the macroeconomic variables that the fiscal and 
monetary policy rules interact with. This primarily includes: inflation rate, output gap and debt. 
Studies that focus on the inflation rate and/or output gaps are inferred to be concerned about 
short run macroeconomic outcomes while studies that focus on debt are consider the long run 
macroeconomic outcomes. The sixth empirical concern is that policy interaction is implicitly 
defined in the DSGE model. There is need to explicitly capture the existing interaction between 
fiscal and monetary policies. Finally, one finds sparseness in articles considering fiscal and 
monetary interactions within a dynamic general equilibrium model in Africa and Nigeria, 




Table 2.1: Summary of Empirical Review 
S/N Author, Title and Year of 
Publication 
Objective Methodology Result Critique 
1. Muscatelli, Tirelli and Trecroci 
(2005). Fiscal and Monetary 
Policy Interactions in a New 
Keynesian Model with Liquidity 
Constraints 
-To examine the extent of interaction 
between fiscal and monetary policy 
- To assess the impact of coordinated 
fiscal-monetary policy on variations in 
output and inflation in the United States, 
-NK DSGE Model 
-First-order (log) 
approximation 




- DSGE model 
Shocks to government 
spending impacts 
positively on output while 
shocks to taxes has a 
negative effect on output 
and positive on inflation 
GMM is a Maximum 
Likelihood estimation 
method that presents an 
identification problem. 
This work instead will use 
Bayesian estimation to 
overcome this problem 
2. Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2007). 
Optimal Simple and 
Implementable monetary and 
fiscal rules  
To obtain optimal fiscal and monetary 
policy rules that maximises economic 






Interest rate = f(lagged 
interest rate, inflation and 
output) 
-Optimal interest rate 
responds significantly to 
inflation but 
insignificantly to output 
-Optimal tax rate has mild 
response to debt 
The optimal rules are 
relevant in designing the 
most welfare-enhancing 
manner in which fiscal and 










Table 2.1: Summary of Empirical Review (continued) 
S/N Author, Title and Year of 
Publication 
Objective Methodology Result Critique 
3. Davig and Leeper (2009). 
Monetary- Fiscal policy 
interaction and fiscal stimulus 
- To estimate Markov switching monetary 
and fiscal policy rules 
 -To investigate the effect of government 
spending on output in presence of 
monetary and fiscal policy interaction 
- NK DSGE model 
-Monotone Map method 
Fiscal rule 




Interest rate = f(inflation 
and output gap) 
-Both monetary and fiscal 
policy switches between 
active and passive 
behaviour 
-there is variation in 
government spending 
multiplier on output 
depending on the 
prevailing monetary and 
fiscal policy interaction 
-The Markov-switching 
policy rules assumed in 
this study is essential to 
capture the dynamic and 
transitional nature of both 
fiscal and monetary policy 
across states and time, 
since both policies are in 
reality, transiting over 
time, between the passive 
and active state. This 
improves on the 
conventional static rule. 
4. 
 
Nunes and Portugal (2010). 
Active and Passive Fiscal and 
Monetary Policies: An analysis 
for Brazil after the Inflation 
Targeting Regime 
To examine the impact of fiscal and 
monetary policy interaction on inflation 
and output gap in Brazil 





Interest rate = f(inflation, 
output gap) 
-Coefficient of output gap 
and inflation on Monetary 




insignificantly to debt 
(passive regime) 
The application of Second-
Order approximation in 
this context may not be 
appropriate as it is most 









Table 2.1: Summary of Empirical Review (continued) 
 
 
S/N Author, Title and Year of 
Publication 
Objective Methodology Result Critique 





-the degree of fiscal 
dominance to be trivial in 
Brazil 
The robustness of this 
result should be verified.  
6. Chuku (2010) - to identify regime shifts in fiscal-
monetary policy interactions in Nigeria 
over the quarterly period 1970-2008.  
Markov switching model - fiscal and monetary 
policy to be negatively 
weak.  
- Markov policy process 
provides a richer insight 
into the dynamic of both 
fiscal and monetary 
policies over a time 
7. Algozhina (2012) Monetary and 
Fiscal Policy Interaction in an 
Emerging Open Economy: A 
Non-Ricardian DSGE Approach 
To examine the joint interaction of fiscal 
and monetary policy on inflation, 
exchange rate and output in Hungary 






(debt deviation, output 
gap) 
Monetary rule 
Interest rate = f(lagged 
interest rate, inflation, 
output gap, nominal 
exchange rate) 
-Public consumption is 
inflationary and it 
negatively impacts on 
output 
-Public investment is non-
inflationary and it boosts 
output 
-interest rate significantly 
contributes to inflation 
The work abstracts from 
the assumption of 
Ricardian policy where 
fiscal policy has neutral 
impact on the economy by  
the assumption of non-
Ricardian agents. Non-
Ricardian household 
shows that fiscal policy 
can have non-neutral 








S/N Author, Title and Year of 
Publication 
Objective Methodology Result Critique 
8. Lima, Maka and Pumar (2012) - To determine the interactions between 
fiscal and monetary policy in Brazil.  
SVAR model They use two different 
identification schemes that 
produce inconsistent result 
in deciding the existence 
of fiscal dominance or not 
in Brazil 
-the shock identification 
scheme fails to produce a 
robust result. There is need 
for further studies to 
handle the inconsistency 
9. Anas (2013). Monetary and 
Fiscal Policy in an Estimated 
DSGE Model for Morocco 
To assess the effect of monetary and 
fiscal policy on macroeconomic 









inflation, output, interest 
rate) 
Monetary rule 
Interest rate = f(inflation, 
output gap) 
-shock to interest rate 
impacts negatively on 
output and inflation 
-shock to capital tax 
reduces investment and 
output 
-shock to government 
spending raises output 
-New Keynesian DSGE 
models are better suited for 
economic policy analysis 
when compared to the Real 




Table 2.1: Summary of Empirical Review (continued) 
 
S/N Author, Title and Year of 
Publication 
Objective Methodology Result Critique 
10. Cekin (2013). Monetary and 
Fiscal Policy Interaction in 
Turkey: A Markov Switch 
Approach 
-characterised monetary and fiscal 
policies in Turkey with Markov 
Switching simple policy rules for the 
periods before and after 2001 
 
-To determine the effect of fiscal-







spending, output gap and 
lagged debt) 
Budget deficit = f (lagged 
debt, government 
spending, measure of 
business cycle fluctuation) 
Monetary rule 
Interest rate = f(inflation, 
output gap, exchange rate) 
- both monetary and fiscal 
policies switched over 
time between active and 
passive regimes 
 
-active monetary policy 
and passive fiscal policy 
led to stable inflation  
 
-The Markov switching 
model allows one to 
identify regime shifts in 
the nature of economic 
policies over time 
11. Gonzalez-Astudillo (2013). 
Monetary-Fiscal Policy 
Interaction: Interdependent 
Policy Rule Coefficient 
To determine coordinated fiscal and 
monetary policy rules that impact on 
inflation and output in the United States 






Interest rate = f(inflation, 
output gap) 
-both fiscal and monetary 
policy switch between 
active and passive regimes 
 
-shocks to both tax and 
interest rate reduce 
inflation and output in the 
short-run 
The work shows that fiscal 
and monetary policy rules 
can be dynamic and their 
innovations can be 

















S/N Author, Title and Year of 
Publication 
Objective Methodology Result Critique 
12. Cevik, Dibooglu and Kutan 
(2014) 
-To assess regime switching in fiscal and 
monetary policy of six Emerging 
European economies over the quarterly 
period 1995Q1 to 2010Q4 
Markov switching model -fiscal and monetary 
policies evolve as a 
Markov switching process 
between an active and 
passive regime. 
The Markov switching 
model is limited to 
alternating between two 
policy regimes. Other 
forms of regimes may exist 
13. Janku and Kappel (2014)  - To determine fiscal-monetary policy 
interactions in Slovakia, Hungary, Czech 
Republic and Poland 
Ordinary Least Square  evidence of monetary 
dominance in all the 
countries except Hungary. 
This depicts the existence 
of an active monetary 
policy and a passive fiscal 
policy 
- The violations of the OLS 
assumptions ought to be 
tested in order to make the 




Table 2.1: Summary of Empirical Review (continued) 
 
S/N Author, Title and Year of 
Publication 






Yemba (2014). Tax and 
Monetary Policy Rules in a small 








-To assess the impact of fiscal and 
monetary policy rules on welfare, real 
exchange rate and output gap 









Interest rate= f(inflation, 
output gap, exchange rate 
gap) 
-Optimised fiscal and 
monetary policy rules 
responds significantly and 
negatively to inflation 
- Optimised fiscal rule 
responds most to public 
debt 
-He makes use of a form of 
fiscal rule different and 
richer than the Taylor-type 
one  
-optimised rules are hardly 
relevant in a policy 
environment characterised 
by discretionary decisions 
15. Adegboye (2015). Effect of 
Fiscal and Monetary Policy 
Interactions on Inflation and 
Output in Nigeria 
-To examine the effect of fiscal and 
monetary policy interaction on inflation 
and output in Nigeria 
-To assess optimal fiscal and monetary 
policy that maximises household welfare 






-Monetary policy responds 
marginally to inflation. 
-fiscal policy responds 
positively to output but is 
negative and insignificant 
to inflation. 
-both fiscal and monetary 
policies had significant 
impact on social welfare. 
-assumes that government 
and central banks commit 
to policy rule  
This study will abstract by 
considering the possibility 





Table 2.1: Summary of Empirical Review (continued) 
16. Cazacu (2015) To examine fiscal and monetary policy 
interactions in Romania  
Structural VAR model  - No distinct pattern of 
interactions between fiscal 
and monetary policies over 
the quarterly period 
2000Q1 to 2014Q2. 
This may be sensitive to 
the shock identification 
scheme adopted. 
Robustness of the result 
should be conducted 
17. Dimakou (2015) To assess fiscal-monetary policy 
interaction in the face of bureaucratic 
corruption by public officials on 77 
developed and developing countries 
-event study analysis 
 
-Panel data analysis 
Corrupt activities have a 
significant impact in 
affecting government’ 
fiscal decisions, which can 
undermine the Central 
Bank’s ability to control 
inflation.  
 
The argument of this study 
is relevant in the context of 
developing economies. 
The Dynamic Stochastic 
General Equilibrium 
framework can also be 
used to examine and to 
provide a richer context to 
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Table 2.1: Summary of Empirical Review (continued) 
18. Jawadi, Mallick and Sousa (2016)  To examine the macroeconomic effects of 
fiscal and monetary policies in five 
emerging economies. They also 
characterise the existing nature of fiscal 
and monetary interrelation in these 
economies. 
Panel Vector 
Autoregressive method  
 
 
They find that monetary 
and fiscal policies have 
respectively, negative and 
positive effects on the 
aggregate economy. At the 
same time, both fiscal and 
monetary policy interacts 
as complements. 
This study can also be 
examined using a multi-
country Dynamic 
Stochastic General 
Equilibrium model. This 
will help to complement 
the existing result 
19.. Gilksberg (2016) To investigate the joint fiscal and 
monetary policy rules that guarantees a 
unique solution to a dynamic general 
equilibrium model. 
Numerical simulation of 
Dynamic General 
Equilibrium model 
 finds that three forms of 
fiscal-monetary 
interactions deliver a 
unique rational 
expectations equilibrium. 
These include active fiscal, 
passive monetary 
combination, active 
monetary and passive 
fiscal combination and a 
passive fiscal and passive 
monetary regime.  
The passive fiscal and 
passive monetary regime is 
a novel finding different 
from Leeper (1991) 
conventional prescription 
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Table 2.1: Summary of Empirical Review (continued) 
20. Kliem, Kriwoluzky and Sarferaz 
(2016) 
- To examine the magnitude of fiscally-
induced inflation in the United States, 





-DSGE model  
fiscally-induced inflation 
is high when fiscally 
indisciplined government 
interacts with an 
independent Central Bank 
and vice-versa 
Their claim that the 
magnitude of relationship 
between fiscal stance and 
inflation is independent of 
the data used but on the 
nature of fiscal-monetary 
policy regime, is 
unconvincing, except it is 
verified by other 
researchers for the sample 
used or for sample used for 
similar economies to the 
United States, Italy and 
Germany. 
21. Shahid, Qayyum and Shahid 
(2016)  
- To examine the existence of fiscal-
monetary policy interaction in Pakistan 




-evidence of interaction 




22. Chen (2017)  to characterise the dynamics between 
fiscal and monetary policy in the United 
States 
a linear DSGE model and 
a Markov switching model 
He finds that both policies 
have the most welfare 
enhancing impact on the 
economy when they 
interact as an active-active 
pair. 
An active-active pair 
contrasts Leeper (1991) 
classification of an active-
passive pairing for both 
fiscal and monetary policy 
Source: Compiled by the researcher 
 
S/N Author, Title and Year of 
Publication 




2.7 Summary of Identified Gaps in the Literature 
This section presented the definitional, theoretical, methodological and empirical review of the 
literature on fiscal and monetary policy interactions. 
 
In the definitional review, fiscal and monetary policy interactions in the context of this study were 
defined. In the theoretical review, the major theories of fiscal and monetary policy interactions 
were outlined and critiqued. From the methodological review, one finds that the a-theoretic, game- 
theoretic and dynamic general equilibrium frameworks have been used to investigate fiscal-
monetary policy interactions. The empirical review showed mixed evidence on the interaction 
between fiscal and monetary policy and their impact on macroeconomic variables such as inflation 
and output gap, across different economies.  
 
Finally, the following research gaps can be deduced from the literature reviewed: 
1. The study of fiscal and monetary policy interaction in Nigeria is a nascent one. The few studies 
on fiscal and monetary policy interaction in Nigeria include Chuku (2010); Okafor (2013); 
Englama et al., (2013); Musa et al., (2013). Furthermore, these studies employ a-theoretic 
estimation techniques. For instance, Englama et al., (2013); Musa, Asare and Gulumbe (2013) 
investigate fiscal and monetary policy interaction in Nigeria using the cointegration technique 
while Chuku (2010) use a Markov switch state-space method.  
 
2. There is also sparseness in articles that examined fiscal and monetary policy interaction within 
micro-founded models of the dynamic general equilibrium framework in Nigeria. Adegboye 
(2015) is one of few studies that investigate the effect of fiscal and monetary policy interactions 
on inflation and output in Nigeria, within a dynamic general equilibrium framework. One reason 
for this sparseness is that dynamic general equilibrium modelling in Nigeria is a recent venture 
and only few studies such as Olekah and Oyaromade (2007), Olayeni, (2009), Alege, (2008, 2012), 
Garcia (2009), and Adebiyi and Mordi (2010) exist. 
 
This study however, adapts the models used in these existing works to examine fiscal and monetary 
policy interactions in Nigeria. For example, Alege (2008, 2012) conducts macroeconomic policy 




export policies, but omits both the fiscal sector and assumptions of a small open economy that is 
interacting with the rest of the world. This current study will address these omissions. 
 
3. Most studies on fiscal and monetary policy interaction in DSGE model assume that government 
is a benevolent entity that commits to a policy rule and that fiscal and monetary policy are fully 
coordinated. These assumptions may be unrealistic for a developing country such as Nigeria. These 
assumptions are, therefore, modified in the context of a developing economy. 
 
4. Most studies on fiscal and monetary policy interaction in DSGE model rely on an implicit 
definition of policy interaction. This is because the DSGE framework provides a natural setting to 
consider policy interactions, since it implicitly assumes the existence of simultaneous interactions 
among economic agents, that is, households, firms, central bank and government. This study 
argues that the implicit interaction does not capture the combined effect of both policies on 
inflation and output. The study, however, constructs an interaction variable to explicitly capture 



























In this chapter, stylised facts that depict the empirical regularities surrounding the interaction 
among major economic variables in the context of this study are presented. The chapter is divided 
into five sections. In Section 3.1, the structure of the Nigerian economy is examined. The fiscal 
and monetary policy frameworks that exist in Nigeria are outlined in Section 3.2 and thereafter, a 
trend and business cycle analysis on relevant fiscal and monetary variables vis-à-vis 
macroeconomic outcomes is performed in order to generate relevant preliminary facts in Section 
3.3 and Section 3.4. In Section 3.5, empirical facts on the alternative assumptions used in this study 
are presented. 
3.1  Structure of the Nigerian Economy 
The structure of a national economy is multifaceted. In a broad sense, it encompasses an 
interrelated system- institutional, demographic, geographical, etc- through which activities in an 
economy are coordinated (Anyanwu, 1997). But in a narrow sense, it outlines the patterns and 
composition of relevant sectors as they determine performance in an economy over a period. In 
other words, it presents the patterns and composition of consumption, employment, trade and most 
essentially the production base in an economy. 
By production base, many national economies are divided into three: the primary, secondary and 
tertiary sectors. The economy of Nigeria, in the same vein, is structurally divided into these three 
sectors. The primary sector comprises productive activities related to natural resources and 
includes agriculture, mining and quarrying while productive activities in the secondary sector 
consists of processing primary commodities. It includes manufacturing, building and construction. 
Essentially, services ranging from transport, communication and finance belong to the tertiary 




Table 3.1: Structure of the Nigerian Economy by Sectors 
Primary                                              Secondary                                                        Tertiary 
Agriculture 
  (a) Crop Production 
  (b) Livestock 
  (c) Forestry 
  (d) Fishing 
Industry 
  (a) Crude Petroleum & Natural 
Gas 
  (b) Solid Minerals 
           Coal Mining 
           Metal Ores 
           Quarrying & Other 
Mining 
 
  (c) Manufacturing 
            Oil Refining 
            Cement 





  (a) Transport 
  (b)Information and 
Communication 
  (c) Utilities 
  (d) Accommodation & 
Food Services 
 (e) Finance & Insurance 
 (f) Real Estate 
(g) Professional, 
Scientific & Technical 
Serv.        
 
(h) Administrative and 
Support Services 
Business Services 
  (i)  Public 
Administration 
  (j)  Education 
(k) Human Health & 
Social Services           
 
(l)  Arts, Entertainment 
& Recreation 
 (m) Other Services 
 
 
Source: CBN Statistical Bulletin, 2015 
Just like most economies in Sub-Saharan Africa, the structure of Nigeria’s economy for most of 
the last five decades has been largely skewed to the primary sector activities. Since 1960, for 
instance, Nigeria has continued to depend heavily on the primary sector. Table 3.2 reveals that 
since 1960, the primary sector has continued to contribute the most to nominal Gross domestic 
output relative to the secondary and tertiary sectors. The primary sector which comprises 
Agriculture, Crude oil, Natural Gas and Solid Minerals, accounts for about 65 percent of real 
output and over 80 percent of government revenues. The sector accounts for over 90 percent of 




Nigeria has a narrowly diversified and externally oriented productive base that makes her 
vulnerable to external shocks due to volatility in prices of primary commodities in the international 
market.  
Trends in the secondary sector comprising manufacturing and building subsectors as seen in Table 
3.2 are unimpressive. Specifically, the sectoral contribution of this sector to GDP has consistently 
declined on average from 15.6 per cent in the 1970s to 5.7 per cent in the period, 2001-2009. This 
trend suggests that Nigeria has experienced a process of de-industrialization since the 1970s. Also, 
one may argue that structural transformation of the economy from the primary to secondary sector 
is slow or non-existent.  
By contrast the contribution of the service sector to nominal output has been on the rise for over 
three decades. In the 1980s, the service sector contributed an average of 24.3 per cent rising to 
29.5 per cent in the 2000s. The favourable trend can be explained by several reasons varying from 
the entry of telecommunications companies, the rise of information and communication 
technology and increased sophisticated banking and financial services among others. However, 
with the rebasing of the Nigerian economy in 2014, there has been a dramatic structural change in 
the economy. The tertiary sector in the period 2010-2015 contributed the most to real output, 
making up to 52.0 per cent, the primary sector followed at 36.1 per cent and the secondary sector 
















Table 3.2: Sectoral Contributions to GDP (in percent) 
 
Sources: Sanusi (2010) and CBN Statistical Bulletin, 2015+ 
Note: * Re-based GDP 
 
Considering the structure of the Nigerian economy from the stance of the primary, secondary and 
tertiary sector alone is incomplete. One can also structurally divide the economy into the oil and 
non-oil sectors, although this is a broad classification and is liable to becloud some specific details 
about the economy. This classification is relevant in light of the economy’s heavy reliance on the 
crude oil sector. From statistics presented in Table 3.3, the oil sector contributes less to total output 
relative to the non-oil sector. This is due to the weak linkage of the oil sector to the other sectors 
of the economy, in terms of its low value-addition. The irony is that the oil sector generates more 














































































































































































Table 3.3: Oil and Non-oil contribution to GDP (in percent) 
Activity 
Sector 

































Sources: Sanusi (2010) and CBN Statistical Bulletin, 2015+ 
3.2   Monetary and Fiscal Policy in the Nigerian Economy 
3.2.1 Monetary Policy in Nigeria 
Monetary policy is the combination of measures designed to control the level of money supply, 
interest rates and credit in an economy in tandem with the desired level of economic activity. The 
fundamental goals of monetary policy are attainment of low inflation and sustainable economic 
growth. Other objectives include full employment and stable real exchange rates. In Nigeria, The 
Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) is charged with the formulation and conduct of monetary policy 
(Central Bank of Nigeria Act 1958, 1991 and 2007). Its monetary policy thrust is to control money 
supply and interest rates in order to achieve the ultimate goals of price stability and economic 
growth (Central Bank of Nigeria, 2011a). 
 
Since 1959, the monetary policy of the Central Bank of Nigeria has been conducted under two 
divergent frameworks. These are the exchange rate targeting and monetary targeting regimes. The 
exchange rate framework was used between 1959 and 1974. Under this regime, the value of 
Nigeria’s currency was pegged to the British pound, then to the American dollars and afterwards 
to a basket comprising the currencies of twelve Nigeria’s major trading partners. An advantage of 
the exchange rate framework is that it provides an easily monitored nominal anchor to guide price 
stability. However, in the face of excessive monetary expansions and fiscal dominance, this 
framework can lead to increased inflationary pressures that erode international competitiveness 
and create current account imbalances (Mason, 2006). In Nigeria, the collapse of the Bretton 
Woods system of fixed exchange rates in 1974 and a change in strategy to demand management 
as a means of containing inflationary pressures and balance of payments imbalances posed 





The CBN, by 1974, transited to the monetary targeting framework. The monetary targeting regime 
entails directly controlling monetary aggregates such as the money base in order to control 
inflationary pressures. It remains the current monetary policy framework of the CBN. Unlike the 
exchange rate targeting, the monetary targeting framework allows monetary policy to focus on 
internal or domestic issues (Mishkin, 2000). This framework is effective on the argument that the 
relationship between monetary aggregates and macroeconomic outcomes such as output and 
inflation is stable. In this regard, Agu (2007) demonstrates that monetary aggregates have indeed 
been fairly stable and is an effective tool of monetary policy in Nigeria. Furthermore, this 
framework has continued to be applicable because of its suitability with relatively undeveloped 
financial markets. Alongside the use of monetary targets, the CBN has also implicitly adopted an 
interest rate target. Under this framework, an interest rate serves as the anchor for setting other 
interest rates in the economy. However, with continued evolvement of the financial market and 
economic policy environments, there are indications that Nigeria may transit to an inflation 
targeting regime as currently used by many developed economies. 
 
A second dimension of the monetary policy framework of the CBN can also be classified as the 
adoption of direct or non-market-based instruments (1974-1993) and indirect or market-based 
instruments (1993-date). Before the implementation of the Structural Adjustment Program in 1986 
and with the existence of underdeveloped money and capital markets, monetary policy was 
conducted using direct control. Instruments used in this regime included credit ceilings to deposit 
money banks, sectoral credit allocation to priority sectors of the economy, interest rate and 
exchange rate control. With the introduction of the Structural Adjustment Program in 1986, there 
was a gradual shift to the indirect control or market-based regime. This began with the elimination 
of credit ceiling imposed on some banks and then, the adoption of the Open market operations in 
1993 as the major instrument. Other instruments adopted under this regime include reserve 
requirements and discount window operations.  
 
Following the implicit adoption of an interest rate target by the Central Bank of Nigeria, the 
Minimum Rediscount Rate (MRR) was adopted as the anchor rate. However, in December 2006, 
CBN used adopted the Monetary Policy Rate in place of the Minimum Rediscount Rate, in order 




actions of the apex bank (CBN Monetary Policy Committee Communique No. 48, 2006). Under 
this framework, CBN introduced the standing deposit and lending facility that allowed Discount 
Houses and Deposit Money Banks that need funds to address their liquidity shortages while those 
with excess liquidity can deposit the funds overnight. 
 
A third dimension to the monetary policy framework of the CBN entails the use of a short-term 
framework or medium-term framework. The short-term framework is an annual framework used 
between 1986 till 2001. In 2002, the CBN transited to a medium-term framework, which is a bi-
annual framework, in the implementation of monetary policy. This most recent framework is 
hinged on the assumption that monetary policy actions affects ultimate economic goals with a lag. 
An advantage of the medium-term framework is that it addresses the challenge of time 
inconsistency in the implementation of monetary policy (Central Bank of Nigeria, 2015a).  
 
Another aspect of monetary policy concerns its transmission channel to the economy. With regard 
to this, the major channels in Nigeria are through money aggregates and interest rate. The first 
channel entails setting an operating target using the base money through an intermediate target, 
the broad money supply (M2). Under this channel, the CBN uses the Open Market Operation 
(OMO) to transact financial securities with both banks and non-bank public for the purpose of 
influencing the ability of banks to create money. This invariably affects the level of money 
supplied in the economy. The second channel involves setting an anchor interest rate whose value 
influences expectation of the private sector and then, affects financial asset prices and exchange 
rate. 
 
3.2.2    Fiscal Policy in Nigeria 
Fiscal policy in Nigeria is largely intertwined within fiscal federalism- an intergovernmental fiscal 
relationship existing among the various tiers of government. In a fiscal federalist state, there exists 
more than one tier of government where each has different expenditure and revenue raising 
powers. The various fiscal tools that are implemented are guided by the existing fiscal federalist 
structure, as contained in the Nigerian constitutions, development plans and specific frameworks 




The various Nigerian Constitutions explicitly allocates taxation and expenditure power among the 
existing tiers of government. For instance, the Richard Constitution of 1946 divided Nigeria into 
the Northern, Western and Eastern regions alongside the Federal Government. Under this era, the 
Philipson Commission appointed to assign fiscal and administrative duties to the regional 
governments, stipulated that regional governments be entitled to revenues that included personal 
income tax, property tax, licenses, etc while revenue accruing to the federal government was to be 
shared using the derivation principle. The Philipson Commission arrangement was discarded as 
the Richard Constitution of 1946 was replaced by the Macpherson Constitution of 1951. 
 
Under the Macpherson Constitution of 1951, the Macpherson Arrangements, Hicks Philipson 
Commission, Chick Commission and Raisman Commission were appointed respectively. Some 
important fiscal reviews under these regimes include the allocation of more taxing power to the 
regional government. The Raisman commission also created a distributable pool account where a 
certain per cent of federally-collected revenue was paid and shared among the regions using the 
sharing formula: 40 per cent to the North, 31 per cent to the East, 24 per cent to the West and 5 
per cent to Southern Cameroon. The Macpherson Constitution of 1951 was replaced by the 1960 
Constitution and then, the 1963 Constitution, when Nigeria became a Republic. Under the 1963 
Constitution, the Binns Commission was created to review existing fiscal procedures. The Binns 
Commission recommended an increase of federal contribution to the distributable pool account 
from 30 to 35 per cent. With the creation of a fourth region, the Mid Western region, the revenue 
sharing formula was also reviewed.  
 
A slight change to the federal structure occurred after the military government seized power in 
1966. The four regions were transformed into a 12-state structure by General Yakubu Gowon in 
1967. Under the military regimes, various decrees were promulgated to determine fiscal 
responsibilities and powers among the states and central government. For example, Decree No.13 
of 1970 adopted population and equality of states as revenue sharing formula. Other reputable 
commissions adopted include the Aboyade Technical Committee on Revenue Allocation and the 
Okigbo Commission. Also, the current 1999 Constitution provides a framework that guide 




level of government as contained in the exclusive, concurrent legislative list, the residual list and 
the establishment of local government. 
 
Tables 3.4 and 3.5 illustrate the allocation of tax and expenditure powers among the three tiers of 
government- Federal, State and Local- in Nigeria. It can be implied from Table 3.4 that the Federal 
Government collects revenue from major sources such as the Import and Excise duties, Mining 
rents and royalties; and the petroleum profits tax, while the State and Local Government have 
jurisdiction over low yielding sources. The Federal Government is, then, able to raise more revenue 
to meet its expenses (Anyanwu, 1999). 
Table 3.4: Tax Jurisdiction in Nigeria 




Mining rents and 
royalties 
Petroleum profits tax 
Companies income tax 
Capital gains tax 
Personal income tax 
Value added tax 
Football pools and other betting 
taxes 




Land registration fees 
Capital gains tax 




Market and trading licenses 
and fees 




















Table 3.5: Expenditure Responsibilities in Nigeria 
Federal only Federal-State 
(shared) 



































i.e. any subject 
not assigned to 






-Control and regulation 




-Social welfare, sewage 
and refuse disposal, 
registration of births, 
deaths 
-Marriages 
-Primary, adults and 
vocational education 
-Development of 
agriculture and natural 
resources 
 
Source: Nigerian Constitution (1999) 
 
A second channel by which fiscal policy in Nigeria is planned and implemented is through the 
Development Plans. The development plans are useful in delineating fiscal policies in Nigeria. 
Nigeria has, over the decades, adopted various forms of development planning ranging from long 
term, medium term, short range, perspective plans and rolling plans (Anyanwu, Oyefusi, 
Oaikhenan and Dimowo, 1997). In these plans, government projected expenditure strategies are 
usually outlined.  Development planning in Nigeria began with the Ten-Year plan of Development 
and Welfare (1945-1955) and the Second Plan (1955-1960) in the colonial era. Furthermore, in the 
post-independence era, there have been four National Developments (1962-1968; 1970-1974, 
1975-1980 and 1981-1985), five rolling plans (1990-1992,1991-1993, 1993-1995, 1994-1996 and 
1997-1999), medium term plans: National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategies 
(NEEDS I and II) and Vision 2020 as a perspective plan. Some of the policy thrusts of these plans 
are summarised in Anyanwu et al., (1997) as: generating significant additional revenue, 
diversification of the revenue base, achieve macroeconomic stability, attain job creation and 





The conduct of fiscal policy in Nigeria can also be deciphered by specific frameworks such as the 
Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2007. The Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) sprang 
from this act. The MTEF is a three-year rolling plan which articulates government’s proposed 
expenditure and revenue and its fiscal policy goals. It comprises a macroeconomic framework, a 
fiscal strategy paper, expenditure and revenue framework, consolidated debt statement and 
statement of contingent liability (Fiscal Responsibility Act, 2007). Furthermore, the MTEF serves 
as a framework for preparing the annual budgets. Some examples of MTEF include: 2009-2011, 
2011-2013, 2013-2015, 2014-2016 and currently, 2015-2017. Recently, the Federal Government 
launched the Economic Recovery Growth Plan (ERGP), a medium- term plan for the period 2017-
2020 (Ministry of Budget and National Planning, 2017). This plan is geared towards resuscitating 
the Nigerian economy after a short bout of recession, investing in the human capital base of Nigeria 
and enhancing the global competitiveness of the nation. 
 
Lastly, the annual budget is the fourth framework that has been used to guide fiscal policy in 



















Table 3.6: Nigerian Annual Budgets   
Year Thrust Revenue 
( N’billion) 
Expenditure 
 ( N’billion) 
Fiscal 
deficit as 
% of GDP 
Debt service 
( N’billion) 
2000 -reduce inflationary trend 
-provide enabling factors for 
private-sector led economic growth 





















2003 Embark on a growth strategy that 
would achieve fiscal stability; 
improve non-oil sector 
competitiveness; reduce inflation; 
maintain a fiscal deficit not 










- External debt 
servicing- 252 
2014 Continuation of prudent economic 
management in order to build on 
recent economic growth to support 
job creation and more 
infrastructure 





















Described as “A Transition 
Budget”, that focuses on managing 
the declining revenue and 
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3.2.3 Monetary and Fiscal Policy Coordination in Nigeria 
The Central Bank of Nigeria and the Federal Ministry of Finance are two independent bodies in 
charge of respectively conducting monetary and fiscal policy in Nigeria. However, by the Central 
Bank of Nigeria (CBN) Act of 2007, the CBN is granted operational independence to direct 
monetary policy using policy instruments and variables such as the policy rates and broad money 
supply. Its primary macroeconomic objective is to attain price stability. Conversely, the Federal 
Ministry of Finance (FMF) alongside adjunct parastatals such as the Debt Management Office 
(DMO) oversees fiscal policy using instruments such as taxes and expenditure, usually with the 
focal objective of long term economic growth and fiscal policy sustainability. 
 
Often times conflicts and externalities arise when monetary and fiscal policy variables and targets 
are independently set and implemented which threatens the internal consistency in the 
macroeconomy and leads to suboptimal policy outcomes (Garba, 2004). As a result, there is need 
to harmonise both policies, necessitating the existence of both institutional and operational 
frameworks for harmonising these policies in Nigeria.  
 
Institutional Framework of Policy Coordination in Nigeria 
The institutional framework creates avenue for joint decision making between the Central Bank of 
Nigeria and the Federal Ministry of Finance through formal or informal committees. Firstly, on a 
high level, the joint decision making occurs through a bilateral interaction between head of the 
fiscal and monetary institutions. Secondly, the joint interaction takes place with formal committee 
meeting. Some of them include: The Fiscal Liquidity Assessment Committee (FLAC) of the CBN, 
Monetary and Fiscal Policy Coordinating Committee (MFPCC) of the DMO and Cash 
Management Committee of the Federal Ministry of Finance. FLAC comprise of members from 
Federal Ministry of Finance, Debt Management Office (DMO), Office of the Accountant- General 
of the Federation (OAGF), Budget Office of the Federation (BOF), Nigerian National Petroleum 
Corporation (NNPC), Nigeria Customs Service (NCS), Federal Inland Revenue Service (FIRS), 
the Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR) and relevant departments of the Central Bank of 
Nigeria, who meet weekly to deliberate on the government fiscal operates affects CBN’s goal of 




template for forecasting the Treasury’s operations as input to the Bank’s Liquidity Assessment 
Model (Central Bank of Nigeria, 2011b). 
 
Secondly, the Monetary and Fiscal Policy Coordinating Committee (MFPCC) of the DMO is a bi-
monthly committee meeting that was created in 2003 to handle matters relating to the way 
monetary activities of the CBN affects budget deficit financing and management of the public 
debt. This is because monetary policy decisions influences government’s capacity to finance 
budget deficits as it determines the cost of obtaining and servicing its debts. Her members include 
delegates from Federal Ministry of Finance, Budget office of the Federation (BOF), Office of the 
Accountant-General of the Federation (OAGF), National Planning Commission (NPC), Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC), Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE), Pension Commission 
(PENCOM), Federal Inland Revenue Services (FIRS), National Insurance Commission 
(NAICOM), National Assembly and the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN).  
 
Thirdly, the Cash Management Committee of the Federal Ministry of Finance is charged to 
monitor and project revenue and expenditure of Federal Government. Her members meet monthly 
and include representatives of Office of the Accountant-General of the Federation (OAGF), 
Budget office of the Federation (BOF), Revenue Generating Agencies of the Government and the 
CBN. 
 
3.3    Trend Analysis on Fiscal and Monetary Policy in Nigeria 
In this section, trend analyses underlying the relevant variables of this study are outlined. The trend 
analysis involves eye-balling the long-term data on relevant fiscal and monetary variables, using 
statistical tools such as tables and charts, in order to generate some statistical facts. These range 
from those describing macroeconomic outcomes in Nigeria, to separate facts on fiscal and 







3.3.1 Trend Analysis on Macroeconomic Outcomes in Nigeria 
a. Output growth rate has been fluctuating over time  
The Nigerian economy grew at an average rate of 6.22 per cent in the 60s. The average 
output growth rate rose to 31.05 per cent and 57.91 per cent between the periods 1971-80 
and 1981-90 respectively. In the 90s however, the average growth rate in that decade 
declined to 2.11 per cent and later rebounded to 8.56 per cent in the period 2000-2013. At 
6.22, 2.11 and 8.56 per cent, the output growth rate for three sub-periods: 1961-1970, 1991-
2000 and 2001-2013 are below the mean growth rate of the entire period 1961-2013, which 
stands at 20.46 per cent. On the other hand, the average growth rate for only two sub-
periods:1971-80 and 1981-90 are above the mean growth rate for the entire period. This 
implies a mix of rise and decline in aggregate economic performance over the period 1961-
2013. The figures are presented in Table 3.7. 















20.46 6.22 31.05 57.91 2.11 8.56 
          Source: CBN Statistical Bulletin (2011, 2013) 
b. There is an upward inflationary trend between 1961 and 2015 
The graph on Consumer Price Inflation in Figure 3.1 shows that the average inflation rate was 4.33 
per cent between 1961-1970 but trended upwards to 15.43 per cent in the 70s and 20.63 43 per 
cent in the 80s. The average inflation rate continued to rise, it increased to 30.60 per cent in the 
1990s. However, between the period 2001 and 2015, the rate of inflation declined to 13.67 per 
cent. One notable reason for this decline stems from the improved macroeconomic outcomes as a 
result of policy choices embarked upon in that decade which came along with Nigeria’s transition 




In addition, over the period 1985-2015, the inflation rate hovered more in the double-digits than 
single-digit range. This implies that the Central Bank has found it rather tasking to control the 
price level within the desired range. 
 
Figure 3.1: Consumer Price Inflation over the period 1961-2015. 
Source: World Development Indicators (2016) 
 
3.3.2    Trend Analysis on Fiscal and Monetary Outcomes in Nigeria 
c. There is a persistent rise in monetary aggregates 
There has been a persistent rising trend in monetary variables. In Table 3.8, a persistent rise in the 
levels of base money, narrow money and broad money is observed. All three variables skyrocketed 
by more than 1000 per cent in the period 1960 and 2015. This closely mirrors the extent of the 
volume of money which has been injected into the economy over the last five decades. This fact 


































Table 3.8: Trend in levels of Base Money, M1 and M2 (N’Million) 
 Source: CBN Statistical Bulletin (2013,2015) 
d. The value of the Real Interest Rate is more easy than tight  
The real interest rate is selected to explain the monetary policy stance in Nigeria, since it serves as 
an operating target that the Central Bank of Nigeria directly controls. The monetary policy stance 
can be tight, neutral and loose. A tight, neutral and loose monetary policy means that the real 
interest rate is respectively decreasing, constant and increasing. In Table 3.9, it is shown that of 
the 46 observations over the period 1970-2015, the monetary stance was loose/easy in 24 years 
and tight for 22 years. Moreover, the average for the sample period indicates a loose monetary 
policy stance. The loose monetary policy stance of the Central Bank, over this period, means that 
the CBN pursued primarily, the policy of lowering real interest rates in order to stimulate credit 
creation and investment borrowing in the economy. It also may reflect in a cursory manner, a 











1960 157.05 217.61 272.40 
1970 388.90 641.5 978.2 
1980 4,797.5 9,650.7 15,100.00 
1990 18,341.00 39,156.2 68,662.50 
2000 354,674.28 637,731.14 1,036,079.55 
2010 1,845,714.52 5,571,269.89 11,525,530.3 




Table 3.9: Monetary Policy Stance in Some Selected Years 
                  Year                             RIR (%) Stance 
1970   -29.27 Easy 
1975   -13.97 Easy 
1980   -3.55 Easy 
1985   3.69 Tight 
1990   14.65 Tight 
1995   -43.57 Easy 
2000   -10.32 Easy 
2005   -3.34 Easy 
2010   -42.31 Easy 
2006   -0.37 Easy 
2013   10.25 Tight 
2015   13.6 Tight 
             Average   -2.01 Easy 
Source: CBN Statistical Bulletin (2015). *Easy monetary policy is associated with negative 
values 
 
e. Total Government Expenditure has been increasing over time 
The trend in Total Government spending as shown in Figure 3.2 provides preliminary evidence of 
the expansionary nature of fiscal policy in Nigeria. Figure 3.2 reveals that since 1961, there has 
been a rising trend in Government spending pattern. For example, government expenditure stood 
at N163.90 million in 1961, but by 2013 and 2015, it had spiralled upwards to N 5.1 and N4.98 
trillion. This reflects the increased intervention of government in the Nigerian economy and that 







Figure 3.2: Trend in Total Government Expenditure 1960-2015 
Source: CBN Statistical Bulletin (2013, 2015) 
 
 
In terms of per cent growth, Total Government Expenditure grew from 22.81 per cent in the period 
1961-1970 to 38.25 per cent in the 70s. This upward trend is closely linked to revenue accrued 
from the oil boom of the early 1970s. In the period from 1981 to 1990, government expenditure 
declined to 17.68 per cent largely due to the austerity measures in the 80s. By the period 1991-
2000, Total Government Expenditure rebounded to 33.95 per cent before it reduced to 14.82 per 
cent over the period of 2000-2015, as shown in Table 3.10. The pattern of growth in the total 
Government Expenditure across the various decades, especially in the 70s and 80s, mirrors the 
procyclical nature of fiscal policy in Nigeria. The procyclical stance shows that the direction of 
government spending correlates positively with movements in oil prices and thus, oil revenue. This 







































































Table 3.10: Growth in Total Government Expenditure (percent) 
Period 1962-1970 1971-1980 1981-1990 1991-2000 2001-2015 
Average Growth in 
Total Government 
Expenditure (%) 
22.81 38.25 17.68 33.95 14.82 
Source: CBN Statistical Bulletin (2011, 2015) 
f. Nigeria has had more budget deficits than surplus  
Figure 3.3 reveals that Nigeria has experienced more episodes of budget deficit than surplus over 
the period from 1961 to 2015. There are more points in the negative zone (beneath the straight 
line) than in the positive zone in Figure 3.3. An economy is deduced to have an expansionary 
stance when its fiscal balance is in deficit and a tight stance when its balance is in surplus. The 
implication of the fact displayed in Figure 3.3 is that the fiscal stance of the Nigerian government 













                           Figure 3.3: Fiscal balance as a percent of GDP (1961-2015) 





































g. Nigeria has had an expansionary fiscal stance 
This buttress the fact examined in the preceding Sub-section (f). The fiscal balance is considered 
to be a measure of the fiscal policy stance. Table 3.11, therefore, provides further evidence that 
fiscal policy in Nigeria can be concluded to have been easy or expansionary in its stance over the 
period 1970- 2015. The stances displayed in Table 3.11, for example, show that fiscal policy in 
1995 alone was tight while it was easy in the other years. 
 
Table 3.11: Fiscal Policy Stance in Nigeria in some selected years (1970- 2015) 
Year  Budget deficit as % of GDP Stance 
1970 -8.62 Easy 
1975 -1.99 Easy 
1980 -3.98 Easy 
1985 -4.48 Easy 
1990 -8.27 Easy 
1995 0.05 Tight 
2000 -2.26 Easy 
2005 -1.11 Easy 
2010 -2.04 Easy 
2013 -1.44 Easy 
                       2015 -1.65 Easy 
Average -3.60 Easy 
Source: CBN Statistical Bulletin (2015). *Easy fiscal policy is associated with lower and negative 
values. For instance, negative fiscal balance depicts deficits which are expansionary in nature 
 
3.3.3     Trend Analysis on the Interaction between Fiscal and Monetary Policy  
h.   There is positive correlation between Government Expenditure and Monetary 
Policy Rate 
The correlation matrix in Table 3.12 displays the correlation between fiscal and monetary policy 
over the period 1970-2015. The correlation coefficient linking the fiscal variable proxied by 
government expenditure (GE) and the monetary variable proxied by monetary policy rate (MPR) 




correlation can be interpreted that fiscal and monetary policies over the last five decades have 
interacted in a complementary manner. This implies that an expansionary fiscal (monetary) policy 
has been accompanied by a corresponding expansionary monetary (fiscal) policy. 
 
Table 3.12: Correlation Matrix- government spending and policy rate 
 GE         MPR   
GE 1.0000  
 
        0.6030 




        1.0000   
Significant values are reported in brackets ( ). 
 
i. There is bi-directional causality between Government Expenditure and Base 
Money 
This evidence is seen in the result of the Granger Causality test on output, inflation, government 
expenditure and reserve money over the period 1960-2015. In the result which is reported in Table 
3.13, there is a bi-directional causality between the fiscal and monetary variable that implies that 
both policies interacted in a way that each influences the stance of each other. A complementary 
VAR Granger Causality test which was also conducted on budget deficit and interest rate 
corroborated the existence of a bi-directional causality between the fiscal and monetary policy. 
The bi-directional causality between the fiscal and monetary variable shows that spill-overs exist 
between both policies. There are policy spill-overs or externality when one policy influences the 
behaviour of the other i.e. fiscal (monetary) policy influences the outcome of monetary (fiscal) 
policy. It can then be concluded that the policy decisions taken by the Central Bank of Nigeria is 











Table 3.13: Pair-wise Granger Causality Test 
Null Hypothesis                                                Probability 
RM does not Granger Cause GE 1.9E-6 
GE does not Granger Cause RM 0.00013 
 
3.3.4    Trend Analysis on the Interaction between Policy and Macroeconomic 
Outcome in Nigeria 
j. Government Expenditure and Monetary Policy Rate are positively correlated 
with Output 
Table 3.14 shows that the trend in both policy variables (government expenditure and monetary 
policy rate) are positively and significantly correlated with output at 0.88 and 0.70, respectively. 
This reflects the significance of both fiscal and monetary policy in influencing the long-term 
outcome of output level in Nigeria. 
 
k. Government Expenditure and Monetary Policy Rate are weakly correlated 
with Inflation 
Table 3.14 also reveal that both government expenditure and monetary policy rate are 
insignificantly correlated with inflation rates. The coefficient of correlation of government 
expenditure with inflation is negative at -0.09 while that of the monetary policy rate is positive at 
0.18. This presents preliminary facts that fiscal and monetary policy variables weakly explains the 













Table 3.14: Correlation Matrix-Policy and Macroeconomic outcomes 
 GDP INF GE MPR 







































3. 4    Business Cycle Facts on Fiscal and Monetary Policy Interactions 
Business cycle facts, that is, the statistics that explain the cyclical components of fiscal and 
monetary policy, are presented in this section. The business cycle statistics are obtained by 
applying the hp-filter technique on logged variables on Real GDP, inflation, government 
expenditure and base money over 1970-2015, to derive their corresponding cyclical series. 
Therefore, the following business cycle statistics that include Standard deviation, autocorrelation, 
correlation and cross-correlation are highlighted in Table 3.15. 
Table 3.15: Business Cycle Statistics on Real GDP, Government Expenditure and Base Money 
Variables 




            38.05% 
Relative Volatility 1 
Phase Shift - 
Autocorrelation Not Persistent 





Relative Volatility 0.56 
Autocorrelation           Persistent 
Phase Shift Leading 





Relative Volatility 0.65 
Autocorrelation Not Persistent 
Phase Shift Lagging 
 
l. The cyclical components of policy variables are relatively smoother than output 
fluctuation 
The volatility of each series is known from the value of its standard deviation. The Relative 
Volatility is used to compare the volatility (standard deviation) of a variable with others, especially 
with GDP. It is defined as the volatility of a variable relative to that of the aggregate economy. It 




coefficients describing the relative volatility in Table 3.15 reveal that the cyclical fluctuations in 
government expenditure and reserve money are less volatile when compared to economy wide 
fluctuation in real GDP.  
m. The cyclical components of fiscal and monetary policy variables are weakly 
correlated with output  
In Table 3.15, the coefficients of the contemporaneous correlation of fiscal and monetary policy 
variables (Xt) are seen to be less than 0.5. This depicts the weak association of fluctuations in 
policy variables with output fluctuation. It implies that fiscal and monetary policies are fairly 
effective for output stabilisation at the short run frequency in Nigeria. However, it can also be 
deduced from Table 3.15, that monetary policy has been more effective than fiscal policy, at output 
stabilisation, based on the comparison of the magnitude of their contemporaneous correlation 
coefficients (Xt ). 
n. Fiscal policy is countercyclical  
The negative correlation between fluctuations in a variable with fluctuation in aggregate economic 
activity is interpreted as being countercyclical. The contemporaneous correlation between 
Government expenditure and GDP in Nigeria, is negative (-0.05), as shown in Table 3.15. This 
means that when the economy is in a recession (boom), government spending increases 
(decreases). The countercyclical nature of government spending in the short run differs from its 
procyclical stance over the long run (see section 3.3.4). One caveat to this preliminary fact is that 
the correlation coefficient is so close to zero (0) such that countercyclical relationship between 
government spending and the state of economy is trivial.  
o. Monetary policy is pro-cyclical 
The positive correlation of fluctuations in a variable with fluctuations in aggregate economic 
activity is interpreted as pro-cyclicality. Base money is shown to be positively correlated with 
GDP in Table 3.15. This implies that when the Nigerian economy slides into a recession (boom), 
the Central Bank of Nigeria usually responds with a tight (easy) monetary policy. The pro-cyclical 
stance of monetary policy at business cycle frequency is similar to the stance found at the long run 




p. The cyclical components of fiscal and monetary policy variables are fairly 
correlated with price level  
The magnitude of the contemporaneous correlation of the cyclical component of government 
expenditure and base money with price level is greater when compared to their correlation with 
output fluctuations. In Table 3.16, the coefficient of correlation for government expenditure and 
base money is 0.2013 and 0.5111 as compared with those presented in Table 3.15 (0.061 and -
0.058). This implies that fiscal and monetary policy tools are more effective at price level 
stabilisation than at output stabilisation. 
Table 3.16: correlation with CPI 
Cyclical components Correlation with CPI 
Consumer Price Inflation           1 
 
Government Expenditure          0.2013 
         (0.1798) 
 
Base Money          0.5111 
         (0.0003) 
Significant values are reported in brackets ( ). 
 
q. Fiscal variable and monetary variables are positively correlated 
Table 3.17 shows the positive association between government expenditure and base money; and 
between budget deficit and real interest rate. This correlation implies that fiscal and monetary 
policies act as complement at business cycle frequency. This means an expansionary fiscal 
(monetary) policy is being accompanied by a corresponding expansionary monetary (fiscal) policy 
and vice-versa. The positive correlation at business cycle frequency also corresponds with the 








Table 3.17: Cyclical Correlation between Fiscal and monetary policy 
















Significant values are reported in brackets ( ). 
 
3.5 Empirical Facts on Alternative Assumptions 
In this section, some empirical evidences buttressing the existence of alternative assumptions, 
adopted in this study are presented i.e. rent-seeking, discretionary fiscal policy and weak policy 
coordinated. These include: 
 
r. Rent-seeking in Nigeria 
According to Martini (2014), there is existing evidence that shows that throughout Nigeria’s post-
colonial history, politicians, members of government and public officials have abused their 
positions to extract state resources. This act has taken place through embezzlement of public funds, 
nepotism, cronyism, etc. 
 
This evidence is corroborated by the low performance of Nigeria in indices such as Transparency 
International’s Corruption Perception Index and the World Governance Indicators. The Corruption 
Perception Index is presented in Table 3.18. Table 3.18 shows that between the period 2012 and 
2016, Nigeria scored poorly between 25 and 28 out of 100. It indicates that there is deep 
corruption/rent-seeking in the country’s public sector. An implication of this index is that with 
deep-seated corruption, especially in the public sector, resources are highly likely to be channelled 








Table 3.18: Corruption Perception Index for Nigeria 











            Source: Transparency International (2016) 
 
Furthermore, using the World Governance Indicators (WGI) which measures the quality of 
governance in a society and can proxy for the state of political institutions in a country, there is 
evidence that politicians and members of government have rarely fared well in enhancing the 
society’s welfare. The WGI shows how an individual country performs in six individual indicators: 
Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism, Government 
Effectiveness, Rule of Law, Regulatory Quality and Control of Corruption. Two of the indicators 
(Government Effectiveness and Control of Corruption) are presented in figures 3.4 and 3.5. 
Government Effectiveness captures the quality of public services and the degree of its 
independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and 
the credibility of government's commitment to such policies while the Control of Corruption 
concerns the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain (World Governance 
Indicators, 2016). Figures 3.4 and 3.5 reveals that Nigeria hovers, in an unimpressive manner, 
between the 10-25th percentile on a scale of 0-100th, in both Government Effectiveness and Control 





Figure 3.4: Aggregate Indicator on Government Effectiveness in Nigeria over the period 1996-
2015.   
Source: World Bank’s World Governance Indicator, 2016 
 
 
Figure 3.5: Aggregate Indicator on Control of Corruption in Nigeria over the period 1996-2015. 







s. Discretionary Fiscal Policy in Nigeria 
The fact that government pursues discretionary fiscal policy means two concepts. First, it means 
that government takes specific actions or interventions to address a particular economic situation 
per time. In a similar vein, it also means that government deviated or did not comply with an 
already laid down fiscal rule. 
In Nigeria, the Fiscal Responsibility Act (2007) contains procedural and numerical fiscal rules that 
should guide fiscal actions. However, evidence shows that the Nigerian government has not 
conformed to these rules (Yelwa, 2010; Onodugo and Amujiri, 2015). This is also corroborated by 
the Fiscal Rule Dataset (1985-2015) of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The dataset shows 
information on the use and design of fiscal rules in 96 countries, including Nigeria. It presents 
details on various characteristics of the fiscal rule, which include legal basis, coverage, escape 
clauses, enforcement procedures, key supporting institutions and monitoring of these rules. The 
fiscal rule data is presented in Table 3.19. It reveals that there are no existing enforcement and 
monitoring procedures for the fiscal rules in Nigeria. This indicates the ease with which 
government may deviate from the existing fiscal rules. 
Table 3.19: Enforcement and Monitoring of Fiscal Rules in Nigeria 

















































t. Fiscal and Monetary Policies have been weakly coordinated  
 
Policy is deemed coordinated when both fiscal and monetary policy take on the same policy stance. 
An example is when both policies take on a tight or loose stance (Nyamongo, Sichei and Mutai, 
2008; Rothenberg, 2004). In Table 3.20, it is revealed that over the period 1970-2015, there is 
evidence that fiscal and monetary policy had more uncoordinated than coordinated stances. Fiscal 
and monetary policy was coordinated in 21 of the entire 46 years, while policy was seen to be 
uncoordinated in the remaining 25 years. This means that fiscal and monetary policy can be 
concluded to have been more uncoordinated than coordinated in Nigeria, and therefore, implies 
weak coordination. This suggests that the Federal Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank of 
Nigeria did not fully harmonise their policy targets and directions. Englama et al., (2013) also 
attest to the weak state of policy coordination in Nigeria over the period 1980 to 2011.  
 
Table 3.20: Policy Coordination in Nigeria for selected years (1970-2015) 
Year       Bdef Stance RIR  stance Inference 
1970 -8.62 
 
Easy -29.27 Easy C 
1980 -3.98 Easy -3.55 Easy C 
1990 -8.27 Easy 14.65 Tight NC 
2000 -2.26 Easy -10.32 Easy C 
2010 -2.04 Easy -42.31 Easy C 
2011 1.97 Tight    5.94 Tight C 
2012 -1.37 Easy    6.88 Tight NC 
2013 -1.44 Easy  10.25 Tight NC 
2014 -0.94 Easy  11.35      Tight NC 
2015 -1.65 Easy  13.59 Tight NC 
Average -3.60 Easy  Tight NC 
Source: CBN Statistical Bulletin (2015) 
Note: *Policy is coordinated when fiscal and monetary policy are both tight or loose. NC: Not 







3.6 Summary of Key Issues 
Preliminary statistical facts describing fiscal-monetary policy interactions and alternative fiscal 
assumptions have been presented in this chapter. The major issues arising from these facts show 
that there is preliminary evidence of: (1) positive correlation, that is, complementary interactions 
between fiscal and monetary policies in Nigeria (2) bi-directional causality between both policies 
such that there is proof of ongoing interactions between fiscal and monetary policies. This means 
that fiscal (monetary) policy influences the stance and overall macroeconomic effect of monetary 
(fiscal) policy (3) positive and significant impact of both macroeconomic policies on output but 
an insignificant influence on the price level (4) the existence of rent-seeking, discretionary fiscal 
policy making and weak policy coordination. The aforementioned statistical facts are used as basis 




























The theoretical base of this study and the estimation strategy to address its primary objectives are 
outlined in this chapter. The Chapter has been divided into three Sections. Section 4.1 discusses 
the theoretical framework used in this thesis. In particular, the framework of the New Keynesian 
Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium model was outlined. Section 4.2 presents the relevant 
research method. The Section comprises the model specification and then the applicable estimation 
strategy is stated. Thereafter, the data sources and measurement are listed. In Section 4.3, the 
method to compute optimal fiscal and monetary policy is examined. 
4.1 Theoretical Framework 
The theoretical base of this work hinges on the New Keynesian School of economic thought. The 
model is first presented and then, applied in the context of this study.  
4.1.1 The New Keynesian Macro-Economic Model 
The New Keynesian model is the theoretical underpinning of this study. This school of economic 
thought sprang up in the 1980s after the New Classicals such as Robert Lucas and Thomas Sargent 
critiqued some existing traditional Keynesian ideas. For example, the Keynesians developed and 
estimated large scale macro econometric models that could be used to predict and forecast the 
impact of policy. Critics like Robert Lucas believed that the specified model lacked a theoretical 
foundation and that estimated parameters in such models will vary in response to changes in policy 
intervention. This variation implies that policy recommendation is time-inconsistent and is 
regarded as a potential drawback to policy analysis and forecast. Lucas argued for the formulation 
of structural econometric models with a strong theoretical underpinning and micro foundation that 




looking and optimising behaviour of economic agents in macroeconomic models to be used for 
policy analysis. 
The work of Mankiw and Romer (1991) is regarded as one of the major contributions to the New 
Keynesian School. This school maintains traditional Keynesian ideas that include the existence of 
imperfect competition among firms and the notion of sticky prices and wages. The implications of 
these assumptions are that there are frictions that prevent prices and wages from adjusting quickly 
to shocks and market failures are possible. This necessitates the intervention of government 
through stabilisation policies to adjust the price mechanism and return the economy to equilibrium. 
The Keynesian also advise the use of stabilisation policies because monetary policy has non-
neutral effects on the economy. 
 
Based on the Lucas critique, the New Keynesian School adopts the micro foundation of the Real 
Business cycle (RBC) model as expounded by the New Classical, in explaining the existing 
macroeconomic theories of the traditional Keynesians. They also borrow from the rational 
expectation school which assume forward looking households and firms who make decisions 
based on the expectation of the future. This culminates in a methodological framework introduced 
by the New Classical: the dynamic general equilibrium method (DGE).  
 
The New Keynesian Dynamic General Equilibrium Models recognise the forward looking and 
optimising behaviour of economic agent. They deviate from traditional assumptions of frictionless 
markets, flexible prices and neutrality of money. They recognise the existence of real and nominal 
shocks, non-trivial effect of monetary policy, monopolistic competition and nominal rigidity. In 
the canonical model, there are 3 economic agents: the household, firms and central banks. The 
household purchases goods, holds money and bonds, supplies labour to the firms and maximises 
its expected present value of utility. There are two types of firms: intermediate and final goods 
producers. The firms produce differentiated products in monopolistic competition while the 
Central Bank sets the nominal interest rate using Taylor-type rules. 
 
The New Keynesian Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model has been adopted 
for this study and is most appropriate to examine fiscal and monetary policy interactions since it 




around the world for such purpose. Secondly, the model recognises a role for fiscal and monetary 
policy in stabilising the economy in the face of shocks. Thirdly, the DSGE model provides a natural 
setting to examine policy interactions since it assumes existing interdependencies among economic 
agents in the different sectors. 
 
The Standard New Keynesian DSGE Model 
The NK DSGE models stem from the contributions of scholars such as Gali and Gertler (1999), 
Smets and Wouters (2003, 2007), Gali (2003), Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005). In these 
models, there are three optimising agents: households, firms and the Central Bank. The abridged 
model (detailed model is found in sub-section 4.2.1) entails: 
 
Household: A representative household derives utility from consumption and disutility from 
labour, and maximises his utility function: 


















      
          (4.1) 
Where 𝐸0: Rational expectation operator 
𝛽𝑡: intertemporal discount factor 
𝛾: Inverse of elasticity of substitution 
𝐶𝑡: Consumption 
𝐿𝑡: Amount of labour supplied 
subject to the inter-temporal household budget constraint (equation 4.2) which shows the total 
income versus their total outlay and is specified as: 
𝑃𝑡𝐶𝑡 + 𝐸𝑡(𝑄𝑡 ,𝑡+1𝐷𝑡+1) ≤ 𝑊𝑡𝑁𝑡 + 𝐷𝑡 + 𝑇𝑃𝑡 + 𝐷𝑉𝑡                         (4.2) 
Where, 
𝑊𝑡𝑁𝑡: Wage bill 
𝑇𝑃𝑡: Transfer payment from government 
𝐷𝑉𝑡: Dividend 




𝐷𝑡+1: Payment at period 𝑡 + 1 from a portfolio of state contingent claims 
𝐸𝑡(𝑄𝑡 ,𝑡+1): One period ahead stochastic discount factor 
Aggregate resource constraint: It is assumed that there is no capital in the economy. Total sum 
of consumption (𝐶𝑡) at each period t of all individual (𝐶𝑖𝑡), therefore, equals the total sum of income 








         
          (4.3) 
Firms: The firms produce the goods and services in the economy (𝑌𝑖𝑡) with a linear production 
function using labour inputs (𝐿𝑖𝑡) and technology (𝑧𝑡) such that: 
it t itY z L                     (4.4) 
The firms are also faced with a price setting decision. They follow the Calvo (1983) staggered 
price-setting mechanism such that while a fraction 𝜇 cannot reset their prices, the other fraction 
1 − 𝜇 can. Therefore, in order to fix prices, 𝑃𝐷,𝑡
∗ , the firms must reset their prices by maximising 
their real discounted profits subject to demand such that: 
Max Et ∑ (βθ)
k∞
k=0 Et,t+k Yt+k(i) [𝑃𝐷,𝑡
∗ −  mct+k]               (4.5) 
Subject to 






𝑌𝑡+𝑘                  (4.6) 
Where, 
Et,t+k : Stochastic discount factor for nominal payoffs in period t + k 
Yt+k(i) : Output in period t + k of good i 
𝑃𝐷,𝑡
∗ : Fixed price that maximises real discounted profits 
mct+k: Real marginal cost in period t + k 
Et : Rational Expectation Operator  




Central Bank: The Central Bank set nominal interest rate by following a Taylor type rule where 


























R                (4.7) 
Where, 
Rt: Interest rate  
Rt−1: lagged interest rate 
πt: Inflation rate 
Yt: Output growth 
St: Exchange rate 
εt
R: Innovation to monetary policy 
ρR: Degree of interest rate smoothing 
φπ, φY, φS: Parameters that measures the response of Central Bank to inflation, output and 
exchange rate. In addition,  R, π, Y, S  are the target values of interest rate, inflation rate, output 
and exchange rate. 
Exogenous Stochastic processes: It is assumed that both real and nominal shocks perturb the 
economy. The shocks are modelled as autoregressive processes of lagged innovations of order one, 
as defined in equation (4.8): 
1t t tz z                       (4.8) 
𝑡~ 𝑖. 𝑖. 𝑑 (0, 𝜎𝜀) 
The preceding canonical model omits the fiscal sector. The model has therefore been extended to 
include the fiscal sector. The New Keynesian DSGE models with fiscal policy initially assumed 
the existence of Ricardian equivalence i.e: a passive or neutral role for fiscal policy. In these 
models there is lump sum taxation and the government faces an inter-temporal solvency condition 
(Leeper, 1991; Leeper and Leith, 2015; Sims, 1994; Bianchi and Ilut, 2016). A later variant of the 
New Keynesian DSGE model gives an explicit role to fiscal policy which sets a policy rule and 
introduces non-Ricardian fiscal effects by assuming the existence of rule of thumb households. 




economy (Gali, Lopez-Salido, and Valles, 2007; Algozhina, 2012; Rossi, 2014). This study will 
include these recent features to capture the interaction between fiscal and monetary policy. 
 
In conclusion, some of the reasons for adopting the New Keynesian model include its usefulness 
for policy analysis since it identifies a role for stabilising (fiscal and monetary) policies. It 
recognises the importance of both real and nominal shocks. It also utilizes a rich dynamic 
optimising and microeconomic background for analysing the decisions of economic agents. It 
recognises the existence of frictions, nominal rigidities and imperfect markets that underlie the 
dual structure of developing economies such as Nigeria. At the same time, with the apparent 
disequilibrium between aggregate demand and supply in the Nigerian economy, this study has 
adopted the NK model (Alege, 2008). The model can also be estimated and provides good policy 
forecast and evaluation. 
4.2 The Research Method 
 
This thesis argues that the fiscal decision of government interacts with instruments and targets of 
monetary policy in Nigeria. This study is, therefore, concerned with empirically testing existing 
theoretical propositions for the impact that fiscal policy wields on monetary outcomes in Nigeria 
and vice-versa. It also examines the effect of the policy interactions on output and inflation in 
Nigeria. The study, therefore, investigates fiscal and monetary interactions within an Open 
Economy New Keynesian DSGE Model that deviates from the assumptions of a benevolent 
government who commits to a policy rule. In this instance, government is assumed to have rent-
seeking tendencies and prefers to use policy discretion in maximising the welfare of a subset of 
the society (see sub-section 3.5 to prove the relevance of rent-seeking and policy discretion in 
Nigeria). The adopted assumptions indicate that this study considers the underlying political 
dimensions to economic policy.  
 
This study captures the rent-seeking tendencies of the fiscal bloc by specifying a utility function 
which shows that the government benefits from both providing public goods and from rent-seeking 
activities that boosts its personal gains. The utility function also admits a fiscal shock and a 
parameter on the quality of existing political institution, which serves in a complementary manner 




in sub-section 4.2.1). In addition, the discretionary policy of government is illustrated in this study 
by considering the micro-foundation of the fiscal sector, in contrast to specifying a fiscal (Taylor-
type) rule. The government is assumed in this instance, to maximise its per period utility function 
subject to its budget constraint (Fragetta and Kirsanova, 2010). 
 
4.2.1  An Open Economy New Keynesian DSGE Model for Nigeria 
 
(a) Structure of the Model 
 
The model is constructed drawing on the works of Gali and Monacelli (2005), Gali and Monacelli 
(2008), Gali (2008), Almeida (2010), Senbeta (2011), Rossi (2014), Miller (2016), Li and Spencer 
(2014) and Adegboye (2015). The study adapted the political economy assumption from Miller 
(2016). The remaining studies aforementioned were instrumental in constructing the Small Open 
Economy (SOE) NK DSGE model. The DSGE model adopted in this study comprises of five 
optimising agents: households, firms, the central bank, government and rest of the world, who 
form model-consistent expectation based on available information. The infinitely lived household 
decides how much units of goods to consume and labour to supply in order to maximise its lifetime 
utility subject to budget constraints. It is assumed that there are two types of household, the 
Ricardian and Non-Ricardian. Unlike the Ricardian, the Non-Ricardian agent is liquidity-
constrained and lacks access to the financial market (Conen and Straub, 2005; Gali, Lopez-Salido 
and Valles, 2007 as cited in Torres, 2015). A large amount of Non- Ricardian consumers implies 
that fiscal policy is not passive as proposed in models with Ricardian equivalence (Rossi, 2014). 
The household also form habits in their consumption. This means that utility is time non-separable; 
it depends on consumption in previous period. The household sector is also assumed to supply 
labour to firms in a perfectly competitive labour market. 
 
In the production sector, there are the final-good producer and the intermediate-goods producers. 
The final-good producer operates under a perfectly-competitive market and can re-optimise their 
prices. The final-good producer aggregates the goods of the intermediate firms using the Dixit-
Stiglitz (1977) framework. The intermediate-goods producers are in monopolistic competition and 
cannot change prices. Following the Calvo (1983) sticky price setting, a fraction of the 




the Central Bank of Nigeria that implements monetary policy by following a Taylor-type rule to 
set its policy rate. It is also posited that Nigeria is a small open economy linked to a foreign 
economy, which is the Rest of the World. As a small open economy, the size of the Nigerian 
economy is tiny and lacks a significant influence on the Rest of the World. Finally, there are some 
exogenous shock processes. 
 
The fiscal authority, the Federal Government of Nigeria, is the fifth agent. In many instances, the 
fiscal authority is modelled to be benevolent i.e. it is concerned with the welfare of the whole 
society (Algozhina, 2012; Leeper and Leith, 2015; Bianchi and Ilut, 2016). It purchases from firms, 
issue bonds, collects lump sum taxes, and makes transfer payment to keep balanced budget. 
Secondly, in these studies, the government commits to a fiscal rule in spending and taxes. This 
present study deviates from these two assumptions, since they may not be realistic in developing 
economies such as Nigeria. 
The study rather assumes the existence of political friction i.e. the government may be concerned 
with maximising the benefit of a subset of its citizen due to its rent-seeking tendencies (Miller, 
2016). Secondly, it is postulated that the fiscal authority uses discretion in choosing its policy on 
spending and taxes. An implication is that, if the monetary authority commits to a rule while the 
fiscal authority relies on discretion, this can be termed a non-cooperative policy game, further 
implying weak or non-existing coordination between the two policies (Dixit and Lambertini, 
2003). This conjecture is realistic since there is evidence of weak coordination between fiscal and 
monetary policy in Nigeria (Englama et al., 2013). The model adopted for this study, therefore, is 
a Small Open Economy, Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium model which comprises of two 
types of households, firms, the monetary authority and a rent-seeking, discretionary fiscal bloc. 
 (b) The Model 
In what follows, the study presents the relevant equations of the Small Open Economy, Dynamic 







(i) The households 
There is a continuum of infinitely lived households 𝑗 ∈ [0,1] who decides how much units of goods 
to consume and labour to supply in order to maximise its lifetime utility subject to its inter-
temporal budget constraints. It is made up of two types of household, where the fraction 𝜇 are 
Ricardian households. They are forward-looking optimisers who have access to the financial 
markets and own the firms in the economy. The other fraction (1 − 𝜇) are non-Ricardian 
households who are liquidity constrained since they can neither borrow nor own firms. 
Ricardian Households 
The Ricardian consumer derives utility at time 𝑡 from consuming a composite good, 𝐶𝑡 relative 
to habit formation, public good 𝐺𝑡 and leisure 1 − 𝑁𝑡. There is neither saving nor investment. 
𝐸𝑡 ∑ 𝛽
𝑡∞
𝑡=0 𝑈((𝐶𝑅,𝑡 − ℎ𝐶𝑅,𝑡−1), 𝐺𝑡 , 𝑁𝑡)                      (4.9) 
Equation (4.9) is stated in its explicit form in equation (4.10). The households’ objective is 
therefore to maximise the sum of discounted expected future utility as shown in equation (4.10) 















)]                   (4.10) 
Where 𝐸𝑡: Rational expectation operator 
𝛽𝑡: Inter-temporal discount factor 
𝐶𝑅,𝑡: Private consumption of composite goods 
𝐺𝑡: Consumption of public goods 
𝑁𝑡: Amount of labour supplied 
ℎ: Co-efficient of habit formation 
𝜎: Inverse of elasticity of substitution 




𝜑: Inverse on Frisch elasticity of labour supply 
ℎ, 𝜎, 𝜒, 𝜑 > 0;                   0 < 𝛽𝑡 < 1 
Consumption,𝐶𝑅,𝑡, is a composite good which consists of domestic goods 𝐶𝐷,𝑡 and foreign goods 
𝐶𝐹,𝑡. This implies that the household allocates its resources in consuming both domestically 
produced goods and imported goods. The composite good 𝐶𝑅,𝑡 is defined using the Dixit-Stiglitz 
(1977) Constant Elasticity of Substitution in equation (4.11)  











                    (4.11) 
Where 𝐶𝐷,𝑡: Index of consumption of domestic goods 
𝐶𝐹,𝑡: Index of consumption of foreign goods 
1 − 𝛼: Degree of openness 
𝛼: Home-bias parameter 
: Elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods 
And where 𝐶𝐷,𝑡 and 𝐶𝐹,𝑡 are assumed to be Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) aggregators of individual 
consumption goods. They comprise of a continuum of both domestic and foreign goods given by: 





                      (4.12) 





                      (4.13) 
In equations (4.12) and (4.13), parameter > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between different 
goods produced in the domestic economy. 
The household decides to allocate a given level of expenditure between domestic and foreign 
goods. They minimise total expenditure on domestic and foreign goods in equation (4.14) 




subject to equation (4.11) to yield the demand function of both the domestic and foreign goods: 





𝐶𝑅,𝑡                      (4.15) 





𝐶𝑅,𝑡                                 (4.16) 
Where, 𝑃𝑡: Aggregate consumer price index 
𝐶𝑅,𝑡: Composite consumption index 
𝑃𝐷,𝑡,𝑃𝐹,𝑡:  domestic and foreign price index 
𝐶𝐷,𝑡, 𝐶𝐹,𝑡: consumption index on domestic and foreign goods 
The price indices PF,tand PD,t, which is the minimum expenditure at which the household can buy 
one unit of CD,t and CF,tare given by: 
𝑃𝐷,𝑡 = [∫ 𝑃𝐷,𝑡(𝑖)
1−𝜀𝑑𝑖]
1
1−𝜀                      (4.17) 
 
and 
𝑃𝐹,𝑡 = [∫ 𝑃𝐹,𝑡(𝑖)
1−𝜀𝑑𝑖]
1
1−𝜀                      (4.18) 
The aggregate price level, which is the consumer price index, is defined by aggregating 
equations (4.15) and (4.16) as: 




1−𝜂                              (4.19) 
 
The household maximises utility function in equation (4.10) subject to a standard budget constraint 
in nominal terms. The budget constraint postulates that the household receive wages for their 
labour supply 𝑊𝑡𝑁𝑡 ,  they own the firm and receive profit in form of dividend 𝐷𝑉𝑡, they own stock 
of risk-free financial assets, 𝐷𝑡 and receive lump sum transfer from government 𝑇𝑃𝑡. The 
household use their resources to pay consumption goods 𝑃𝑡𝐶𝑅,𝑡 and to purchase portfolio of 
financial assets, 𝐷𝑡+1. This relation can be written as: 





𝐸𝑡(𝑄𝑡 ,𝑡+1) ≡ 𝑄𝑡 = (
1
1+𝑖𝑡
): One period ahead stochastic discount factor 
𝑖𝑡: Nominal interest rate 
𝐷𝑡+1: Payment at period 𝑡 + 1 of portfolio held at the end of period t 
The Langragian function derived by maximising equation (4.10) subject to equation (4.20) is given 
by: 













𝑡[𝑊𝑡𝑁𝑡 + 𝐷𝑡 + 𝑇𝑃𝑡 + 𝐷𝑉𝑡 − 𝑃𝑡𝐶𝑅,𝑡 −
𝐸𝑡 (𝑄𝑡 ,𝑡+1𝐷𝑡+1)]                                             (4.21) 
The first order conditions (FOCs) with respect to consumption, labour supply and financial assets 
are obtained from equation (4.21) as: 




: (𝐶𝑅,𝑡 − ℎ𝐶𝑅,𝑡−1)
−𝜎






















                      (4.23) 







𝜑+ 𝜆𝑡𝑊𝑡 = 0                                  (4.24) 





As usual, the FOC on financial asset is derived by taking the partial derivative of 𝐷𝑡. This yields: 
𝑄𝑡 ,𝑡+1 = 𝛽 
𝜆𝑡+1
𝜆𝑡
                       (4.25) 
Substitute equation (4.23) into equation (4.25), this becomes: 







                     (4.26) 
Take expectations of both sides of equation (4.26). This becomes: 







]                    (4.27) 
Where 𝐸𝑡𝑄𝑡 ,𝑡+1 ≡ 𝑄𝑡 =  
1
(𝑅𝑡)
. This is substituted into equation (4.27) which can then be re-
written as:  







                     (4.28) 
Equation (4.28) is the consumption Euler Equation. The inter-temporal consumption Euler 
equation is one of the two major optimality conditions for the household sector. It describes the 
optimal consumption of the household between the current and future period. 
Equation (4.28) is log-linearised to obtain: 
𝑐𝑅,𝑡 − ℎ𝑐𝑅,𝑡−1 = 𝐸𝑡(𝑐𝑅,𝑡+1 − ℎ𝑐𝑅,𝑡) −
1−ℎ
𝜎
(𝑟𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡Π𝑡+1)                             (4.29) 
Where, 




The second optimality condition is the intra-temporal consumption. It shows the marginal rate of 
substitution between consumption and labour supply. To derive the intra-temporal consumption 
equation, we combine the FOC on consumption with that of labour supply such that: 



















                      (4.30) 
Equation (4.30) is re-arranged and yields: 
𝑊𝑡
𝑃𝑡
=  (𝐶𝑅,𝑡 − ℎ𝐶𝑅,𝑡−1)
𝜎
𝑁𝑡
𝜑(1 + 𝜏)                                           (4.31) 
Log-linearise equation (4.31) to get the labour supply schedule for the Ricardian household. This 
becomes: 
𝑤𝑡 − 𝑝𝑡 =
𝜎
1−ℎ
(𝑐𝑅,𝑡 − ℎ𝑐𝑅,𝑡−1) + 𝜑𝑛𝑡                    (4.32) 
Non-Ricardian Household 
The liquidity constrained consumer maximises the same utility function in equation (4.10) subject 
to the budget constraint in equation (4.33):  
𝑃𝑡𝐶𝑁𝑅,𝑡  ≤ 𝑊𝑡𝑁𝑁𝑅,𝑡 + 𝑇𝑃𝑡                                 (4.33) 
The budget constraint postulates that the household receives only wage bills 𝑊𝑡𝑁𝑡 and lump sum 
transfer from the government 𝑇𝑃𝑡 and uses its income to buy consumption goods. The budget 
constraint takes this form since it is assumed that the non-Ricardian household cannot accumulate 




The Lagrangian function is obtained by combining equations (4.10) and (4.33), to get: 













𝑡[𝑊𝑡𝑁𝑡 + 𝑇𝑃𝑡 − (1 + 𝜏)𝑃𝑡𝐶𝑡]         
                                               (4.34) 
As usual, the First order conditions with respect to consumption, labour supply and 𝜆𝑡 are obtained 







                      (4.35) 
𝜕ℒ
𝜕𝑁𝑡




                       (4.36) 
𝜕ℒ
𝜕𝜆𝑡𝑡
: 𝑊𝑡𝑁𝑁𝑅,𝑡 + 𝑇𝑃𝑡 − 𝑃𝑡𝐶𝑁𝑅,𝑡 = 0                                (4.37) 




=  (𝐶𝑁𝑅,𝑡 − ℎ𝐶𝑁𝑅,𝑡−1)
𝜎
𝑁𝑁𝑅,𝑡
𝜑                                (4.38) 
The consumption equation for the non-Ricardian household is given by log-transforming the 




(𝑤𝑡 − 𝑝𝑡 + 𝑛𝑁𝑅,𝑡) +
𝑇𝑃
𝑃𝐶
(𝑡𝑝𝑡)                    (4.39) 
The law of motion of the Transfer payment to non-Ricardian household is: 
𝑇𝑃𝑡 =  𝜌𝑇𝑃𝑇𝑃𝑡−1 + 𝑡
𝑇𝑃                                                                                                            (4.40) 
Equation (4.39) shows that the non-Ricardian household does not optimise but simply equates their 
consumption expenditure to wage income plus transfer payment from government. Furthermore, 
the labour supply schedule in equation (4.38) is derived as  
𝑤𝑡 − 𝑝𝑡 =
𝜎
1−ℎ





(ii) The firms 
Following Gali and Monacelli (2005), it is assumed that there is a continuum of identical 
monopolistic competitive firms 𝑗 ∈  [0,1], in the domestic economy, that produce differentiated 
goods using a linear production technology with labour as the only input: 
𝑌𝑡(𝑗) = 𝐴𝑡𝑁𝑡(𝑗)                       (4.42) 
Where 
𝐴𝑡: Total Factor Productivity 
𝑁𝑡(𝑗): Labour input for each firm 
Log 𝐴𝑡  ≡  𝑎𝑡 is assumed to evolve with an AR (1) process such that: 
𝑎𝑡 =  𝜌𝑎 𝑎𝑡−1 + 𝑡
𝑎 
𝑡
𝑎 is the technology shock to production in the economy. It is normally distributed with mean of 
zero and the standard deviation is 𝜎𝜀𝑎 ,  i.e., 𝑡
𝑎 ∼ 𝑁(0, 𝜎2𝜀𝑎) 
Let the aggregate output produced across the firms be defined as: 









                                 (4.43) 
𝑌𝑡 is an index for aggregate domestic output which is similar to that of consumption in equation 
(4.11). 
The intermediate firms optimise in two stages. In one stage, they take wages accrued on labour 
services as given. They determine the quantity of labour required in order to minimise cost. They 
minimise their total cost subject to the linear production technology in equation (4.42). This is 
stated as follows: 
𝑀𝑖𝑛 𝐶 =  
𝑊𝑡
𝑃𝑡
𝑁𝑡 + 𝑄𝛾                                             (4.44) 






: Real wages 
𝑁𝑡: Amount of labor  
The Langragian function is obtained as:   
ℒ = 𝑊𝑡𝑁𝑡 + 𝜆𝑡[𝑌𝑗,𝑡 − 𝐴𝑡𝑁𝑗,𝑡]                                (4.45) 
The first order conditions with respect to 𝑁𝑡and 𝑌𝑗,𝑡 yields: 
𝜕ℒ
𝜕𝑁𝑗,𝑡







: 𝜆𝑡                        (4.47) 





                        (4.48) 




                        (4.49) 
Log-linearising equation (4.49) yields: 
𝑚𝑐𝑡 = 𝑤𝑡 − 𝑝𝑡 − 𝑎𝑡                       (4.50) 
From the linear production function in equation (4.42), we derive the amount of labour demanded 
by each firm 
𝑁𝑗,𝑡 =  
𝑌𝑗,𝑡 
𝐴𝑡
                        (4.51) 




𝑁𝑗,𝑡 =  
𝑌𝑗,𝑡 
𝐴𝑡




This implies that: 
𝑁𝑡 =  
𝑌𝑡 
𝐴𝑡
                        (4.52) 
Log-linearise equation (4.52) to get the production relation in equation (4.53) as: 
𝑛𝑡 = 𝑦𝑡 − 𝑎𝑡                        (4.53) 
Price setting 
In the second stage of the optimisation problem of the intermediate firms, the firms are concerned 
with setting the optimal price for their goods. The firms in this regard, set prices following the 
Calvo (1983) price-setting mechanism such that at each period, 1 −  fraction of randomly 
selected domestic firms set prices optimally, while the other  fraction keep their prices 
unchanged. Let 𝑝𝑡(𝑗)
∗  represent the price chosen by firm j resetting its price in period t. 𝑝𝑡(𝑗)
∗  is 
assumed to be identical across all firms since they will choose the same price in any given period 
such that 𝑝𝑡(𝑗)
∗ = 𝑝𝑡
∗. The firms fix prices,𝑃𝑡
∗, by maximising their nominal discounted profits 
subject to demand constraints such that: 
 
Max Et ∑ (βθ)
k∞
k=0 Et,t+k Yt+k|t [𝑃𝑡
∗ − mct+k|t]             (4.54) 
Subject to 






𝑌𝑡+𝑘                (4.55) 
Following several algebraic manipulations as reserved in Appendix eight, the optimisation 
problem from equations (4.54) and (4.55) yields the optimal pricing equation of the resetting 
firm such that: 
𝑝𝑡
∗ − 𝑝𝑡−1 = 1 − βθ ∑ (βθ)
k Et 
∞
k=0 [mct+k|t̂ + 𝑝𝑡+𝑘 − 𝑝𝑡−1]           (4.56) 




Equation (4.56) can be re-arranged and re-written as: 
𝑝𝑡
∗ = 𝜇 + (1 − βθ) ∑ (βθ)k Et 
∞
k=0 [mct+k|t + 𝑝𝑡+𝑘]                  (4.57) 
Where, 
𝜇 = −𝑚𝑐 ≡ log
− 1
 
From equation (4.57), it can be deduced that firms set a price according to the desired mark-up 
over a weighted average of expected marginal cost 
 (iii)  Rest of the World 
It is assumed that the world economy consists of a continuum of countries. Each economy is a 
small open one and its decisions have no significant international impact. The rest of the world is 
assumed to be a closed economy where domestic goods represent a negligible fraction of the 
world's consumption. It is also assumed that there are identical preferences across the households 
in both the domestic and foreign economies. The open economy relationship between the terms of 
trade, consumer price index inflation, the real exchange, international risk sharing and uncovered 
interest parity is derived. This is to obtain the open economy relations that is needful in subsequent 
derivation of the open economy IS curve, Philips curve and the goods market clearing conditions.  
 
The Law of One Price (LOP) 
It is assumed that there is complete asset market, with zero arbitrage in the international market. 
The law of one price holds such that: 




                        (4.58) 
LOP holds when Ψ𝑡 = 1. This becomes: 
𝑃𝐹,𝑡 = 𝑡𝑃𝑡





Ψ𝑡: Law of one price gap, LOP holds when Ψ𝑡 = 1 
𝑡: Nominal Exchange rate 
𝑃𝑡
∗: World price index 
𝑃𝐹,𝑡: Domestic price of imported goods 
Log-linearising equation (4.59) yields: 
𝑝𝐹,𝑡 = 𝑒𝑡 + 𝑝𝑡
∗                             (4.60) 
Real Exchange Rate 
The real exchange rate is defined as the ratio of the world price index to that of domestic price, 
which is: 




                  (4.61) 
Where, 
𝑄𝑡: Real exchange rate 
𝑡: Nominal Exchange rate 
𝑃𝑡
∗: World price index 
𝑃𝐷,𝑡: Domestic price  
The log-linearisation of equation (4.61) gives: 
𝑞𝑡 = 𝑒𝑡 + 𝑝𝑡
∗ −  𝑝𝐷,𝑡                 (4.62) 
Terms of Trade 
The terms of trade between the domestic economy and foreign economy is defined as the ratio of 
domestic prices (exports) to foreign prices (import). It measures the competitiveness of the 




𝑆𝑡 =  
𝑃𝐷,𝑡
𝑃𝐹,𝑡
                  (4.63) 
Where 
𝑆𝑡: Terms of trade 
𝑃𝐷,𝑡: Price of domestic goods 
𝑃𝐹,𝑡: Price of foreign goods  
The log-linearisation of the terms of trade in equation (4.63) will be: 
𝑠𝑡 = 𝑝𝐷,𝑡 −  𝑝𝐹,𝑡                 (4.64) 
Domestic and Consumer Price Index (CPI) Inflation 
The CPI Inflation is defined as the rate of change in the aggregate price index (that comprises the 
domestic and foreign price index) while the domestic inflation is the rate of change in the domestic 
price index. The log-linearisation of the Consumer Price Index, 𝑃𝑡 = (𝑃𝐷,𝑡)
1−𝛼 + (𝑃𝐹,𝑡)
𝛼 around 
a symmetric steady state where the Purchasing Power Parity holds (i.e: 𝑃𝐷,𝑡 =  𝑃𝐹,𝑡) leads to: 
𝑝𝑡 = (1 − 𝛼)𝑝𝐷,𝑡 + 𝛼𝑝𝐹,𝑡                (4.65) 
Simplifying further, this becomes: 
𝑝𝑡 = 𝑝𝐷,𝑡 − 𝛼(𝑝𝐷,𝑡 − 𝑝𝐹,𝑡)                (4.66) 
Since 𝑠𝑡 = 𝑝𝐷,𝑡 −  𝑝𝐹,𝑡 from equation (4.64), substitute it into equation (4.66) to get: 
𝑝𝑡 = 𝑝𝐷,𝑡 − 𝛼(𝑠𝑡)                 (4.67) 
Using a one-period lag, equation (4.67) becomes: 
𝑝𝑡 − 𝑝𝑡−1 = 𝑝𝐷,𝑡 − 𝑝𝐷,𝑡−1 − 𝛼(𝑠𝑡 − 𝑠𝑡−1)              (4.68) 
Equation (4.68) can be re-written as: 




Equation (4.69) relates the CPI inflation (𝜋𝑡 = 𝑝𝑡 − 𝑝𝑡−1), domestic inflation (𝜋𝐷,𝑡 = 𝑝𝐷,𝑡 −
𝑝𝐷,𝑡−1)  and the terms of trade (𝑠𝑡 = 𝑝𝐷,𝑡 − 𝑝𝐹,𝑡). It shows that the difference between the two 
measures of inflation is proportional to changes in terms of trade. Parameter 𝛼 is the coefficient of 
proportionality. 
The link between the terms of trade and the law of one price 
Next, equation (4.66) 𝑠𝑡 = 𝑝𝐷,𝑡 − 𝑝𝐹,𝑡which defines the terms of trade is combined with 
equation (4.60) 𝑝𝐹,𝑡 = 𝑒𝑡 + 𝑝𝑡
∗that depicts that the law of one price holds to give: 
𝑠𝑡 = 𝑒𝑡 + 𝑝𝑡
∗ − 𝑝𝐷,𝑡 
Make 𝑒𝑡 the subject of the formula: 
𝑒𝑡 = 𝑠𝑡 − 𝑝𝑡
∗ + 𝑝𝐷,𝑡                  (4.70) 
Next, the relationship between the terms of trade and real exchange rate is derived. The real 
exchange rate in equation (4.62) is imputed into equation (4.70) to give:     
𝑞𝑡 = 𝑠𝑡 − 𝑝𝑡
∗ + 𝑝𝐷,𝑡 + 𝑝𝑡
∗ − 𝑝𝑡 
Simplifying, this becomes: 
𝑞𝑡 = 𝑠𝑡 + 𝑝𝐷,𝑡 − 𝑝𝑡 
Where 𝑝𝑡 = 𝑝𝐷,𝑡 − 𝛼(𝑠𝑡) as seen in equation (4.67) is substituted into the previous equation, this 
becomes: 
𝑞𝑡 = 𝑠𝑡 − 𝛼𝑠𝑡 
𝑞𝑡 = (1 − 𝛼)𝑠𝑡                 (4.71) 
International Risk Sharing 
In a complete and integrated international financial market, it is assumed that there is perfect risk 
sharing between households in the domestic and foreign countries i.e. it is assumed that the prices 




and foreign economies share similar preferences. The first order conditions on consumption (4.23) 








=  𝑄𝑡,𝑡+1                (4.72) 
with the no-arbitrage condition  
𝑡𝑄𝑡,𝑡+1

















𝑡+1              (4.74) 
Using equation (4.61) on the real exchange rate: 


















                (4.75) 
After re-arranging equation (4.75), it becomes: 
𝐶𝑅,𝑡 =  𝐾𝐶𝑡
∗𝑄𝑡
1








Log-linearise equation (4.76), that is: 




𝑞𝑡                            (4.77) 
Recall from equation (4.71) that 𝑞𝑡 = (1 − 𝛼)𝑠𝑡, then equation (4.77) becomes: 








Since consumers are assumed to form habits on their consumption and with world market 
clearing condition 𝑦𝑡
∗ = 𝑐𝑡
∗, this becomes: 
𝑐𝑅,𝑡 −  ℎ𝑐𝑅,𝑡−1 =  𝑦𝑡




𝑠𝑡             (4.79) 
Equation (4.77) shows a relation that links the domestic consumption (𝑐𝑅,𝑡), world consumption 
(𝑐𝑡
∗) and the terms of trade (𝑠𝑡). 
 
Uncovered Interest Parity 
Under the complete international financial market, it is assumed that investors are indifferent 
between buying domestic or foreign bonds since the interest rates in both economies are the same. 
This means that returns on domestic bonds (𝑅𝑡) equals the returns on foreign bonds (𝑅𝑡,





)                 (4.80) 
Log-linearise equation (4.80) to give: 
𝑟𝑡 = 𝑟𝑡
∗ + 𝐸𝑡(𝑒𝑡 − 𝑒𝑡+1)                (4.81) 
Re-arranging, it becomes: 
𝑟𝑡 − 𝑟𝑡
∗ = 𝐸𝑡∆𝑒𝑡+1                 (4.82) 
This can be rewritten after combining equation (4.82) with equation (4.62) to obtain: 
(𝑖𝑡 − 𝜋𝑡+1) − (𝑖𝑡
∗ − 𝜋𝑡+1
∗ ) = 𝐸𝑡∆𝑞𝑡+1              (4.83) 
The expression shows that changes in the real exchange rate depends on the wedge between 







Exogenous Processes in the Foreign Economy 
Nigeria is assumed to be a small open economy relative to the large global economy and can 
barely affect large foreign economies with respect to their interest rate, inflation and output. The 












                         (4.85) 
Foreign Interest rate:  𝑟𝑡




                         (4.86) 
The stochastic processes, 𝑡
𝑖~𝑖𝑖𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑖
2) 
𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖 = 𝑦𝑡
∗, 𝜋𝑡
∗,  𝑟𝑡
∗. This means that the stochastic processes of foreign output, inflation and interest 
rate are identically, independently and normally distributed of zero mean and variance of 𝜎𝑖
2. 
(iv)   The Monetary Authority 
The fourth agent in the model is now discussed. The Central Bank of Nigeria is assumed to follow 
a simple Taylor-type rule i.e. the Central Bank implements monetary policy using the interest rate. 
The CBN, under this rule, sets the interest rate by considering past value of interest rate, the 

























sr,t              (4.87) 
Where, 
Rt: Nominal interest rate  
Rt−1: lagged interest rate 
πt: Inflation rate 
Yt: Output  
et: Exchange rate 




ρR: Degree of interest rate smoothing 
υπ, υY, υe: Parameters that measures the response of Central Bank to inflation, output and 
exchange rate. In addition, 𝑅, π, Y and e are the target values for interest rate, inflation rate, 
output and exchange rate. 
The log-linearisation of equation (4.87) gives: 
𝑟𝑡 =  ρR𝑟𝑡−1 + (1 − ρR)[υππ̂t + υyŷt + υe∆et] + sr,t            (4.88) 
(v)   The Fiscal Authority 
The fiscal policy maker is assumed to commit to discretionary policy rather than rules, in making 
fiscal decision and is also proposed to be a rent-seeker instead of being benevolent. There is, 
therefore, the need to explore the micro-foundation of fiscal policy making in order to explicitly 
model the alternative assumptions. 
Assumption 1: Fiscal policy maker uses discretion 
The fiscal policy maker is traditionally modelled to commit to policy rules in DSGE models. This 
implies that government commit to a policy path and follows this path at all dates in the future, 
irrespective of the state of the economy (Kydland and Prescott, 1977). This definition also 
indicates that government implements its policy in a mechanical manner without being strategic 
about its decision making (Fragetta and Kirsanova, 2010). A realistic assumption however, is that 
the government acts strategically in order to respond to the state of the economy in each period, 
by aligning to discretion in its policy choices (Fragetta and Kirsanova, 2010). A policy maker, 
therefore, is assumed to commit to discretionary policy when he is free to alter its instrument 
setting to suit its own objective (Walsh, 2010). 
In a more technical term, using discretionary policy means that government re-optimises every 
period i.e. it follows a period by period (sequential) optimisation rather than committing to a state-
contingent path (Gali, 2008; Kirsanova and le Roux, 2013). In specifying the optimisation problem 
of the discretionary policy maker, the objective function is void of the expectations operator, since 
he does not commit to any future policy path but treats future values of policy instruments as given 
(Adam and Billi, 2007). The optimization problem of the discretionary policy maker is given as: 




Subject to the government budget constraint. The policy problem is to choose 𝐺𝑡 (government 
spending) and 𝑅𝑁𝑡(rent) period by period such that the utility function of the policy maker is 
maximised. 
Assumption 2: Fiscal policy maker seeks rent 
Rent-seeking is a major assumption in the field of political economy and public choice. It is defined 
as a situation where people derive personal benefit from the political arena (Henderson, 2008). 
The concept of rent-seeking is similarly adopted in the context of this study to mean that 
government has the tendency to channel public resources for its personal benefits including that of 
its close allies. 
The fiscal policy maker is, therefore, modelled as being partly benevolent and partly rent-seeking. 
In his benevolent state, he seeks to maximise the welfare of the citizens under his jurisdiction, 
through the provision of public goods. This will ensure the subsequent re-election of his party and 
at the same time guarantee his reputation. As a rent-seeker, the fiscal policy maker wants to 
maximise his private returns from rent-seeking activities which includes: corruption, bribery and 
inefficiently designed contracts, that drains citizens’ welfare but benefits the politicians, their 
family members and allies (Persson, 2001; Miller, 2016). An implication of the rent-seeking 
assumption is that economic policy making does not rely alone on economic factor but is also 
influenced by political factors. 
The fiscal authority is therefore assumed to enact discretionary policy in government spending, 
such that, the preference function is maximised subject to the government budget constraint. The 
fiscal authority derives utility from providing public goods and consuming rent. The functional 
form of the utility function is specified by taking a cue from Miller (2016), Azzimonti, Battaglini 
and Coate (2016), and Barseghyan, Battaglini and Coate (2013). The utility function of the fiscal 






𝑡=0 + ln 𝑅𝑁𝑡                         (4.89) 
Subject to the nominal government budget constraint  





𝐺𝑡: Government provision of public goods 
𝑅𝑁𝑡: Rent received. Rent received is defined to depend on the propensity of public office holders 
to seek rent and the total revenue that the government generates. It is defined as: 
𝑅𝑁𝑡 = 𝜒𝜏𝑡                                                  (4.91) 
where 𝜒 𝑖𝑠 the degree of rent seeking.  𝜒 < 0 ≤ 1; the degree of rent seeking increases as 
 𝜒 → 0. 𝜏𝑡 is the total government revenue 
: Institutional Parameter, when → 1, the political institution is strong and when → 0, there is 
weak political institution. 
Equation (4.89) is subject to the nominal government budget constraint (equation 4.90). The 
constraint shows that the total spending of government in form of rents accrued to government and 
allies and on the provision of public goods equals total revenue of government taxes. 
𝑃𝑡𝐺𝑡 + 𝜒𝜏𝑡𝑃𝑡 = 𝜏𝑡𝑃𝑡                  
Where,  
𝐺𝑡: Government spending  
𝜒𝜏𝑡: Rent raised 
𝜏𝑡: Total Revenue 
𝑃𝑡: Nominal price 
As usual, the Lagrangian function of the maximisation problem from equations (4.89) and (4.90) 






𝑡=0 + ln 𝑅𝑁𝑡 + 𝜆𝑡[𝜏𝑡𝑃𝑡 − 𝑃𝑡𝐺𝑡 − 𝜒𝜏𝑡𝑃𝑡]                        (4.92) 




















= 0: 𝜏𝑡𝑃𝑡 = 𝑃𝑡𝐺𝑡 + 𝜒𝜏𝑡𝑃𝑡               (4.95) 






                  (4.96) 
Equation (4.96) is then re-arranged to be: 
𝐺𝑡
𝜁
= 𝑅𝑁𝑡                                        (4.97) 
Equation (4.97) gives: 
𝐺𝑡 =  (𝜒𝜏𝑡)
1
𝜁                                                   (4.98) 
In equation (4.98), government spending policy 𝐺𝑡 at time t depends on the degree of rent seeking 
(𝜒), the quality of political institution ( ) and government revenue.  




(𝜒𝜏𝑡)                  (4.99) 
Assumption 3: There is no or weak policy coordination  
This third assumption is implicitly modelled by assuming that both fiscal and monetary authorities 
are adopting different policy regimes-discretion or rules. In the case of this study, the government 
is pursuing a discretionary regime while the Central Bank is following a rule-based regime. 
(vi)  Exogenous Shock Processes 
In the model adopted for this study, eleven sources of exogenous shocks are considered. They 
include: innovation in technology, monetary policy, government spending, foreign inflation, 
foreign output and foreign interest rate, tax, rent seeking, output, domestic inflation and transfer 
payment. The equations of these shocks can be expressed as follows: 
Technology:𝑎𝑡 =  𝜌𝑎𝑎𝑡−1 +  𝑡





R =  𝜌𝑟𝑠𝑟𝑡−1 + 𝑡
𝑟                      (4.101) 
Government Spending: st
G =  𝜌𝑔𝑠𝑔𝑡−1 +  𝑡
𝑔
                     (4.102) 
Tax: 𝜏𝑡 = 𝜌𝜏𝜏𝑡−1 + 𝑡
𝜏                                                                                                     (4.103) 
Output: st
y
=  𝜌𝑦𝑠𝑦𝑡−1 +  𝑡
𝑦
              (4.104) 
Domestic Inflation:  st
πD =  𝜌𝜋𝑠𝜋𝑡−1 +  𝑡
𝜋𝐷            (4.105) 
Rent seeking: 𝑟𝑛𝑡 = 𝜌𝑟𝑛𝑟𝑛𝑡−1 + 𝑡
𝑟𝑛                                             (4.106)         
Transfer payment:  𝑇𝑃𝑡 = 𝜌𝑇𝑃𝑇𝑃𝑡−1 + 𝑡












            (4.85) 
Foreign Interest rate:  𝑟𝑡









𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑗 = 𝑎, 𝑟, 𝑦𝑡
∗, 𝜋𝑡
∗,  𝑟𝑡
∗, 𝑔𝑡, 𝑇𝑃, 𝑟𝑛, 𝜏, 𝑦, 𝜋 
(vii)  Aggregation Rules 
According to Adegboye (2015), the following aggregation rules for consumption and labour 
supply over the Ricardian and non-Ricardian households are specified. Aggregate consumption 
for both Ricardian and non-Ricardian agents is given by: 
ct = ψ cR,t + (1 − ψ)cNR,t              (4.106) 
Aggregate labour supply for both Ricardian and non-Ricardian agents is given by:  
nt = ω nR,t + (1 − ω)nNR,t              (4.107) 
Total inflation is also given by the sum of domestic inflation and foreign inflation, such that: 




(viii)  General Equilibrium 
a. Aggregate Demand Side: Goods Market Equilibrium and IS-Curve 
Goods market clearing condition for the domestic economy requires that aggregate output equals 
aggregate domestic and foreign demands (exports) for locally produced goods such that: 
𝑌𝑡(𝑗) = 𝐶𝐷,𝑡(𝑗) + ∫ 𝐶𝐷,𝑡(𝑗)
𝑖1
0
𝑑𝑖 + 𝐺𝑡             (4.109) 
𝐶𝐷,𝑡(𝑗): Domestic demand for good j produced in the domestic economy 
𝐶𝐷,𝑡(𝑗)
𝑖 : Foreign demand by country i for good j produced in the domestic economy 
Where according to Gali (2008), 𝐶𝐷,𝑡(𝑗)and 𝐶𝐷,𝑡(𝑗)




































Equation (4.109) is inserted into aggregate domestic output in equation (4.110) to get the aggregate 
domestic and foreign demands (exports) for locally produced goods. 













+ 𝐺𝑡           (4.110) 
It becomes: 


























































Log-linearising equation (4.112) yields: 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝑐𝑡+𝛼𝛾𝑠𝑡+𝛼 ( −
1
𝜎
) 𝑞𝑡              (4.113) 
Equation (4.113) can be rewritten as: 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝑐𝑡 +
𝛼𝜔
𝜎
𝑠𝑡 + 𝑔𝑡               (4.114) 
Where 𝜔 is defined as: 
𝜔 = 𝜎𝛾 + (1 − 𝛼)(𝜎 − 1) 
Goods market clearing condition for the rest of the world is: 
𝑦𝑡
∗ = 𝑐𝑡
∗                (4.115) 
𝑦𝑡
∗ 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑐𝑡
∗are indices for world output and consumption 
Where 
𝑦𝑡
∗ = ∫ 𝑦𝑡
𝑖 𝑑𝑖 
𝑐𝑡
∗ = ∫ 𝑐𝑡
𝑖 𝑑𝑖 
Following Gali (2008) and Bergholt (2012), Equation (4.114) of the goods market clearing 
condition can be combined with the consumption Euler equation (4.29) to obtain the Open 










(𝑖 − 𝐸𝑡Π𝑡+1 − 𝜌) 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝐸𝑡𝑦𝑡+1 −
1 − ℎ
𝜎














(𝑖 − 𝐸𝑡Π𝐷,𝑡+1 − 𝜌) −
𝛼(𝜔−1)
𝜎




Where Θ = (𝜔 − 1) 




𝑠𝑡 into equation (4.116) to get the open economy IS curve 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝐸𝑡𝑦𝑡+1 −
1−ℎ
𝜎𝛼
(𝑖 − 𝐸𝑡Π𝐷,𝑡+1 − 𝜌) − 𝛼Θ 𝐸𝑡  (∆𝑦𝑡+1
∗ )          (4.117) 







𝑛 − 𝜌) − 𝛼Θ 𝐸𝑡 (∆𝑦𝑡+1
∗ )                      (4.118) 
Subtract equation (4.118) from (4.117) to obtain the dynamic IS curve: 
𝑦?̃? = 𝐸𝑡?̃?𝑡+1 −
1−ℎ
𝜎𝛼
(𝑖 − 𝐸𝑡Π𝐷,𝑡+1 − 𝑟𝑡
𝑛)            (4.119) 
 
b. Aggregate Supply Side: Marginal Cost and Open Economy New Keynesian 
Philips Curve 
Recall that the optimal price setting condition of the firm in equation (4.56) is given as: 
𝑝𝑡
∗ − 𝑝𝑡−1 = 1 − βθ ∑ (βθ)
k Et 
∞
k=0 [mct+k|t̂ + 𝑝𝑡+𝑘 − 𝑝𝑡−1]    
mct+k|t̂ = 𝑚𝑐𝑡+𝑘|𝑡 − 𝑚𝑐𝑡+𝑘 
Equation (4.56) is simplified further to yield: 
𝑝𝑡
∗ − 𝑝𝑡−1 = βθ Et [𝑝𝑡+1
∗ − 𝑝𝑡] + (1 − βθ)mct̂ + πt                    (4.120) 
Dynamics of the aggregate price index 
The law of motion for the aggregate price index is: 
?̅?𝑡 = [ (𝑃𝑡−1)
1−𝜀 + (1 − )(𝑃𝑡
∗)1−𝜀]
1
1−𝜀            (4.121) 
This becomes 
(?̅?𝑡)
1−𝜀 = [ (𝑃𝑡−1)
1−𝜀 + (1 − )(𝑃𝑡
















             (4.123) 
to give 
Π𝑡






              (4.124) 
Log-linearise equation (4.124) to obtain 
𝜋𝑡 = (1 − )(𝑝𝑡
∗ − 𝑝𝑡−1)              (4.125) 
Equation (4.125) shows that the re-optimising firms usually choose a price that differs from the 
average price in the economy in the previous period 
The optimal price setting condition in equation (4.120) is combined with the dynamics of the 
aggregate price level in equation (4.125) to obtain the NK Philips curve in equation (4.126):  





Equation (4.126) shows that domestic inflation is proportional to the deviation of the marginal cost 
from its steady state. 
Marginal Cost 
In the open-economy case, the marginal cost differs from the one derived for the closed economy. 
From equation (4.50), the real marginal cost for the closed economy is specified as: 
𝑚𝑐𝑡 = 𝑤𝑡 − 𝑝𝐷𝑡 − 𝑎𝑡        
Equation (4.50) is rewritten as: 




Equation (4.67) which shows that the difference between the aggregate price and domestic price 
is proportional to the terms of trade:  𝑝𝑡 = 𝑝𝐷,𝑡 − 𝛼𝑠𝑡  and the labour supply schedule in equation 
(4.32): 𝑤𝑡 − 𝑝𝑡 = 𝜎𝑐𝑡 + 𝜑𝑛𝑡 is inserted into equation (4.127) to get: 
𝑚𝑐𝑡 = 𝜎𝑐𝑡 + 𝜑𝑛𝑡 + 𝛼𝑠𝑡 − 𝑎𝑡                       (4.128) 
The next step is to insert the international risk sharing condition in equation (4.83) and the 
production relation in equation (4.54) into equation (4.128). This will yield: 




𝑠𝑡] + 𝜑[𝑦𝑡 − 𝑎𝑡] + 𝛼𝑠𝑡 − 𝑎𝑡                                 (4.129) 
With the world market clearing condition 𝑦𝑡
∗ = 𝑐𝑡
∗, equation (4.129) can be rewritten as: 
𝑚𝑐𝑡 = 𝜎𝑦𝑡





𝑠𝑡 is inserted into equation (4.130). This becomes: 
𝑚𝑐𝑡 = (𝜎𝛼 + 𝜑)𝑦𝑡 + (𝜎 − 𝜎𝛼)𝑦𝑡
∗ − (1 + 𝜑)𝑎𝑡           (4.131) 
Equation (4.131) is rewritten in the flexible price version as: 
𝑚𝑐 = (𝜎𝛼 + 𝜑)𝑦𝑡
𝑛 + (𝜎 − 𝜎𝛼)𝑦𝑡
∗ − (1 + 𝜑)𝑎𝑡           (4.132) 
Equation (4.132) is subtracted from equation (4.131) to obtain the real marginal cost gap: 
𝑚?̂? = (𝜎𝛼 + 𝜑)𝑦?̃?               (4.133) 




  in order to derive the open-economy NK Philips curve equation as 
specified in equation (4.134) as: 
𝜋𝐷,𝑡 = βEt [𝜋𝐷,𝑡+1] + kα𝑦?̃?              (4.134) 
Where  
kα = λ(𝜎𝛼 + 𝜑) =
(1 − θ)(1 − βθ)
θ




4.2.2  Solving and Estimating the Open Economy NK DSGE model 
In this sub-section, the steps to solving and estimating the DSGE model adopted for this study are 
presented. These involve three procedures that comprise the log-linearisation of the model, then 
solving a system of linear difference equations derived from the model and lastly, the Bayesian 
estimation of the model. 
 
1. Log-Linearise the model  
The set of equations of the DSGE model as specified in sub-section 4.2.1 are represented in a 
canonical form as: 
𝐸𝑡{𝑓(𝑦𝑡+1, 𝑦𝑡 , 𝑦𝑡−1, 𝑒𝑡} = 1              (4.135) 
Where, 
𝑦𝑡:     Vector of endogenous variables of the model. There are current, lead and lag values of the 
endogenous variable 
yt−1: Vector of predetermined variables 
𝑒𝑡:      Vector of stochastic exogenous variables, 𝑒𝑡~𝑖𝑖𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑖
2) 
 
DSGE models often lack an exact and closed form solution that can be cumbersome and messy 
with paper and pencil. The solution to the DSGE model in equation (4.135) is derived by 
approximating the non-linear set of equations. The existing approximation methods are classified 
as either the Perturbation or Projection Methods. The Perturbation solutions are local approximants 
that usually involves a Taylor series approximation of equilibrium equations around their non-
stochastic steady state. Fernandez-Villaverde, Rubio-Ramirez and Schorfheide (2016) argue that 
perturbation methods are most suitable for solving a medium-scale NK model since it is 
sufficiently well behaved. Linear Quadratic method, linear approximation and Second (or Higher) 
Order Approximation are some Perturbation methods. Projections methods on the other hand, have 
global solutions. In this study, one of the perturbation method is used, specifically, the log-linear 
approximation method. 
 
The log-linear approximation method approximates the solution to equation (4.135) in terms of 
the log-deviations of the variables with respect to their steady state. In general, it is adequate for 




suitable for empirical estimation and forecasting. Log-linear solutions are easy to read, the 
coefficient terms are interpreted as elasticity and, in some circumstances, they can improve the 
accuracy of the solution (Fernandez-Villaverde, Rubio-Ramirez and Schorfheide, 2016). The 
procedure of log-linearising begins with finding the steady state of the model where there are no 
exogenous shocks and variables have no time sub-scripts such that, 
{𝑓(?̅?, ?̅?, ?̅?, 0} = 1               (4.136) 
Equation (4.135) is thereafter approximated by a first-order Taylor expansion of its logarithm 
around the steady-state (4.136) such that, 
 
𝐸𝑡{𝑓𝑦𝑡+1  ?̂?𝑡+1, 𝑓𝑦𝑡𝑦?̂?, 𝑓𝑦𝑡−1?̂?𝑡−1, 𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑡} = 1            (4.137) 
 

















4.2.3   System of Equations to be estimated 
After obtaining the optimisation result of each sector of the economy, the relevant equations to 
be estimated are presented in Tables 4.1 and 4.2. They are as follows: 
Table 4.1: Log-linear System of Equations 



















(𝒓 − 𝑬𝒕𝚷𝒕+𝟏) 
Where, 
𝚷𝒕+𝟏 = 𝑷𝒕+𝟏 − 𝑷𝒕 
  
4.29 







































𝒘𝒕 − 𝒑𝒕 =
𝝈
𝟏 − 𝒉










𝒎𝒄𝒕 = 𝒘𝒕 − 𝒑𝒕 − 𝒂𝒕    






























   
S/N Name Equations Equation 
Number 
    




𝒚𝒕 = 𝒄𝒕 +
𝜶𝝎
𝝈
𝒔𝒕 + 𝒈𝒕 + 𝒔𝒚,𝒕   
       
Where  







𝒄𝒕 −  𝒉𝒄𝒕−𝟏 =  𝒚𝒕
∗ −  𝒉𝒚𝒕−𝟏
∗ + 

























𝝅𝑫,𝒕 = 𝛃𝐄𝐭 [𝝅𝑫,𝒕+𝟏] + 𝐤𝛂𝒚?̃? + 𝒔𝝅𝑫  
      
Where  
𝐤𝛂 = 𝛌(𝝈𝜶 + 𝝋) =
(𝟏 − 𝛉)(𝟏 − 𝛃𝛉)
𝛉
(𝝈𝜶 + 𝝋) 
 
 



























Table 4.1: Log-linear System of Equations (continued) 
S/N Name Equations Equation 
Number 






Terms of Trade 
 
𝐬𝐭 = 𝐩𝐃,𝐭 − 𝐩𝐅,𝐭 − 𝛆𝐭 
Lag each term by one period 
𝐬𝐭 − 𝐬𝐭−𝟏 = 𝐩𝐃,𝐭 − 𝐩𝐃,𝐭−𝟏 − 𝐩𝐅,𝐭 − 𝐩𝐅,𝐭−𝟏 − 𝛆𝐭 − 𝛆𝐭−𝟏 
𝐬𝐭 = 𝐬𝐭−𝟏 + 𝚷𝐃,𝐭 − 𝚷
∗






∗ = 𝑬𝒕∆𝒆𝒕+𝟏  4.82 
13. Law of One Price 
Gap 
𝒑𝑭,𝒕 = 𝒆𝒕 + 𝒑𝒕
∗ 
Lag each term by one period 
𝐞𝐭 − 𝐞𝐭−𝟏 = 𝚷
∗
𝐭 − 𝚷𝐅,𝐭 
4.60 
14. Monetary Policy 
Rule 
 















𝒓𝒏𝒕 + 𝐬𝐠,𝐭 
 
 




















Table 4.2: Foreign Economy and other Exogenous Processes 
S/N Name Equations Equation 
Number 





    4.84 





    
  
4.85 
19. Foreign Interest 
rate 
 𝒓𝒕





























































𝛑𝐃 =  𝝆𝝅𝑫𝒔𝝅𝒕−𝟏 +  𝜺𝒕
𝝅𝑫 
 
𝒔𝒓𝒏𝒕 = 𝝆𝒔𝒓𝒏𝒓𝒏𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜺𝒕
𝒓𝒏 
 





























Table 4.3: List of Parameters estimated 
Symbol Parameters Distribution Mean Standard 
deviation 
Reference 
H Habit formation  Beta 0.70 0.10 Almeida (2010) 
Sigma (𝜎) Inverse elasticity of 
substitution 
Normal 3.00 1.00 Cebi (2011) 
Psi (𝜓) Share of non-Ricardian 
household 
Beta 0.70 0.10 Value informed by Iwata 
(2009) 
alpha (𝛼) Degree of openness Beta 0.40 0.10 average value of trade 
openness in Nigeria (1960-
2015)  
Phi (𝜑) Inverse elasticity of labour  Normal 4.38 2.00 Adegboye (2015) 
eta ( )  Elasticity of substitution 
between home and foreign 
goods 
Gamma 11.42 1.00 Adegboye (2015) 
Theta ( )  Calvo Price Stickiness Beta 0.50 0.10 Adegboye (2015) 
upssilon_pii 
(𝜐𝜋) 
Taylor feedback on 
Inflation 
Gamma 1.50 0.20 Gali and Monacelli (2005) 
upssilon_y 
(𝜐𝑦) 
Taylor feedback on Output Gamma 0.50 0.10 Gali (2008) 
upssilon_ex
r (𝜐𝑒) 
Taylor feedback on 
exchange rate 
Gamma 0.80 0.10 Adegboye (2015) 
rrho_r (𝜌𝑟) Interest rate smoothening Beta 0.70 0.10 Serbaniou (2012) 
chi (𝜒) Degree of rent- seeking Beta 0.50 0.10 Informed by data from 
Corruption perception 
Index and World 
Governance Indicator 
Zeta ( ) Quality of political 
institutions 
Beta 0.35 0.10 Informed by data from 
Corruption perception 




AR(1) of foreign output Beta 0.70 0.10 Informed by Traum and 
Yang (2011) to depict 
high persistence of shock 
processes 
rrho_a (𝜌𝑎) AR(1) of technology Beta 0.70 0.10 Informed by Traum and 
Yang (2011) to depict 
high persistence of shock 
processes 





Table 4.3 (continued): List of Parameters estimated 





AR(1) of inflation 
shock 
Beta 0.70 0.10 Informed by Traum and 
Yang (2011) to depict 
high persistence of 
shock processes 
rrho_sr (𝜌𝑠𝑟) AR(1) of interest 
rate shock 
Beta 0.70* 0.10 Informed by Traum and 
Yang (2011) to depict 
high persistence of 
shock processes 
rrho_sg (𝜌𝑠𝑔) AR(1) of 
government 
spending shock 
Beta 0.70* 0.10 Informed by Traum and 
Yang (2011) to depict 
high persistence of 
shock processes 
rrho_sy (𝜌𝑠𝑦) AR(1) of output 
shock 
Beta 0.70 0.10 Informed by Traum and 
Yang (2011) to depict 




AR(1) of shock to 
rent seeking 
Beta 0.70 0.10 Informed by Traum and 
Yang (2011) to depict 







Foreign output Inverse 
Gamma 
0.25** ∞ Arbitrarily fixed by 
author 
eps_a ( 𝑡
𝑎) Technology shock Inverse 
Gamma 








0.25** ∞ Arbitrarily fixed by 
author 
eps_r ( 𝑡
𝑟) Interest rate shock Inverse 
Gamma 
0.25** ∞ Arbitrarily fixed by 
author 
e_piiD ( 𝑡
𝜋𝐷) Inflation shock Inverse 
Gamma 




) Output shock Inverse 
Gamma 
0.25** ∞ Arbitrarily fixed by 
author 
eps_rn ( 𝑡




0.25** ∞ Arbitrarily fixed by 
author 
Sources: Listed in table 4.3 
The endogenous variables estimated include: Aggregate Consumption(𝐶𝑡), Ricardian 
Consumption (𝐶𝑅,𝑡), Non Ricardian Consumption (𝐶𝑁𝑅,𝑡), Domestic Inflation (𝜋𝐷,𝑡), Output(𝑦𝑡), 
Terms of trade (𝑠𝑡), Nominal Exchange Rate (𝑒𝑡), Nominal interest rate (𝑟𝑡), Fiscal Policy (𝑔𝑡), 
Real Marginal cost (𝑚𝑐𝑡), Foreign Output (𝑦𝑡
∗),Foreign Inflation (𝜋𝑡
∗), Foreign Interest rate (𝑟𝑡
∗), 










𝑎), Monetary Shock ( 𝑡
𝑟), Inflation shock ( 𝑡
𝜋𝐷), output shock ( 𝑡
𝑦
), shock to rent seeking 
( 𝑡
𝑟𝑛) and Fiscal shock ( 𝑡
𝑔
). 
2. Solving a system of linear difference equation 
The log-linear approximation method obtained as shown in the previous sub-section, usually 
produces a system of linear stochastic difference equations which can be cast in state-space form 
as: 
𝐴𝑥𝑡 = 𝐵𝑥𝑡−1 + 𝐶𝑒𝑡                  (138) 
Where,  
A, B and C:  Matrices that contain the reduced-form parameters of the model 
xt: Vector of endogenous variables 
 
This equation can be solved by two main methods: the eigenvector-eigenvalue decomposition and 
undetermined coefficients. The eigenvector-eigenvalue decomposition was first proposed by 
Blanchard and Kahn (1980). This study adopts the Blanchard and Kahn (1980) method.  It involves 
delineating the system into stable and unstable equations. The method provides the condition for 
the determinacy of a unique equilibrium such that a solution exists and is unique if and only if the 
number of unstable eigenvectors (i.e., the number of eigenvalues outside the unit circle) is exactly 
equal to the number of non-predetermined variables.  
  
3. Bayesian Estimation of New Keynesian DSGE 
The formal estimation of DSGE models has become a vital aspect of modern macroeconomics 
(Fernández-Villaverde, 2009). This encompasses confronting DSGE models with observed data 
in order to obtain numerical values of parameters in the model. DSGE models are currently 
estimated using a variety of methods that include calibration, General Methods of Moments, 
Maximum Likelihood and Bayesian. The Bayesian method, out of the existing techniques, is 
preferred because of the following reasons: (1) It estimates the complete system of equations in 
the DSGE model as opposed to limited information method such as General Methods of Moments 
that focuses on estimating only specific equilibrium equations such as the consumption Euler 




address model misspecification by the inclusion of measurement errors in the system of equations 
(4) It can also be used for model comparism (Grifolli, 2013). 
 
The Bayesian method consists of using data 𝑌𝑇 to estimate the parameters  of a model 𝑀. The 
data 𝑌𝑇are observable values that are assumed to be given. The model 𝑀 hinges on economic 
postulation and comprises of a vector of unobservable and random parameters; a likelihood 
function, prior and posterior distribution. The likelihood function 𝑃(𝑌𝑇 | ) is the probability the 
model assigns to the data given the parameters. The prior 𝑃( ) captures a researcher’s subjective 
belief about the true value of the model’s parameters; while the posterior distribution shows the 
state of knowledge of  after each update. The link among the likelihood function, prior and 
posterior distribution is summarised by Bayes’ Theorem. It shows that the posterior distribution is 




              (4.139) 
 
𝑃( |𝑌𝑇) ∝  𝑃(𝑌𝑇| ) 𝑃( ) =  𝐾( |𝑌∗)            (4.140) 
Where, 
𝑃( |𝑌𝑇) : Posterior distribution 
𝑃(𝑌𝑇| ): Likelihood Function 
𝑃( ): Parameter Vector 
𝑃(𝑌𝑇): Data 
 
There are three main procedures for Bayesian estimation, these include: 1. calculate the log 
likelihood function, 2. Specify Priors and 3. Simulate the posterior distribution 
 
1. Calculate the log likelihood function 
To obtain the log likelihood function, we start with the transition and the measurement equation. 
The transition equation is the solution to the DSGE model, it shows that the paths of endogenous 
variables in time t depends on predetermined variables and innovation. The measurement equation 
on the other hand, links the DSGE model to data. The measurement equation shows that observable 





Transition equation:     𝑌?̂? = 𝐷?̂?𝑡−1+ 𝑒𝑡            (4.141) 
 
Measurement equation: 𝑌𝑡
∗ = 𝐹𝑌?̂?+𝑢𝑡            (4.142) 
 





If 𝑢𝑡 , 𝑒𝑡 and 𝑌0̂, the initial condition are normally distributed, then 𝑌?̂? and 𝑌𝑡
∗ are also assumed to 












−1(𝑦∗ − ?̅?∗)        (4.143) 
Where  
𝑦∗: whole sample data; 
n: number of observed variables;  
T : number of periods in the sample;  
?̅?∗:expected value of 𝑦∗; and  
Σ𝑦∗: variance-covariance matrix. 
 
2. Specify Priors 
In this stage, priors are specified for each parameter to be estimated. Priors give a pre-sample 
description of the state of knowledge of the parameter vector, . This allows the researcher to 
incorporate extra information about the parameter vector  based on their belief and which is not 
captured by data 𝑌𝑇. The choice of priors depends on the category of the parameters to be 
estimated. The categories of parameters include: a. parameters that affect the steady state of the 
DSGE model such as the inflation rate, real interest rate and output growth rate; and b. parameters 
that describe the law of motion of the exogenous shock process. Priors for steady state parameters 
can be derived from pre-sample averages and existing empirical studies. Priors on shock processes 





The priors selected for each parameter are usually represented by probability distribution ranging 
from normal, gamma and beta distributions. Prior distribution for parameters on the real line and 
not- bonded are normal; for non-negative parameters could be gamma and log Normal; parameters 
on a bounded interval take Beta distribution. 
 
3. Simulate the Posterior Distribution 
The posterior distribution is the probability assigned to the parameter value after observing the 
data. It is an updating rule that relies on data to update a researcher’s prior belief about each model 
parameter: 
𝑃( |𝑌𝑇) =




𝑃( |𝑌𝑇)is the posterior distribution. 
𝑃( |𝑌𝑇) ∝  𝑃(𝑌𝑇| ) 𝑃( ) =  𝐾( |𝑌∗) 
Where 𝐾( |𝑌∗)is the posterior kernel 
Take log of both sides: 
log 𝐾( |𝑌∗) = log  𝑃(𝑌𝑇| ) + log 𝑃( ) 
= log  𝑃(𝑌𝑇| ) + 𝛿ℎ=1 log 𝑃( ℎ)             (4.144) 
Where h is the  number of parameters to be estimated 
Equation (4.144) is non-linear and difficult to estimate in an analytical manner. It then becomes 
necessary to rely on a computational method. The Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) method 
specifically the Metropolis Hastling is used to simulate the posterior distribution. 
 
The Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) method is a simulation technique that is used to generate 
samples from the posterior distribution based on the assumption that the samples drawn are 
dependent. There are two major algorithm of the MCMC method: The Gibbs Sampling algorithm 
and the Metropolis Hastings algorithm. The Metropolis Hastings algorithm is used in this study 
since it is readily available in the Dynare software. The Metropolis Hastings algorithm is used to 
draw samples from the posterior distribution that is unknown, that is, the researcher has limited 




of the full conditional distribution for relevant parameters to be computed. The Metropolis 
Hastings algorithm involves the following procedures: 
(1) Choose an initial arbitrary value 𝜽(𝟎) 
(2) Draw candidate sample from the jumping distribution or proposal probability distribution 
(3) Compute the acceptance ratio to determine whether to accept or reject a candidate sample 
(4) Decide whether to accept or reject a candidate sample. The acceptance rate should be 
between 0.25 and 0.33 (Grifolli, 2013). 
(5) Repeat steps 2 to 4 N times, in order to draw N number of samples. 
 
4.2.4  Data Sources and Measurements 
This study obtained data over the period 1961Q1- 2016Q4 on six observable variables: output, 
domestic inflation, government spending, terms of trade, and interest rate for the Nigerian 
economy; and foreign output for the United States since it is chosen to be proxy for the world 
economy. The domestic dataset for Nigeria was collected from the Statistical Bulletin of the 
Central Bank of Nigeria; while the set of foreign data was sourced from the World Development 
Indicators of the World Bank. The dataset for the study was transformed by applying the one-sided 
Hodrick-Prescott filter to extract the cyclical components from its trend. This is required in order 
to express the variables of the model as percentage deviation from their deterministic steady state 
value. Due to the non-availability of quarterly data and its necessity for the short-run analysis 
peculiar to DSGE models, the annual dataset was converted to quarterly series using the 
interpolation method. In addition, the interpolation method proved useful in handling the few cases 













Table 4.4: Data Description, Measurement and Sources 
Variable         Description/Measurement 
 
  Source 
Real Gross Domestic 
Product  (Y) 
Measures the value of goods produced in 
the Nigerian economy. It is expressed in N’ 
Billion 
CBN Stat. Bulletin 
(2011, 2016) 
Interest rate  (R) Measures the lending rate adjusted for 
inflation. It is expressed in percentage 
World Development 
Indicators (2016) 
    Govt. Expenditure (G)       Captures the total spending of     
   the federal government in N’ Billion                                                               
CBN Stat. Bulletin 
(2011, 2016)
Foreign GDP   (Y*) It is the value of goods produced in the 
economy of the United states (proxy for 
world economy). It is expressed in  $ 
Billion 
 World Development 
Indicators (2016) 
Terms of trade (S) It is calculated as the ratio of export to 
imports.  
CBN Stat. Bulletin 
(2011, 2016) 
Consumer Price Inflation  This captures the domestic inflation rate in 
the Nigerian economy. It is expressed in 
percentage 
CBN Stat. Bulletin 
(2011, 2016) 
 
4.3   Optimal Fiscal and Monetary Policy 
The optimal fiscal and monetary policy is defined as the path of government spending and nominal 
interest rates that optimise the objective function of the policy maker given the constraints posed 
by the structural equations of the small open economy. There are three major methods to compute 
the optimal policy. They include the optimal policy under commitment, that is, Ramsey Policy, 
optimal policy under discretion and the optimal simple rule. In line with the objective of this study, 
the Ramsey policy and optimal discretionary policy are chosen. This, specifically, allows one to 
observe and compare the implication of rent seeking and discretion in describing the paths of the 




computed in this section using the Linear Quadratic approximation to the objective function and 
structural constraints. The calibration of the parameters is taken from Table 4.3. 
4.3.1   Ramsey Policy 
The problem of the Ramsey planner is to choose the interest rate and government spending 
plans that minimise the welfare loss of the policy maker subject to the constraints of the small open 
economy. The Ramsey plan is time-invariant, that is the planner chooses the paths of fiscal policy 
and monetary policy instruments that it sticks with even at future dates (t+n). This makes the 
Ramsey solution susceptible to the time-inconsistency problem The Ramsey policymaker, 
therefore, seeks to minimise the deviation of the actual values of output, inflation and government 
spending from their target values such that: 
Min ∑ 𝜋2 + 0.5𝑦2 + 0.5𝑔2∞𝑡=0                                                                                          (4.145) 
Subject to the structural constraints that includes the open economy Dynamic IS curve, New 
Keynesian Philips Curve and Fiscal Policy decision. These are of the form: 
NK Philips Curve: 𝜋𝐷,𝑡 = βEt [𝜋𝐷,𝑡+1] + kα𝑦?̃?                      (4.134) 
Where  
kα = λ(𝜎𝛼 + 𝜑) =
(1 − θ)(1 − βθ)
θ
(𝜎𝛼 + 𝜑) 
IS Curve:𝑦?̃? = 𝐸𝑡?̃?𝑡+1 −
1
𝜎𝛼
(𝑟 − 𝐸𝑡Π𝐷,𝑡+1 − 𝑟𝑡
𝑛)                                                          (4.119) 
Rent seeking government: 𝑔𝑡 =
1
𝜁
(𝑟𝑛𝑡)                                                                          (4.99) 
Benevolent Government: 𝑔𝑡 = 𝜌𝑔𝑔𝑡−1 + (1 − 𝜌𝑔)(𝜐𝑔𝑦) + 𝑡
𝑔
        (4.146) 
4.3.2   Discretionary Policy 
The discretionary policymaker is assumed to choose the path of interest rate and government 
spending in every period t, based on the current state of the economy. This implies that the 
discretionary policymaker re-optimises his objective function in every period t. The optimal policy 




Furthermore, it mimics actual economic policy making in the real world than the Ramsey solution. 
In this instance, the discretionary policymaker is concerned about minimising the per period loss 
function subject to constraints in the economy such that: 
Min 𝜋2 + 0.5𝑦2 + 0.5𝑔2                                                                                                 (4.147) 
Subject to the structural constraints of the form: 
NK Philips Curve: 𝜋𝐷,𝑡 = βEt [𝜋𝐷,𝑡+1] + kα𝑦?̃?                                 (4.134) 
Where  
kα = λ(𝜎𝛼 + 𝜑) =
(1 − θ)(1 − βθ)
θ
(𝜎𝛼 + 𝜑) 
IS Curve:𝑦?̃? = 𝐸𝑡?̃?𝑡+1 −
1
𝜎𝛼
(𝑟 − 𝐸𝑡Π𝐷,𝑡+1 − 𝑟𝑡
𝑛)                                                           (4.119) 
Rent seeking government: 𝑔𝑡 =
1
𝜁
(𝑟𝑛𝑡)                                                                           (4.99) 
Benevolent Government: 𝑔𝑡 = 𝜌𝑔𝑔𝑡−1 + (1 − 𝜌𝑔)(𝜐𝑔𝑦) + 𝑡
𝑔


















RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
This chapter empirically addresses the three objectives of this study. The first objective analyses 
the empirical nature of the interactions between fiscal and monetary policies. The second objective 
is to examine the transmission effects of the policy interactions on macroeconomic variables such 
as inflation and output. Finally, the third objective considers the optimal combination of fiscal and 
monetary policy. The Chapter is divided into five sections. The estimation results of this study are 
presented in section 5.1. Model diagnostic testing on the estimated model is conducted in Section 
5.2. In Sections 5.3 and 5.4, the results on the nature of fiscal and monetary policy interactions 
and the optimal paths of fiscal and monetary policy are presented. Finally, in Section 5.5, the main 
findings of this study are highlighted. 
5.1 Presentation of Results 
The results of Bayesian estimation, Impulse Response Functions and Variance Decomposition are 
presented in this Section. These outputs are obtained by using Dynare Version 4.5.1 on Octave 
4.2.1 to run the relevant codes. The Dynare package is a pre-processor that runs on both Matlab 
and Octave and are used to solve and estimate Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium Models 
(Grifolli, 2013). Specifically, the Bayesian technique is used to estimate parameters from the 
system of equations of the New Keynesian DSGE model outlined in Chapter 4. The estimation 
process includes the following steps: (1) obtain the reduced form solution of the DSGE model (2) 
derive a state-space representation of the model which maps unobserved state variables into the 
observed data (3) the likelihood function of the observed data is got by applying the Kalman filter 
to the reduced form (4)  Monte-Carlo based optimisation of the posterior kernel to obtain the 
posterior mode (5) a Metropolis-Hastings algorithm is used to generate 100,000 draws of 5 chains 
from the posterior distribution, in order to compute the posterior moments. Out of the 100, 000 




5.1.1   Parameter Estimates of the DSGE Model  
A. Structural Parameter 
Table 5.1 present the estimates of the structural parameters. It shows the posterior mean of each 
estimated parameter alongside their prior mean. The posterior estimate of habit formation is 0.86 
and is higher than its prior mean. This implies that a large share of Nigerian households slowly 
changes their consumption pattern following an income shock. It depicts the tendency of Nigerian 
households to base their current preferences on past consumption patterns. For instance, several 
Nigerians are likely to resort to borrowing, so as to retain their lifestyle and taste, despite the fall 
in their real wages. The posterior mean of habit formation is lower when compared with the 
estimate found by Mordi et al., (2013) at 0.94.  
The inverse elasticity of inter-temporal substitution,(σ), shows the magnitude by which 
consumption is sensitive to changes in the interest rate. The posterior mean of the inverse elasticity 
of inter-temporal substitution is estimated to be 1.82. The elasticity of intertemporal substitution, 
on the other hand, is, therefore, calculated to be 0.55. It can then be interpreted that consumption 
is insensitive to changes in the real interest rate in Nigeria. Increases in the real interest rate, in this 
instance, is not expected to induce consumers to forego current consumption for the future. This 
is evident in the poor saving culture among several Nigerians who prefer to spend in the present 
than save for the future. An exception to Nigerians' poor saving attitude is the retirement savings 
scheme which several Nigerian workers have been institutionally compelled to subscribe to. The 
retirement scheme encourages these individuals to forego present spending for future benefits. The 
posterior estimate of the inverse elasticity of inter-temporal substitution is clearly distinct from its 
prior mean at 3.00 and at the same time, it is lower than the estimated value in Cebi (2011). 
The estimated value of the share of non-Ricardian households,(𝜓), at 0.703 is clearly higher than 
the reported estimate of 0.37 in Muscatelli, Tirelli and Trecroci (2005). The difference in the 
estimate of the parameter lies in the distinct economic structure between the advanced economy 
of the United States and the developing one of Nigeria. The result depicts the presence of a large 
share of liquidity constrained individuals, that is, non-Ricardian households in Nigeria. These 
individuals live from hand to mouth, this means that they only consume but cannot save. In 




spend a greater proportion of their income on food, shelter and energy, with little of their income 
left for savings. Statistics reveal that Nigeria spends about 65 percent of its total expenditure on 
food alone (National Bureau of Statistics, 2012). 
The posterior mean of Calvo price stickiness, ( ), at 0.499 is slightly lower than its prior mean. 
This differs from the finding of Rasaki (2017) who estimated the price stickiness parameter to be 
0.71. The estimated value of Calvo price stickiness at 0.499 shows that about 50 percent of firms, 
do not re-optimise their prices in a given quarter. It also implies that price contracts remain fixed 
for about two quarters. This implies that businesses and firms in Nigeria tend to change the prices 
of their goods and services every six months. The frequent change in the prices of goods and 
services is suspected to originate from fluctuations in the prices of food and exchange rates, in the 
Nigerian economy. 
Furthermore, the parameter estimate of the degree of openness, 𝛼, is higher than its prior mean. It 
shows that Nigeria has a high degree of openness to trade. Foreign trade is therefore believed to 
wield a good influence on the domestic economy of Nigeria. For instance, Nigeria has gained 
tremendously from its exports of primary products such as agricultural produce and crude oil. At 
the same time, imports of raw materials, manufactured goods, electronics and cars have been able 
to improve living conditions in the country. The posterior mean for the elasticity of substitution 
between home and foreign goods, ( ), is positive and high, such that, Nigerians are perceived to be 
willing to forego their consumption of local products in preference for imported goods. It shows 
that consumers’ preference for imported goods is high. On average, Nigerians prefer to consume 
imported clothes, shoes, electronics. This is suspected to be linked to the poor quality and lack of 
competitiveness of their locally made counterparts. This has, therefore, necessitated recent 
campaigns for ‘made in Nigeria’ products.  
The posterior estimate of the inverse elasticity of labour, 𝜑, is found to be greater than its prior 
mean. The inverse elasticity of labour shows the responsiveness of labour supply to changes in the 
wage rate. The elasticity of labour is low at 0.22 (this is calculated as 1/4.5). This depicts that the 
amount of labour supplied by Nigerian workers can be insensitive to changes in the wage rate. For 
instance, in spite of cuts in their salaries, many Nigerian workers consider the dire state of 















h Habit formation  Beta 0.70 0.86 0.799 0.919 
Sigma (𝜎) Inverse elasticity of 
substitution 
Normal 3.00 1.82 1.487 2.153 
Psi (𝜓) Share of non-
Ricardian household 
Beta 0.70 0.703 0.546 0.868 
alpha (𝛼) Degree of openness Beta 0.40 0.62 0.515 0.735 
Phi (𝜑) Inverse elasticity of 
labour  
Normal 4.38 4.50 1.189 7.717 
eta ( )  Elasticity of substn 
b/w home and foreign 
goods 
Gamma 11.42 11.44 9.812 13.026 
Theta ( )  Calvo Price Stickiness Beta 0.50 0.499 0.330 0.667 
 
B. Policy Parameters 
The policy parameters are those specified within the monetary policy rule and fiscal decision 
equations. They include the reactions of inflation, domestic output and exchange rate to changes 
in interest rate, the degree of rent-seeking and quality of political institutions specified in the fiscal 
policy equation. The result of the posterior mean of these parameters is presented in Table 5.2. 
The posterior estimate of the inflation coefficient in the Taylor-type monetary policy rule, (𝜐𝜋), is 
0.80 while the estimated value of the coefficients of output (𝜐𝑦) and exchange rate (𝜐𝑒𝑥𝑟) are 1.32 
and 0.54. The posterior means of the three parameters in the monetary policy rule differs from 
their respective prior mean. The implication of the estimated value of the monetary policy 
parameters shows that the Central Bank of Nigeria places greater weight on economic growth than 
on price stability and exchange rate stability. A broader outlook of the Central Bank of Nigeria on 
economic growth is related to the belief that the apex bank has extended its core mandates beyond 
price and exchange rate stability. The apex bank has also been concerned with development 
finance. Evidence of their interest in development finance includes intervention funds to boost the 




Bank of Nigeria also provided bailout funds to support states that experienced difficulty in 
payment of workers' salaries. Adebiyi and Mordi (2016) on the contrary, find that the Central Bank 
of Nigeria is primarily concerned with price stability. Another implication of the coefficient of 
Taylor rule reaction to inflation is interpreted in the sense of Leeper (1991). Monetary policy is 
active (passive) when the estimated value of the Taylor reaction to inflation, is greater (less) than 
one. The result observed from Table 5.2 shows that monetary policy took a passive stance over the 
sample period. Furthermore, the posterior value of the degree of interest rate smoothing (𝜌𝑟) shows 
that the lagged interest rate plays a significant role in determining the current interest rate. 
The posterior mean of the proxy for rent-seeking (𝝌) is estimated to be 0.21, which shows that 
only 21 percent of government revenue is generated for public spending, the remaining 79 percent 
are suspected to be wasted or misused for corrupt and self-interested activities spending. For 
instance, the Minister of Information, Lai Mohammed, commented that one third of the public 
funds stolen by former politicians and bureaucrats between 2006 and 2013, could have provided 
635.18 kilometres of road; built one ultra-modern hospital in each state of the Federation; erected 
183 schools; educated 3,974 children from primary school to University; and provided 20,062 
units of 2-bedroom houses, in order to ease accommodation. On the other hand, the posterior 
estimate of the quality of political institutions (𝜻) suggests, rather puzzlingly, the existence of 






















 5% 95% 
upsillon_pii 
(𝜐𝜋) 
Taylor feedback on 
Inflation 
Gamma 1.50 0.80 0.686 0.918 
upsillon_y 
(𝜐𝑦) 
Taylor feedback on 
Output 
Gamma 0.50 1.32 1.209 1.418 
upsillon_exr 
(𝜐𝑒) 
Taylor feedback on 
exchange rate 
Gamma 0.80 0.54 0.451 0.634 
rrho_r (𝜌𝑟) Interest rate 
smoothening 
Beta 0.70 0.86 0.840 0.889 
cchi (𝜒) Degree of rent- seeking Beta 0.50 0.21 0.126 0.277 
Zetta ( ) Quality of political 
institutions 
Beta 0.35 0.79 0.716 0.862 
 
C. Persistent Parameters  
Persistent parameters are coefficients of the lagged dependent variable in the autoregressive 
equations of order one, AR(1). The parameter values are expected to range between zero and one, 
such that the value at zero and one are interpreted respectively as non-persistence and persistent 
parameters. The degree of persistence of a parameter shows how long it takes for an economy to 
return to steady state after a perturbation. Parameters with a high persistence value (close to one) 
mean that the economy slowly adjusts to unexpected shocks, and, conversely for parameters with 
lower persistence values, the economy quickly returns to steady after an unexpected shock. 
The results on the estimates of the persistent parameters as reported in Table 5.3, shows that all 
the parameters of the AR(1) process are highly persistent. Furthermore, the posterior mean of the 
individual persistent parameters is higher than their prior mean. An implication of this finding is 
that it takes a prolonged time for the Nigerian economy to adjust to the shocks listed in Table 5.3. 
Therefore, when macroeconomic policies are implemented, the Nigerian economy adjusts slowly 














Symbol Description 5% 95% 
rrho_ystar 
(𝜌𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟) 
AR(1) of foreign 
output 
Beta 0.70 0.92 0.881 0.962 
rrho_a 
(𝜌𝑎) 
AR(1) of technology Beta 0.70 0.702 0.548 0.865 
rrho_piiD 
(𝜌𝑝𝑖𝑖𝐷) 
AR(1) of inflation 
shock 
Beta 0.70 0.701 0.543 0.867 
rrho_sr 
(𝜌𝑠𝑟) 
AR(1) of interest 
rate shock 






Beta 0.70 0.98 0.968 0.991 
rrho_sy 
(𝜌𝑠𝑦) 
AR(1) of output 
shock 
Beta 0.70 0.93 0.900 0.954 
rrho_srn 
(𝜌𝑠𝑟𝑛) 
AR(1) of shock to 
rent-seeking 
Beta 0.70 0.80 0.763 0.840 
 
D. Shock Parameters 
Table 5.4 present the posterior estimates of the shock parameters. The size of these parameters 
provides a measure of the volatility of individual shocks. Table 5.4 shows that output shocks is the 
most volatile, with a posterior mean of 0.68. The next volatile ones are the inflation and technology 
shocks with posterior estimates of 0.28 and 0.23, respectively. The least volatile shocks are those 
of government spending, interest rate, foreign output and rent-seeking with estimated means of 
0.07, 0.04, 0.03 and 0.03. It can then be deduced that output shock is the most volatile, that is, the 
most significant source of economic fluctuations to the Nigerian economy. On the other hand, 
























Foreign output Inverse 
Gamma 
0.25 0.03 0.0294 0.0298 
eps_a ( 𝑡
𝑎) Technology shock Inverse 
Gamma 







0.25 0.07 0.068 0.080 
eps_r ( 𝑡
𝑟) Interest rate shock Inverse 
Gamma 





Inflation shock Inverse 
Gamma 
0.25 0.28 0.054 0.487 
e_y ( 𝑡
𝑦
) Output shock Inverse 
Gamma 








0.25 0.03 0.029 0.038 
 
5.1.2    Impulse Response Analysis 
Impulse Response Analysis is considered in this subsection by using plots of the Impulse Response 
Function. The Impulse Response Function measures the reaction of endogenous variables to 
unexpected shocks of one standard deviation. In this study, the response of endogenous variables 
to monetary, fiscal, inflation and output shocks are examined. 
A. Monetary Policy Shock 
A monetary policy shock happens when the Central Bank unexpectedly alters the policy rate. The 
positive monetary policy shock, in Figure 5.1, causes the nominal interest rate to fall on impact. 
The monetary shock impacts negatively on domestic inflation for a duration of one quarter, before 
its quick return to the steady state. Domestic output also falls after a positive monetary policy 
shock from quarter one to quarter twenty. This finding negates the a priori expectation that in the 
face of an accommodative monetary policy, domestic inflation ought to rise. It should also be 
observed that government fiscal instrument does not respond to the monetary shock. This raises 





Figure 5.1: Impulse Response to Monetary Policy.  
Note: y- output; pii_D-inflation and r-nominal interest rate 
B. Fiscal Policy Shock 
A positive innovation to government spending caused government spending to increase from the 
first to the last quarter. Figure 5.2 shows that fiscal shock impacted negatively on domestic output 
from quarter one before it converged around the steady state in quarter 20. The negative impact of 
government spending on output is expected since the government is modelled to be involved in 
rent-seeking or wasteful public spending. At the same time the inflation level rise after the 
government spending shock. This implies that increased government spending induces upward 
inflationary trend, as proposed by the Monetarist arithmetic hypothesis and proponents of the 
Fiscal theory of price level. In response to tackling increased domestic inflation, the central bank 
responds by raising the nominal interest rate. An increase in the nominal interest rate from quarter 
one to seven can, therefore, be observed in Figure 5.2. However, from quarter 8 to 20, the nominal 
interest rate falls in response to the fiscal shock. The reaction of the nominal interest rate to the 
fiscal shock implies that from quarter 1 to 7, an unexpected increase in government spending that 
is, expansionary fiscal measure, triggered a contractionary monetary response. This indicates that 
fiscal and monetary policy interacted as substitutes over the short run, from quarter 1 to 7. 
Conversely from quarter 8 to quarter 20, nominal interest rate falls, that is an expansionary 
monetary action, in response to the positive fiscal shock. This reveals the complementary nature 




of Adegboye (2015) that fiscal and monetary policy acts as complements in the short term and act 
as substitutes in the medium term. 
 
Figure 5.2: Impulse Response to Fiscal Policy Shock  
Note: y- output; pii_D-inflation; r-nominal interest rate and g-government spending 
C. Output Shock 
From Figure 5.3, a positive output shock monotonically increased the level of domestic output into 
the horizon but reduced the price level and nominal interest rate. The reaction of the price level is 
expected because a rise in the level of output implies an increased production of goods and lower 
unemployment level, which means that household are earning an adequate income to demand 
goods and at the same time, aggregate supply is increasing, this will prevent demand-pull inflation. 
The reduction of the price level after an output shock is also intuitively backed by the Philip’s 
curve which depicts a trade-off between output and inflation. In addition, the Central Bank reduces 





Figure 5.3: Impulse Response to Output Shock 
Note: y- output; pii_D-inflation and r-nominal interest rate 
D. Shock to Rent seeking 
Shock to rent-seeking implies an increase in the amount of rent raised. A sudden rise in the amount 
of wasteful spending or amount of rent raised, as seen in Figure 5.4, impacted negatively on 
domestic output, over a period of three quarters by 0.12 percentage points before its return to the 
steady state level. This shows that rent-seeking activities have an initial adverse impact on 
domestic output. It shows that rent-seeking activities impact negatively on the Nigerian economy 
but the economy quickly adjusts to it. This means that the money being stolen and misused by 






Figure 5.4: Impulse Response of Shock to Rent-Seeking 
Note: y- output; pii_D-inflation; r-nominal interest rate; rn-rent seeking; g-government spending 
5.1.3 Variance Decomposition 
The variance decomposition method considers the relative contribution of individual shocks to 
fluctuations in an endogenous variable. The variance decomposition presents the percentage of 
variance of the error that arises from the shock of the variable due to itself and other variables over 
a specific time horizon. It is useful in measuring the importance of a shock as a source of volatility 
to a macroeconomic variable. The variance decomposition of output, inflation, interest rate, rent-
seeking and government spending are examined in this sub-section. 
From Table 5.7, it can be observed that interest rate and foreign output shocks contribute most to 
variations in output at 58.86 percent and 28.99 percent, respectively. Shocks to foreign inflation, 
foreign interest rate, tax, rent-seeking and output itself, also respectively accounted for fluctuations 




payment shock and inflation shock did not trigger any variation in domestic output. It is also 
observed that external shocks, that is, foreign inflation, foreign interest rate and foreign output are 
the main sources of volatility in domestic inflation at 16.82, 36.84 and 38.77 percent. On the other 
hand, domestic sources of shocks such as government spending, interest rate, tax, output and rent-
seeking accounted for lesser variations in domestic inflation at 0.05, 0.14, 0.54, 1.19, 5.65 percent, 
respectively. 
The result of the variance decomposition also reveals that foreign inflation and foreign interest rate 
are the main perturbations to the domestic interest rate. They contributed 29.07 and 61.95 percent 
to variations in the nominal interest rate. Other sources of shocks such as government spending, 
interest rate, foreign output, tax, output and rent-seeking account for 1.31, 0.13, 1.49, 0.82, 1.06 
and 4.16 percent volatility in the nominal interest rate. Domestic shocks, that is, government 
spending shocks and shocks to rent-seeking are the only contributor to the variations in 
government spending at 92.23 and 7.09 percent. The other form of shocks does not trigger 
fluctuations in government spending. At the same time, the volatility in rent-seeking is primarily 
explained by shocks to rent-seeking itself and tax revenue at 91.34 and 8.66 percent. The result 














Table 5.7: Posterior mean variance decomposition (percent) 
          
Model Diagnostic Testing 
The estimated model is a small-scale New Keynesian DSGE model with a system of 27 equations 
and 27 endogenous variables. The posterior moments of this model are computed by using the 
Metropolis-Hastings algorithm where 100,000 posterior draws of 5 parallel chains are generated, 
after the first 30,000 draws are discarded, in order to ensure convergence. In addition, the Monte-
Carlo based optimisation method is used to obtain the posterior mode. In this Section, therefore, 
the statistical validity of the estimated model is examined. This involves presenting graphs on the 
numerical optimisation of the posterior kernel and the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm, in order to 
detect problems or build confidence in the results of the estimated model. 
5.2.1   Stability of the Model 
This is about the existence and uniqueness of a solution to the adopted NK DSGE model. A 
solution exists when the number of equations equals the number of endogenous variables. In the 
case of this study, this condition is met such that there are 27 equations with 27 endogenous 
variables. The Blanchard-Kahn condition is also used to test for the existence of a unique solution 
to this model. The condition requires that the number of eigenvectors lying outside a unit root 
equals the number of forward-looking variables. The Blanchard-Kahn condition of the estimated 










Govt. Spending shock (eps_g) 
Interest Rate shock (eps_r) 
Foreign Output (eps_ystar) 
Foreign Inflation (eps_piistar) 
Foreign Interest rate 
(eps_rstar) 
Technology Shock (eps_a) 
Tax Shock (eps_taxx) 
Transfer payment shock 
(eps_TP) 
Inflation shock (e_piiD) 
Output shock (e_y) 






































































model is satisfied such that there are three eigenvalues larger than one in modulus as there are 
three forward-looking variables in the system. This depicts the existence of a unique solution for 
the estimated system of equations. 
5.2.2   Identification of the Parameter Estimates 
The estimated parameters of the model are expected to be identified by the observed data. This 
means that the observed data provide sufficient information about the parameters. The criterion 
used to gauge parameter identification is the distinctness between the prior and posterior 
distribution such that they are not the same. Identical prior and posterior distributions imply that 
the concerned parameter is only weakly identified and the data is uninformative. It can also mean 
in a converse manner that the data provides perfectly accurate information about the parameter. 
Tables 5.1 to 5.4 show that the prior values are different from the posterior values for most of the 
estimated parameters. This is also corroborated by the plots presented in Figures 5.5a, 5.5b and in 
Appendix nine, which shows that the prior distribution (grey line) is distinct from the posterior 
distribution (black line) for most of the parameters.  
Furthermore, the plots of posterior distribution (black curve) possess a near normal shape while, 
at the same time, the mode computed from the numerical optimization of the posterior kernel 
(green vertical line) is seen to be close to the peak of the posterior distribution (black curve). These 











Figure 5.5b: Prior-Posterior Plots 
5.2.3   Mode Check  
The accuracy of the Monte-Carlo based optimisation routine used in computing the posterior mode 
is inspected using the mode check plots. The computed mode (green line) should ideally be located 
at the maximum of the posterior likelihood (blue line) for each parameter. There are possible 
problems with the optimization routine if this is not the case. The mode plots presented in Figure 
5.6 show that the estimated mode (green line) is close to the maximum of the posterior likelihood 
(blue line). The implication is that the optimiser was able to compute a robust maximum for the 
posterior mode. The deviations between the red line (posterior mode) and the blue line (likelihood 




















5.2.4   Univariate Convergence Statistics 
This is the Brooks and Gelman (1998) test used to monitor the convergence of the Metropolis-
Hastings simulations. It requires that the iterations between and within the five distinct parallel 
chains are close and similar for the moments of individual parameters. The existence of 
convergence of the MH simulations can be assessed by observing the graphical output produced 
by Dynare. In each graph, the red line (within chain) and the blue line (between chain) should be 
close and stabilise horizontally for the moments, that is, the mean, variance and third moment of 
each estimated parameter. Figures 5.7a, b and Appendix two presents the result of the Monte Carlo 
Markov Chains (MCMC) univariate diagnostics and shows convergence, that is, the red and blue 
lines converge and are relatively stable, for most of the parameters. Grifolli (2013) highlights the 
convergence and stability property of the Metropolis-Hastings iterations as the primary avenue to 
justify the sensibility of the estimation results. This, therefore, implies that the estimated results in 
this study are sensible. 
 





Figure 5.7b: MCMC Univariate Diagnostics for selected parameters 
5.2.5   Multivariate Convergence Diagnostic 
This statistic is a measure of the overall convergence of the aggregate parameters in the model. 
Just as in the case of the univariate statistics, it is also expected that the simulations within the 
chains should be similar and that those between the chains should be close, for convergence to be 
reached. Figure 5.8 shows that the multivariate convergence for this model exists such that the red 





Figure 5.8: Multivariate Convergence Diagnostic 
5.2.6  Historical and Smoothed variables 
The historical and smoothed variable graphs of the observed data are used to detect the presence 
of measurement errors in the estimated model. Measurement errors are absent when the actual data 
and the smoothed data are identical. The plot of the historical and smoothed variable displayed in 
Figure 5.9 shows the dotted black line (historical data) and the red line (smoothed data) overlap 





Figure 5.9: Historical and Smoothed variables 
5.2.7  Smoothed Shocks  
The plot of the smoothed estimated shocks is expected to centre around zero. Figure 5.10 shows 
that the smoothed shocks processes are around zero. This is an indication of the statistical validity 










Figure 5.10: Smoothed Shocks 
5.3   Nature of Fiscal and Monetary Policy Interactions 
In this sub-section, the interactions between fiscal and monetary policy are characterised. This 
encompassed obtaining the direction and magnitude of the correlation between both policies. The 
impact of the policy interactions on macroeconomic variables such as output and inflation are also 
examined. To this end, numerical simulations are conducted using the First order Taylor 
approximation method on the system of log-linear equations. The Dynare software is used to carry 




of covariance of shocks. It proves the existence of no serial correlations among the shocks. Tables 
5.9 and 5.10 present the theoretical moments and the coefficient of autocorrelation. These statistics 
are relevant to inspect the results of the numerical simulation. 
Table 5.8: Matrix of Covariance of Shocks 
Shocks eps_g eps_r e_piiD e_y eps_rn eps_com 
eps_g 0.010000      
eps_r  0.000000 0.010000     
e_piiD  0.000000  0.000000 0.010000    
e_y  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 0.010000   
eps_rn  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 0.010000   
eps_com  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 0.010000 
Where, eps_g: Government spending shock; eps_r: Interest rate shock; e_piiD: Inflation shock; 
e_y: Output shock; eps_rn: Shock to rent-seeking and eps_com: Shock to Interaction variable 
 








































































Table 5.10: Coefficient of Autocorrelation 
Variable  Definition 1 2 3 4 5 
Y Output 0.6005 0.3790 0.2407 0.1528 0.0964 
pii_D   Inflation 0.0464 0.0293 0.0202  0.0151 0.0116 
R Interest rate 0.8281  0.6439 0.4884 0.3659  0.2721 
G Government 
spending 
0.8132   0.6032 0.4324 0.3057 0.2149 
Ytilde Output gap 0.0219 0.0156 0.0098  0.0069 0.0051 
Rn Rent seeking 0.8264 0.6164  0.4429 0.3134  0.2204 
v_com   Interaction 
variable 
0.7701 0.5464  0.3753 0.2541 0.1708 
 
The nature of interdependence between fiscal and monetary policy is found from the direction and 
magnitude of the correlation between both policy variables. The correlation matrix presented in 
Table 5.11, obtained from the dynamic simulation of the NK DSGE model, reveals a strong but 
negative correlation between fiscal and monetary policy. This shows that both policies are strong 
substitutes. The result negates that of Chuku (2010) who conclude that fiscal and monetary policy 
act as weak substitutes. The Impulse Response function obtained from the Bayesian estimation as 
presented in Figure 5.2 also corroborates the findings of the correlation matrix. It is such that, 
although, fiscal and monetary policy acted as substitutes from period 1 to 7 and as complements 
from period 8 to 20, the magnitude of the negative interactions between both policies may have 
outweighed their complementary interactions. In an overall manner, over the sample period, both 
fiscal and monetary policies interacted, therefore, as strong substitutes. This implies that when the 
fiscal (monetary) policymaker implements the expansionary measure, the monetary (fiscal) 










Table 5.11: Correlation Matrix: Interest rate and government spending 
Variables Nominal Interest Rate (r) Government Spending (g) 
Nominal Interest Rate (r) 1.0000 -0.7727 
Government Spending (g) -0.7727 1.0000 
 
The effect of the policy interactions on output and inflation are also discussed by examining the 
effect of nominal interest rate, government spending and a common interaction variable. The 
interaction variable is obtained by an additive function of both interest rate and government 
spending. It is used to approximate the existing interactions between both fiscal and monetary 
policies. Table 5.12 presents result that shows monetary policy has a positive correlation with 
output and inflation, while government spending negatively correlates with both macroeconomic 
variables, that is, output and inflation rate. The common interaction variable is also seen to impact 
negatively on both output and inflation. 













1.0000     
Government 
Spending (g) 
-0.7727 1.0000    
Interaction 
Variable(v_com) 
-0.7727  0.9677 1.0000   
Output (y) 0.4461  -0.3957  -0.3273 1.0000   







5.4   Optimal Fiscal and Monetary Policy 
In this Section, the optimal Ramsey and discretionary paths of fiscal and monetary policy are 
numerically investigated. The optimal fiscal and monetary policy is defined as the path of 
government spending and nominal interest rates that minimise the welfare loss of the policymaker 
given the constraints posed by the structural equations of the small open economy. The welfare 
function of the policymaker is such that both policy makers jointly desire to minimise the 
deviations of actual values of inflation, output and government spending from their target values. 
The implication of various assumptions on the behaviour of fiscal policy such as rent-seeking, 
benevolent, commitment and discretionary, on the optimal paths are specifically examined. 
The moments of the optimal policies under different assumptions are presented in Table 5.13. The 
moments are computed from dynamic simulations, specifically using the Linear Quadratic method. 
The Linear Quadratic approach takes a first-order Taylor approximation to the constraint equations 
and a quadratic approximation to the objective function. To this end, Dynare 4.5.1 routines on 

















Table 5.13: Moments of Optimal Fiscal and Monetary Policy 
A. Ramsey with Benevolent Fiscal Policy (Benchmark) 
Variable Standard 
deviation 
Autocorrelation Welfare Loss 
Government Spending 
 








B. Ramsey with Rent seeking Fiscal Policy 
Variable Standard 
deviation 
Autocorrelation Welfare Loss 
Government Spending 
 











C. Discretionary with Benevolent Fiscal Policy 
Variable Standard 
deviation 

















D. Discretionary with Rent seeking Fiscal Policy 



















The Ramsey outcomes show the dynamic properties of optimal policy when policymakers commit 
to specified rules for current and future dates. In the benchmark model, government spending and 
interest rates are 13.8 and 3.4 percentage points volatile. Government spending is also found to be 
more persistent than the nominal interest rate. Furthermore, the welfare loss is 0.176. In 
comparison with the other models (B, C and D), the Ramsey policy with the benevolent 
government has the least volatile paths for both fiscal and monetary policy instruments. It can then 




optimal policies are more volatile in models with rent-seeking assumptions. This implies that the 
rent-seeking tendencies of government can be a source of volatility. It can also be deduced from 
the table that the discretionary form of policy has a trivial impact on the sequence of optimal fiscal 
and monetary policy. 
Furthermore, the value of the loss function of the policymakers at 0.806 is higher in models with 
rent-seeking assumptions than in the model with benevolent government at 0.176 and 0.179. This 
means model economies with rent-seeking tendencies are more welfare-reducing than those of 
economies with a benevolent government. In summary, the benchmark model, that is, Ramsey 
Policy with benevolent government has the most desirable path for optimal fiscal and monetary 
policy. An economic implication of this result is that the Nigerian government ought to commit to 
policy rules and should implement policies that are expected to maximise economic welfare for 
all, not just a subset of its citizens. 
5.5  Implication of Findings 
A New Keynesian DSGE model has been simulated and estimated in this chapter using Dynare 
codes. The model is a system of 27 equations with 27 endogenous variables and coincidentally, 
27 parameters were calibrated to mimic the Nigerian economy. 
The main results obtained from this study include: 
(1) The parameter value of the reaction of inflation to the changes in interest rate (υπ) is less than 
one, while the reaction of output to the Taylor rule (υy) has a higher magnitude. This indicates the 
existence of a passive monetary policy such that the Central Bank has to adjust its policy decisions 
to suit fiscal behaviour. The second implication of this result is that the Central Bank has not been 
primarily implementing policies for price stability, but for output stability. 
(2) The parameter value of the degree of rent-seeking (𝜒) suggests that only a trivial proportion of 
government expenditure was actually expended for welfare-enhancing projects, the remainder is 
suspected to have been wasted, misused or stolen. 
(3) The study also found that both fiscal and monetary policies act as strong substitutes. This means 




using contractionary policy. This contrasts with Chuku (2010) who used the Markov-switching 
model and find that fiscal and monetary policy act as weak substitutes 
(4) The common variable that explicitly captures the interaction between fiscal policy and 
monetary policy shows that the joint process of both policies has a weak but negative effect on 
output and inflation. This result can be interpreted in two ways. The first implication is that actual 
policy implementation in Nigeria that captures the rent seeking and discretionary nature of the 
federal government coupled with existing weak policy coordination, have sub-optimal impact on 
the Nigerian economy. The result also shows on the other hand, that stabilisation policies may be 
inadequate in influencing the outcomes of output and inflation in Nigeria. 
(5) The optimal fiscal and monetary policy are characterised by a regime where the fiscal policy 
maker is benevolent and commits to a policy rule while the Central Bank commits to its monetary 
policy rule. Rent seeking activities considerably reduces welfare by over 357 percent when 
compared with the welfare loss from a benevolent government. Therefore, rent- seeking activities 




















CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION    
6.1       Summary 
The renewed interest of policymakers in implementing fiscal measures towards economic 
stabilisation, in the aftermath of the 2008/2009 global financial crisis, has sparked attention on the 
issue of fiscal and monetary policy interactions. In Nigeria, policymakers are also concerned about 
the alignment of fiscal and monetary policy coupled with a consistent policy design. Chuku (2010); 
Musa et al., (2013) and Adeboye (2015) have investigated the interactions between fiscal and 
monetary policy in Nigeria. However, existing evidence on government's fiscal behaviour shows 
that conventional assumptions such as benevolent spending, rule-based fiscal process and policy 
coordination, should be modified in line with the political economy literature (Fragetta and 
Kirsanova, 2010; Dimakou, 2015; Miller, 2016). This study, therefore, argued that the rent-seeking 
tendency of fiscal policymakers, the discretionary power of government and weak policy 
coordination have implications in accounting for the interaction between fiscal and monetary 
policies. 
Following this background, the study sought to examine fiscal and monetary policy interaction 
under alternative assumptions of a rent-seeking government that follows discretionary policies and 
where no economic policy coordination exists. Its specific objectives were to assess the nature of 
fiscal policy interactions with monetary policy in Nigeria; examine the transmission effect of the 
policy interactions on output and inflation and investigate the optimal fiscal and monetary policy 
mix that guarantees economic stability in Nigeria. To this end, the study tested the null hypotheses 
that include: (1) Fiscal policy has no interaction with monetary policy in Nigeria; (2) There is no 




optimal fiscal and monetary policy mix for output and inflation stability in Nigeria over the 
quarterly period of 1961Q1 to 2016Q4. 
The study hinged on the New Keynesian School of economic thought. The New Keynesian model 
maintains traditional Keynesian postulations such as imperfect competition and sticky prices. In 
addition, they propose the use of micro-founded models that assume forward-looking and 
optimising economic agents. The study, to this end, adopted the use of a New Keynesian dynamic 
general equilibrium model. Features such as habit formation, Non-Ricardian households and a 
discretionary rent seeking fiscal behaviour were added to the canonical New Keynesian Dynamic 
Stochastic General Equilibrium model, in order to adapt the model to the Nigerian economy.  
To achieve the three specific objectives of the study, the Bayesian estimation method was used. In 
addition to it, numeric simulations based on log-linear Taylor approximation method and the linear 
quadratic technique were adopted. The Bayesian method was used to test the quarterly empirical 
data on Nigeria and the United States, over the period 1961Q1 to 2016Q4 on relevant 
macroeconomic policy variables. The relevant variables include the Real Gross Domestic Product, 
Consumer Price Index, Terms of trade, Nominal interest rate, Government Expenditure. Also, the 
Real Gross Domestic Product (RGDP) series for the United States was used as proxy for the 
foreign economy. 
The Bayesian method was employed to estimate the New Keynesian Dynamic Stochastic General 
Equilibrium model. Numerical simulations were also used to empirically characterise the nature 
of policy interactions and measure the effect of this interaction on output and inflation. The 
dynamic simulation essentially the linear quadratic approach to Ramsey and discretionary optimal 
policy was used to obtain the optimal paths of both the fiscal and monetary policy. Answers found 
using the estimation and simulation techniques established the significance of the study. Therefore, 
the study was able to characterise the interrelation between both fiscal and monetary policies. 
Secondly, it was able to identify the transmission effects of fiscal actions on monetary policy and 
the aggregate economy. Consequently, this study was novel in testing the implication of alternative 
assumptions for fiscal-monetary policy interactions. Secondly, the study was also novel in 





6.2   Major Findings of the Study  
Chapters 3 and 5 are the primary source of findings in this study. Using the requisite descriptive 
statistics, the stylised facts established among other facts, that there is positive correlation between 
fiscal and monetary policy. It also found that there are indications for rent-seeking in Nigeria. In 
addition, fiscal and monetary policies were seen to have been weakly coordinated in Nigeria and 
finally, it found evidence of discretionary fiscal policy in Nigeria. The study also presented 
relevant estimation and simulation results. The Bayesian estimation method and numerical 
simulations were used to answer the first research question ‘To what extent does fiscal policy 
interacts with monetary policy in Nigeria?’ The results show, contrary to findings of the stylised 
facts that fiscal policy correlates strongly but negatively with monetary policy in Nigeria.  
A numeric simulation using the log-linearisation method was used to answer the second research 
question ‘What is the transmission effect of the policy interaction on output and inflation in 
Nigeria?’ To answer this question, a common interaction variable was constructed to explicitly 
capture fiscal-monetary policy interactions. The study found out that the joint process of both 
policies had a weak but negative effect on output and inflation. Finally, a dynamic simulation 
applying the Linear Quadratic approximation method was employed to address the third research 
question ‘How should fiscal and monetary policy be optimally combined for output and inflation 
stability in Nigeria?’ The result showed that the optimal fiscal and monetary policy is characterised 
by a regime where the fiscal policy maker is benevolent and commits to a policy rule while the 
Central Bank commits to its monetary policy rule. Other major results from the study shows that 
the parameter value of the reaction of inflation to the changes in interest rate is less than one, while 
the reaction of output to the Taylor rule has a higher magnitude. Furthermore, a low parameter 
value for the degree of rent-seeking suggests a high rate of rent-seeking among politicians and 
bureaucrats. 
6.3 Recommendations 
To reiterate the main findings: Firstly, there is a strong and negative correlation between fiscal and 
monetary policy; secondly, joint policy interaction has a weak but negative effect on the 




benevolent government commits to policy rule and where the central bank also commits to its 
Taylor rule. 
A political economic implication of the strong and negative correlation between fiscal and 
monetary policies means that both fiscal policy and monetary policy act as strong substitutes. This 
indicates that when one policymaker implements an expansionary measure, the other counters this 
action using contractionary policy. It, therefore, implies that policymakers have in the past, 
implemented conflicting and uncoordinated fiscal and monetary measures. This can be a potential 
source of instability to the economy. This conflicting form of policy implementation occurred in 
the divergent response of the Federal Government and the Central Bank to the recent recessionary 
episode in 2016. In this instance, the Federal Government adopted an easy fiscal stance by 
increasing the amount of budget deficit, while, the Central Bank of Nigeria tightened its monetary 
stance by raising the Monetary Policy Rate. 
The negative effect of the joint policy interaction on inflation and output implies that the overall 
impact of policy interaction negatively affects both long run and short run economic outcomes. Its 
weak effect also signals that actual policy implementation in Nigeria that captures the rent-seeking 
and discretionary nature of the federal government coupled with existing weak policy 
coordination, have sub-optimal impact on the Nigerian economy. Furthermore, the result shows 
that asides stabilisation policies, other measures such as structural policies are, therefore, suspected 
to significantly account for the outcomes in output and inflation. These structural policies include 
but are not limited to trade policy and financial policy. The result on the optimal fiscal-monetary 
combination points out that politicians and bureaucrats in government should take caution on 
policy reversals by committing to policy rules and at the same time, should implement policies 
that enhance the welfare of the entire citizens, not just a subset of the citizens.  
 
Furthermore, the parameter estimates of the coefficients in the Taylor rule indicate the existence 
of a passive monetary policy regime. It means that the Central Bank has to adjust its policy 
decisions to suit government's fiscal decisions. The second implication of this result is that the 
Central Bank has not primarily implemented policies for price stability, but for output stability. 
This may also be viewed from the perspective that the Central Bank of Nigeria may not have 




The economic implication of the high degree of rent-seeking among politicians and bureaucrats is 
that only a trivial proportion of government expenditure is actually expended for welfare-
enhancing projects, the remainder is wasted, misused or stolen. For instance, the Minister of 
Information, Lai Mohammed, argued that a sizeable proportion of stolen public funds by former 
politicians and bureaucrats between 2006 and 2013, could have provided 635.18 kilometres of 
road; built thirty-six ultra-modern hospitals; erected 183 schools; educated 3,974 children from 
primary school to University; and provided 20,062 units of 2-bedroom houses, in order to ease 
accommodation. 
Based on the implications of the major findings of this study, it is necessary that political economy 
scholars and the government consider the following measures: 
a. The Central Bank of Nigeria and Federal Ministry of Finance can improve existing 
coordination mechanisms using evidence-based planning and forecasting through the 
adoption of sophisticated economic models such as the Dynamic Stochastic General 
Models. 
b. In relation to (a), the Central Bank of Nigeria and Federal Ministry of Finance can 
harmonise their policy decisions by mutually adopting the same economic model and/ or 
assumptions to guide the planning and forecasting of their target values. 
c. The results show that stabilisation policies, that is, fiscal and monetary policy are 
inadequate towards guiding the macroeconomy. These policies ought to be complemented 
with structural policies such as trade policy and financial policy. A study considering and 
comparing the impact of each variant of policy is, therefore, suggested 
d. Politicians, bureaucrats and legislators alike, should evaluate policies using evidence-based 
models before deciding on policy reversals. Moreover, more effective and non-partisan 










6.4   Contributions to Knowledge 
It is worthy of note that this study contributed to knowledge, by filling the following research gaps: 
Firstly, the study explicitly modelled alternative fiscal assumptions within a DSGE model for 
Nigeria. This is important to reflect the political economic reality of policymaking and then, 
explore how it affects the interaction between fiscal and monetary policy. This meant that the study 
adopted a political economy approach to economic policymaking. Secondly, the study constructed 
a common variable in order to explicitly measure the joint processes of fiscal and monetary policy 
interactions. This is to enable the measurement of the transmitted effect of policy interaction on 
both inflation and output. 
In another dimension, the study also contributed to knowledge by adding to the relatively 
unexplored literature on fiscal-monetary policy interaction in Nigeria, especially within the context 
of modelling the fiscal behaviour of government using realistic assumptions and the application of 
the Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium framework in a Small Open economy environment. 
6.5    Suggestions for Further Research 
In a political economy environment typified by rent-seeking, a discretionary pattern of policy 
actions and weak policy coordination, it is expected that these factors will be relevant in altering 
the overall impact of macroeconomic policies. In line with this, some parameter estimates in this 
study were somewhat inconsistent with Adegboye (2015), who consider fiscal-monetary policy 
interactions under the conventional assumptions. Future studies can, therefore, compare the results 
of policy interaction, using both diverging conventional and alternative assumptions. Secondly, 
since both fiscal and monetary policies are found to have a weak effect on the economy, future 
studies can investigate and compare the magnitude of structuralist policies vis-a-vis stabilisation 
policies.  
Moreover, subsequent research can examine Markov-switching fiscal and monetary policies. This 
captures richer dynamics in the behaviour of these policies since it shows that policy parameters 
are not constant over a horizon but can vary over time. Furthermore, the Linear Quadratic method 
finds zero mean values for variables, therefore, the actual values of optimal policy variables cannot 
be measured. Hence, subsequent studies can consider optimal fiscal and monetary policy using a 




also examine the interactions between fiscal and monetary policies using data for the sub-national 
government such as states in the Nigerian Federation. This is because the fiscal decisions of state 
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Appendix Three: Dynare Code for Bayesian Estimation 
 
var CR CNR C y pii_D mc s r exr g ytilde pii_F ystar piistar rstar a taxx w NNR TP rn 
pii s_piiD s_r s_y s_g s_rn; 
 
varexo eps_g eps_r eps_ystar eps_piistar eps_rstar eps_a eps_taxx eps_TP e_piiD e_y 
eps_rn; 
 
parameters h sigmma pssi alphha omegga betta phii rrho_r rrho_ystar rrho_piistar 
rrho_rstar rrho_a rrho_taxx rrho_TP cchi zetta gamarr etta thetta upssilon_pii 
upssilon_y upssilon_exr kapa_alphha sigmma_alphha paw patp rrho_rn rrho_piiD rrho_sr 









































































var eps_ystar=0.01;  
var eps_piistar=0.01;  
var eps_rstar=0.01;  
var eps_a=0.01;  










h, beta_pdf, 0.7, 0.1; 
sigmma, normal_pdf, 3.0, 1; 
pssi, beta_pdf, 0.7, 0.1; 
alphha, beta_pdf, 0.4, 0.1; 
phii, normal_pdf, 4.38, 2; 
rrho_r, beta_pdf, 0.7, 0.1 ; 
rrho_ystar, beta_pdf, 0.7, 0.1; 
rrho_a, beta_pdf, 0.7, 0.1; 
rrho_piiD, beta_pdf, 0.7, 0.1; 
rrho_sr, beta_pdf, 0.7, 0.1; 
rrho_sg, beta_pdf, 0.7, 0.1; 
rrho_sy, beta_pdf, 0.7, 0.1; 
rrho_srn, beta_pdf, 0.7, 0.1; 
upssilon_pii, gamma_pdf, 1.5, 0.2; 
upssilon_y, gamma_pdf, 0.5, 0.1; 
upssilon_exr, gamma_pdf, 0.8, 0.1; 
cchi, beta_pdf, 0.5, 0.1; 
zetta, beta_pdf, 0.35, 0.1; 
etta, gamma_pdf, 11.42, 1; 
thetta, beta_pdf, 0.5, 0.1; 
stderr eps_ystar, inv_gamma_pdf, 0.25, inf; 
stderr eps_a, inv_gamma_pdf, 0.25, inf; 
stderr eps_g, inv_gamma_pdf, 0.25, inf; 
stderr eps_r, inv_gamma_pdf, 0.25, inf; 
stderr e_piiD, inv_gamma_pdf, 0.25, inf; 
stderr e_y, inv_gamma_pdf, 0.25, inf; 









































Appendix Four: Dynare Code for Optimal Ramsey and Benevolent Government 
var pii_D ytilde r g r_nat a ystar; 
 
 
varexo eps_ytilde eps_g eps_ystar eps_a eps_piiD; 
 
parameters betta sigmma alphha thetta phii etta gamarr rrho_ystar 
rrho_a pssi lambda1 lambda2 sigmma_alphha kapa_alphha rrho_sytilde 



























//1.Open economy NK Philips curve 
pii_D=betta*pii_D(+1)+kapa_alphha*ytilde+eps_piiD; 
 
//2. Open economy Dynamic IS Curve 
ytilde=ytilde(+1)-(1/sigmma_alphha)*(r-pii_D(+1)-r_nat)+eps_ytilde; 
r_nat= -sigmma_alphha*gamarr*(1-rrho_a)*a + 
alphha*sigmma_alphha*(thetta+pssi)*(ystar(+1)-ystar); 
a=rrho_a*a(-1)+eps_a; 
ystar= rrho_ystar*ystar(-1) + eps_ystar; 
 










var eps_ytilde;  
stderr 0.01; 
































Appendix Five: Dynare Code for Optimal Ramsey and Rent-seeking Government 
var pii_D ytilde r g taxx r_nat a ystar rn ; 
 
varexo eps_ytilde eps_g eps_taxx eps_ystar eps_a eps_piiD; 
 
parameters betta zetta cchi sigmma alphha thetta phii etta gamarr 
rrho_taxx rrho_ystar rrho_a pssi lambda1 lambda2 sigmma_alphha 




























//1.Open economy NK Philips curve 
pii_D=betta*pii_D(+1)+kapa_alphha*ytilde+eps_piiD; 
 
//2. Open economy Dynamic IS Curve 
ytilde=ytilde(+1)-(1/sigmma_alphha)*(r-pii_D(+1)-r_nat)+eps_ytilde; 
r_nat= -sigmma_alphha*gamarr*(1-rrho_a)*a + 
alphha*sigmma_alphha*(thetta+pssi)*(ystar(+1)-ystar); 
a=rrho_a*a(-1)+eps_a; 
ystar= rrho_ystar*ystar(-1) + eps_ystar; 
 












var eps_ytilde;  
stderr 0.01; 
































Appendix Six: Dynare Code for Optimal Discretionary and Benevolent Government 
var pii_D ytilde r g r_nat a ystar ; 
 
varexo eps_ytilde eps_g eps_ystar eps_a eps_piiD; 
 
parameters betta sigmma alphha thetta phii etta gamarr rrho_ystar 
rrho_a pssi lambda1 lambda2 sigmma_alphha kapa_alphha rrho_sytilde 



























//1.Open economy NK Philips curve 
pii_D=betta*pii_D(+1)+kapa_alphha*ytilde+eps_piiD; 
 
//2. Open economy Dynamic IS Curve 
ytilde=ytilde(+1)-(1/sigmma_alphha)*(r-pii_D(+1)-r_nat)+eps_ytilde; 
r_nat= -sigmma_alphha*gamarr*(1-rrho_a)*a + 
alphha*sigmma_alphha*(thetta+pssi)*(ystar(+1)-ystar); 
a=rrho_a*a(-1)+eps_a; 
ystar= rrho_ystar*ystar(-1) + eps_ystar; 
 










var eps_ytilde;  
stderr 0.01; 

































Appendix Seven: Dynare Code for Optimal Discretionary and Rent-seeking Government 
var pii_D ytilde r g taxx r_nat a ystar rn ; 
 
varexo eps_ytilde eps_g eps_taxx eps_ystar eps_a eps_piiD; 
 
parameters betta zetta cchi sigmma alphha thetta phii etta gamarr 
rrho_taxx rrho_ystar rrho_a pssi lambda1 lambda2 sigmma_alphha 




























//1.Open economy NK Philips curve 
pii_D=betta*pii_D(+1)+kapa_alphha*ytilde+eps_piiD; 
 
//2. Open economy Dynamic IS Curve 
ytilde=ytilde(+1)-(1/sigmma_alphha)*(r-pii_D(+1)-r_nat)+eps_ytilde; 
r_nat= -sigmma_alphha*gamarr*(1-rrho_a)*a + 
alphha*sigmma_alphha*(thetta+pssi)*(ystar(+1)-ystar); 
a=rrho_a*a(-1)+eps_a; 
ystar= rrho_ystar*ystar(-1) + eps_ystar; 
 









var eps_ytilde;  
stderr 0.01; 





































Appendix Eight: Derivation of the optimal pricing equation for the firm 
Max Et ∑ (βθ)
k∞
k=0 Et,t+k Yt+k|t [𝑃𝑡
∗ − mct+k|t]             (1) 
Subject to 






𝑌𝑡+𝑘                (2) 
Substitute equation (2) into (1): 
Max Et ∑ (βθ)
k∞







∗ −  mct+k|t]            (3) 
After expanding the bracket, this leads to: 
Max Et ∑ (βθ)
k∞
k=0 Et,t+k Yt+k [(𝑃𝑡+𝑘)
𝜀(𝑃𝑡
∗)1−ε −  (𝑃𝑡+𝑘)
𝜀(𝑃𝑡
∗)−ε mct+k|t]         (4) 
The first order condition on (𝑃𝑡
∗) is obtained as: 
Et ∑ (βθ)
k∞







k=0 Et,t+k Yt+k (𝑃𝑡+𝑘)
𝜀 mct+k|t      
                             (5) 
Equation (5) can be re-written as: 
0 = Et ∑ (βθ)
k∞




 mct+k|t]            (6) 















] = 0 
∑ (βθ)k Et 
∞







 MCt+k|tπt−1,t+k] = 0          (7) 
The first order Taylor expansion at the zero-inflation steady state yields the optimal pricing 
equation of the resetting firm: 
𝑃𝑡
∗ − 𝑃𝑡−1 = 1 − βθ ∑ (βθ)
k Et 
∞




Where mct+k|t̂ =  mct+k|t − mc 
Equation (8) can be re-arranged and re-written as: 
𝑃𝑡
∗ = 𝜇 + (1 − βθ) ∑ (βθ)k Et 
∞
k=0 [mct+k|t + 𝑃𝑡+𝑘]                  (9) 
Where, 
𝜇 = −𝑚𝑐 ≡ log
− 1
 
From equation (9), it can be deduced that firms set a price according to the desired mark-up over 






















Appendix Nine: Prior-Posterior Plot 
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